Monthly Forecast April 2013

The central issue facing the Council is the configuration of the new UN special political mission. One important aspect will be determining the mandate in relation to the division of labour among the UN, AU and the government.

With the anticipated expansion of the UN presence within Somalia, the Council’s request for the establishment of an

AMISOM guard force for the protection of international staff takes on added urgency.

Another key issue is the impact of the partial lifting of the arms embargo and whether the safeguards envisaged in

resolution 2093 will be sufficient in terms of ensuring that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

The main option for the Council is to mandate a new special political mission for Somalia based on the Secretary-General’s expected recommendations, to be deployed by 3 June as previously outlined in resolution 2093.

Alternatively, depending on the results of the TAM and the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Council may decide to delay deployment of the new UN mission pending the presence of appropriate security conditions within Somalia.

A further option for the Council is to send a visiting mission to Mogadishu in response to the invitation issued by For-

eign Minister Fauzia Yusuf Haji Adan on 14 February.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Although resolution 2093 passed unanimously, there nonetheless seems to be underlying divisions among Council mem- bers, particularly regarding the arms embargo. The resolution represents a compromise between those who wanted a more comprehensive lifting of the arms embargo (the US) and those who opposed any modification.

The structure of the future UN mission in Somalia has also been a contentious issue. The US had advocated keeping UN Support Office for AMISOM separate, but apparently conceded on this particular point during negotiations. Concerned about the politicisation of aid delivery, humanitarian agencies opposed the structural integration of the UN country team, which under resolution 2093 will be phased in by January 2014. (The government of Somalia had requested a unified UN presence within Somalia.) An upcoming donor conference on 7 May in London may provide additional urgency to the Council’s consideration of a resolution regarding the future UN mission.

Somalia has been increasingly asserting its sovereignty, while it has also requested the UN to end its bunker mentality and expand its presence throughout the country. Meanwhile, as the UN is anticipating taking on a larger peacebuilding role, the AU has officially expressed its intention to expand the scope of AMISOM’s work. Tensions regarding the precise division of labour among the UN, the AU and the Somali government may become more pronounced.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, while the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee.

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolution

S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia.

S/2013/69 (31 January 2013) was the latest regular report on Somalia.

S/PV.6929 (6 March 2013) concerned the re-authorisation of AMISOM.

S/2013/134 (5 March 2013) was from the Secretary-General and included the AU strategic review and communiqué regarding AMISOM. S/2013/94 (14 February 2013) was from the Secretary-General and included a joint statement with the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania).

Size and Composition of AMISOM Current strength as of 25 January: 17,709 total uniformed personnel. The main troop contributors

are Burundi (5,432 troops), Kenya (4,652 troops), Uganda (6,223 troops) and Djibouti (960 troops).

Special Representative of the AU and Head of AMISOM Mahamat Salah Annadif (Chad).


Western Sahara


Expected Council Action

In April, the Council expects a briefing in consultations on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MIN- URSO) by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of MINURSO. The Sec- retary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, is also likely to brief the Council.

A likely outcome is the adoption of a resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate—which expires on 30 April 2013—for

another 12 months.

Ross last briefed the Council on the status of negotiations on Western Sahara in consultations on 28 November 2012, fol- lowing which there was no outcome. Weisbrod-Weber also made a statement. Ross focused primarily on his trip to North Africa from 25 October to 11 November—which included meetings with King Mohammed of Morocco and Mohamed Abdelaziz, the Secretary-General of the Polisario Front (in Algeria)—in addition to meetings in Madrid and Paris on 12-15

November. The trip resulted in an agreement on a “shuttle diplomacy” approach to the negotiating process, reminiscent of that undertaken by then Personal Envoy James A. Baker III in 1997, comprising regular visits to Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara.

From 28 January to 15 February, Ross continued his tour of members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) aimed at building international support for the negotiations, visiting Wash- ington DC and Moscow, in addition to Germany and Switzerland.

The next step in the shuttle diplomacy began on 20 March and was scheduled to end on 3 April, with the aim of prepar- ing for the subsequent phase in the negotiating process and a possible resumption of direct talks by mid-2013. Ross has held discussions with Morocco and the Polisario Front and visited Western Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania. Ross may also consider visiting Libya and Tunisia at a later stage, to explore further options for regional engagement and support for the negotiating process, as well as to discuss concerns about the heightened risks of instability and insecurity in the Sahel.

On 15 March, the Group of Friends issued a joint statement, welcoming the upcoming trip and expressing their sup- port for the mediation efforts undertaken by Ross. The statement also encouraged the parties to show flexibility in their engagement with the Personal Envoy and each other, in the hopes of ending the current impasse and achieving progress towards a political solution.

There have been some improvements in the situation since the adoption of resolution 2044 renewing MINURSO’s mandate on 24 April 2012. UN officials noted an increase in access to a broader range of interlocutors, including Ross’s visits to Western Sahara in October-November 2012 and early 2013 and regular meetings with Morocco’s National Human Rights Council.

However, media reports suggest that access to Western Sahara for international delegations remains an issue of con- cern. On 6 March, four members of the European Parliament arrived in Casablanca on their way to Laâyoune for meetings with human rights organisations and MINURSO representatives; they were denied access by Morocco and later returned to Europe.

The programme run by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), offering separated families in Western Sahara and refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria a range of services to help them reconnect, has continued. UNHCR’s family visit programme has significantly expanded, with larger aircraft permitting a greater number of Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf to reunite with their families in Western Sahara and vice versa. Furthermore, free telephone services allow separated Sahrawi families to contact and stay in touch with their relatives. However, as noted by Ross in his 28

November briefing, there is a need for increased funding for UNHCR’s confidence-building measures programme, which has seen a significant decrease in financial support due to the global economic crisis.

On 19 February, a spokesperson for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern at the use of a military court to try and convict 25 Saharan civilians charged in relation to violence surrounding the dismantling of the Gdim Izik protest camp near Laâyoune on 8 November 2010, and at the alleged ill-treatment they received during their pre-trial detention. According to a report of Morocco’s National Human Rights Council, the trial took place “under normal conditions and was marked by due process”.

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) considered several reports relevant to the situation in Western Sahara during its March

session.

introduced his report to the HRC on his September 2012 visit to Morocco that included Laâyoune (A/HRC/22/53/Add.2 of 28 February

2013).

On 5 March, the HRC considered the report of the working group on enforced or involuntary disappearances on the follow-up to its country mission to Morocco (A/HRC/22/45/Add.3 of 1 March 2013).

In the lead up to the ongoing negotiations on the draft resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate, a number of international human rights groups reiterated their call for the introduction of a human rights component in MINURSO’s mandate, obtaining widespread media exposure.

A key issue for the Council is the renewal of MINURSO’s mandate that complements the negotiating process and takes

into consideration the regional context and the instability of the situation in Mali and the Sahel.

A related issue is for the Special Representative and Personal Envoy, UN and associated personnel and international

delegations to have free access to interlocutors in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara.

Human rights monitoring and agreement on a mechanism that is independent, impartial, sustained and comprehen- sive is an ongoing issue.

One option is for Council members to adopt a resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate for a period of 12 months, maintaining similar language to that of the current mandate and encouraging progress in the negotiating process and the resumption of direct talks.

This option could include taking note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation for an increase in MINURSO personnel that appeared in his report of 5 April 2012 (S/2012/197). The request was for 15 UN military observers to bolster MINURSO’s monitoring capacities, in addition to six MINURSO police officers to support the expansion of the humanitarian family visit

programme.

Further options that could be discussed in April for possible consideration at a later stage relate to the monitoring of

human rights, such as:

• welcoming the work of Morocco’s National Human Rights Council and Morocco’s ongoing cooperation with Special

Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council;

• requesting the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to brief on the human rights situation in Western Sahara, encouraging consideration of alternative human rights monitoring arrangements such as regular OHCHR staff visits; and (although unlikely options at this juncture)

• asking the Secretary-General to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the overall human rights situation in Western Sahara; or

• introducing a human rights component to MINURSO’s mandate.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members engaged on the issue, including Morocco, remain supportive of the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by

Ross and remain hopeful that such an approach could pave the way for moving into direct talks shortly.

Positions on Western Sahara—including those of the Group of Friends, four of whom are permanent Council mem- bers—remain unchanged, with most Council members remaining reluctant to speak out strongly on the issue and instead preferring to use their political capital on other issues on the Council’s agenda.

While the EU stance has generally been aligned with that of Morocco, some EU members may be shifting, as reflected by the 5 December 2012 vote by the Swedish parliament to recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Media reports suggest that advocacy efforts are underway to promote similar initiatives in other European parliaments.

The US is the penholder on Western Sahara.

S/RES/2044 (24 April 2012) renewed the MINURSO mandate for twelve months.

S/2012/197 (5 April 2012) was the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Western Sahara.

S/PV.6758 (24 April 2012) was the adoption of resolution 2044 renewing MINURSO’s mandate.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINURSO Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany). Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Christopher Ross (US).

MINURSO Size, Composition and Budget Strength as of 31 January 2013: 25 troops; 175 military observers; 6 police; 95 international

civilians; 165 local civilians; 16 UN volunteers. Budget (July 2012-June 2013): $61.3 million. MINURSO Duration April 1991-to present.

In April, the Council expects a briefing by Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and on the Secretary-General’s special report requested by resolution 2062 with, inter alia, recommendations on possible adjustments in the structure and strength of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

The Council also expects a briefing in consultations by the chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, Ambas- sador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala) on the final report of its Group of Experts (GoE). A new resolution renewing the sanc- tions measures and the mandate of the GoE is the likely outcome.

The current mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 July 2013 and the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE expire on 30 April 2013.

Koenders briefed the Council on recent developments in Côte d’Ivoire on 17 January. He noted how—despite the existence of a comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) strategy and a national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policy—security continues to be a challenge.

Paramilitary groups have continued to operate in the country and along the borders with Ghana and Liberia, poten- tially further destabilising the country, as exemplified by the mid-March deadly attacks in the town of Zilebly, close to the Liberian border.

Charles Blé Goudé, an ally of former President Laurent Gbagbo and former leader of the Young Patriots militia, was arrested on 17 January in Ghana. Blé Goudé was listed in the travel ban and asset freeze list of the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee. He was extradited to Côte d’Ivoire and has been charged with war crimes, murder and theft of public funds.

The prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, confirmed on 19 February the charges pending against Gbagbo, who may bear criminal responsibility for four counts of crimes against humanity for the post-electoral violence that hit the country in late 2010 and early 2011. The news resulted in violent clashes among pro- and anti-Gbagbo demonstrators.

Despite the release of political detainees in late December 2012 and the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the divisions within the country continue to be blatant. Regional and local elections, originally scheduled for February, were postponed to 21 April to allow all major political parties to participate. However, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) leaders have announced that the party will not participate in the April elections.

A technical assessment mission from UN headquarters was deployed from 2 to 16 February. The mission evaluated the situation on the ground and assisted UNOCI in developing benchmarks with the government to measure progress. Its findings will feed into the special report to the Council to be submitted by 31 March. As requested in resolution 2062, the report is supposed to include benchmarks to measure and track progress towards the achievement of long-term stability in the country, recommendations on possible adjustments in UNOCI’s structure and strength, options to reinforce inter- mission cooperation arrangements between UNOCI and the UN Mission in Liberia and an assessment of the implementa- tion of UNOCI’s protection of civilian strategy.

Rosenthal last briefed the Council as chair of the 1572 Sanctions Committee on 25 October 2012 during consultations on the Committee’s activities and the midterm report of the GoE (S/2012/766). The report recorded numerous violations of all the measures, including the arms embargo, the travel ban and the restrictions on diamonds, during the previous six months. The report provided details of the regional geopolitical reach of the Ivorian anti-government forces and the illicit movement of arms into the country to support these forces. Furthermore, the GoE stated its concern regarding the lack of implementation of the sanctions measures imposed on Côte d’Ivoire by member states, which constituted a serious issue in the monitoring of both the arms and diamond embargoes.

On 19 March, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, Doudou Diène, presented to the Human Rights Council his report for the period 15 July-15 December 2012 (A/HRC/22/66 of 7 January 2013). The expert undertook his third visit to the country from 24 September to 12 October 2012. Diène reported that large-scale attacks that took place in August-September 2012 against the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) in an attempt to destabilise the country resulted in the killing of 60 people including FRCI troops and civilians, wounded others and displaced populations in the west of the country. The FRCI reacted vigor- ously to these attacks, at times disproportionally, leading to human rights violations, including killings, arbitrary arrest and detention and torture. Diène also highlighted the persistence of intercommunity tensions, the resurgence of acts of sexual violence and serious violations against children and the urgent need to fight impunity.

The key overarching issue for the Council is the security situation, in particular the recent series of attacks against civilian

populations, the government and UN personnel.

A related issue is the impact of such attacks on already existing divisions throughout the country, hampering the pos- sibility of a credible political dialogue and national reconciliation.

Concerns about the upcoming 21 April elections are another related issue, given that the FPI has decided to boycott

them and that UNOCI’s electoral assistance division was shut down.

In spite of the recent establishment of the National Security Council, SSR—including the DDR process—remains a key issue due to the ongoing circulation of large numbers of weapons in Côte d’Ivoire.

A closely related issue is how to control the flow and movement of arms in the country and the region and how to enhance the implementation of Council-imposed sanctions or whether to revise the existing sanctions to make them bet- ter suited to the current situation.

A further related issue, if contemplating easing notification requirements when renewing sanctions, will be to consider how non-lethal equipment (such as satellite phones or uniforms) can act as force multipliers.

A broader issue is the cross-border linkages of anti-government groups, which continue heightening the regional

dimensions of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.

Options

Options for the Council include:

• to maintain the sanctions regime without modifications and to renew the mandate of the GoE, strongly emphasising the need for compliance with the sanctions measures; or

• to sharpen further the sanctions regime in light of the anticipated downsizing of UNOCI by emphasising private compa-

nies’ responsibility for ensuring compliance with the sanctions and requiring the issuance of end-user certificates; and

• to emphasise the need for Côte d’Ivoire and all countries in the region to facilitate the work of the GoE by replying in a timely manner to its queries, granting access to all necessary documents, and ensuring that companies based in their countries do likewise.

At least one Council member, echoing Côte d’Ivoire’s worries, has expressed its reservations regarding the downsizing of the mission by one battalion before July. However, as the decision was already agreed upon in resolution 2062 (and deferred in October 2012 following a letter from the Secretary-General), no further questioning of this decision is expected. Regarding further downsizing, Council members might express different views, mainly if the conclusions of the GoE report on the compliance with the sanctions regime are rather pessimistic.

Also, while President Alassane Ouattara’s leadership has been hailed in recent Secretary-General’s reports, some Coun- cil members have shown frustration at the worsening of the security situation since last summer. In addition, accounts of retaliation and violent clashes initiated by pro-government militias might prevent the Council from easing the arms embargo when it comes to the provision of lethal equipment for the government, as Côte d’Ivoire has requested.

France is the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire, while Guatemala is the chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.

S/RES/2062 (26 July 2012) renewed the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013 and requested a special report by 31 March 2013. S/RES/2045 (26 April 2012) renewed the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime for 12 months, renewed the mandate of the Group of Experts and rolled over most of the measures in resolution 1980.

S/2012/964 (31 December 2012) was the 31st progress report on UNOCI.

S/2012/186 (29 March 2012) was a special report on the reduction of UNOCI’s military component.
Security Council Letter

S/2012/772 (16 October 2012) was from the Secretary-General to the Council recommending a deferment in the reduction of UNOCI’s

military strength.
Security Council Meeting Record

S/PV.6902 (17 January 2013) was Special Representative Albert Gerard Koenders’ most recent briefing to the Council.