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Monthly Forecast April 2013


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Key Recent Developments

Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on Darfur and the latest UNAMID report prior to its consultations on the issue on 24 January. Mulet expressed concern at the recent deterioration of the security situation in certain parts of Darfur, particularly western Jebel Marra and North Darfur. He said that the government needed to provide “a holistic settlement of the issues of political and economic marginalisation affecting not only Darfur but Sudan as a whole” to achieve a durable and comprehensive peace in Darfur.

Speaking after Mulet, Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman (Sudan) urged the Council to take stronger measures against rebel groups that have not joined the Doha peace process. He also alleged that rebel movements in Darfur received logistical and political support from South Sudan and claimed that they initiated attacks from South Sudan on Darfur.

On 14 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2091 renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assist- ing the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee for an additional year. The resolution did not make any fundamental changes to the mandate of the Panel. However, it expressed concern that materiel or other resources supplied to Sudan could be used to operate military aircraft in violation of the arms embargo. In a statement in the Council after the adoption of the resolution, Ali Osman said, “This concern is based on false premises, since…Sudan uses its aircraft for purely peaceful, civilian purposes”.

Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement-Bashar (JEM-Bashar) continued their negotiations in an effort to reach a peace agreement. On 24 January in Doha they signed a framework agenda outlining the topics to be discussed, which are based on five elements of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), including power sharing, wealth sharing, justice and reconciliation, ceasefire and security arrangements and compensation of refugees and internally displaced persons. Sudan and JEM-Bashar signed a ceasefire agreement in Doha on 10 February, and on 24 March they struck a partial deal, also in Doha, as they are still negotiating power-sharing and security arrangements. (JEM-Bashar, headed by Mohamed Bashar Ahmed, is a splinter group of the JEM, one of the main rebel groups in Darfur.)

Violent conflict has continued in Darfur in recent months. Fighting between the Beni Hussein and Abbala communi- ties in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, over access to a gold mine caused 100 deaths and displaced 100,000 people in early January. Despite a ceasefire agreement signed on 17 January, the two communities clashed again in late February, this time near El Sereif, North Darfur, with Al-Jazeera reporting that the fighting claimed 51 lives. UNAMID sent medical supplies to the area and flew 37 of the injured to El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, to receive medical care. On 8 and

9 March, bombings were reported in Al Malaha, North Darfur, apparently destroying several homes and killing a large number of cattle. Additionally, on 15 March, members of the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) report- edly killed four civilians who were part of the Rizeigat community during a raid on their camp near Beleil, South Darfur.
HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

The independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Mashood Baderin, visited Sudan from 3-10 February. He met with a variety of interlocutors in Khartoum and El-Fasher. At the end of the visit, Baderin made preliminary observations regarding the flaws in the prosecution of crimes committed in Darfur, the challenges faced by civil society organisations, the arrest and detention of political opposition figures by the National Intelligence and Security Services, the lack of security and denial of humanitarian access in North Darfur and his concerns regarding women and children’s rights. Baderin will present his report to the Human Rights Council in September 2013.



Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether and how UNAMID can strengthen its role in protecting civilians, given the toll that

recent outbreaks of inter-communal violence have taken on civilian populations.

Another key issue is how the Council can exert leverage on Sudan to end aerial bombardments in civilian areas in

Darfur.

An additional important issue is how the Council can facilitate progress in the implementation of the DDPD, given the significant delays in its implementation, so that noticeable, concrete progress can be made in improving the lives of people on the ground.



An ongoing, key issue is how to convince rebel groups in Darfur that have not put down their arms and the Sudanese

government to engage in constructive peace talks.



Options

The Council could decide to invite the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for

Human Rights to brief the Council on the impact of the recent conflict in Darfur on civilians.

It could also adopt a statement that:

• expresses concern with recent inter-communal violence in Darfur and its impact on civilians;

• condemns violence against civilians by parties to the conflict;

• condemns destabilising activities by rebel groups and demands that they join the peace process;

• encourages progress in negotiations between Sudan and the JEM-Bashar faction; and

• urges progress in implementing the provisions of the DDPD, while expressing support for the upcoming donor confer-

ence on Darfur, scheduled for 7-8 April in Doha.



Council Dynamics

Over the past year, the Council’s focus on Darfur has been somewhat overshadowed by its dealings with Sudan-South Sudan issues. However, several Council members have been troubled by reports of deteriorating security in Darfur and its humanitarian impact. In particular, there is growing concern among several Council members about the heightened inter-communal violence this year in North Darfur, notably between the Beni Hussein and Abbala communities. None- theless, some members appear to believe that inter-communal tensions in North Darfur have diminished in recent weeks.

Over the past several months, some Council members have also been disappointed by the lack of progress in imple- menting the DDPD, pointing to the difficult security situation, weak rule of law and the lack of sufficient funds for imple- mentation. While Council members are hopeful that the upcoming donor conference on Darfur could provide funds to help support implementation of the DDPD, some are more optimistic than others that the funds generated will be used effectively to improve services in Darfur.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.



UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/2091 (14 February 2013) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sanctions Committee until 17

February 2014.

S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013.

S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.

S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.



Secretary-General’s Report

S/2013/22 (10 January 2012) was the most recent UNAMID report.


Security Council Meeting Records

S/PV.6920 (14 February 2013) was the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution 2091 renewing the Panel of Experts’ mandate.

S/PV.6910 (24 January 2013) was the latest briefing to the Council on UNAMID.

Sudan and South Sudan


Expected Council Action

In April, the Council is likely to hold its twice-monthly consultations on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan in accordance with resolution 2046. The Council is also expected to discuss in consultations the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which expires on 31 May.

It is unclear whether there will be any outcome to the deliberations on Sudan-South Sudan this month, especially given

the divisive nature of the Council’s discussions on this issue in the recent past.



Key Recent Developments

On 8 March, the defence ministers of Sudan (Abdul Raheem Mohammad Hussein) and South Sudan (John Kuong Nyuon) met in Addis Ababa and signed an implementation agreement focusing on security arrangements agreed to by the parties on 27 September 2012. The implementation agreement outlines tasks and deadlines related to making operational the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) between Sudan and South Sudan. On 12 March, Sudan and South Sudan additionally adopted an implementation matrix that pro- vides a timeline for tasks to be completed by the parties related to security arrangements (including those outlined on 8

March), the administration of Abyei, nationality issues, oil production, trade and other matters.

The Council met in consultations on 12 March to discuss Sudan/South Sudan issues and was briefed by Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan. In light of the 8 and 12 March agreements, Ladsous discussed the technical aspects of establishing the JBVMM, stating that UNISFA would need more troops to fulfil its mandate to support the JBVMM. Menkerios said that the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) had agreed to negotiate directly with Sudan on the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states but that, to date, Sudan had not been willing to engage in such negotia- tions with the SPLM-N. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP) scheduled talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N on at least two occasions in the first half of March to no avail.

During the meeting, Russia tabled a draft press statement welcoming the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. However, the US, which had been leading negotiations on a draft presidential statement on Sudan and South Sudan since mid-February, was unwilling to endorse the statement. (It appears that the draft presidential statement was in part intended to express concern with delays in the implementation of the 27 September agreements, in addition to addressing the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the situation in Abyei.)

Speaking to media at the stakeout after the meeting, Ambassador Susan Rice (US) argued that the proposed press statement was “divorced from the larger set of issues”, as it did not mention the situations in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, nor did it address recent cross-border incidents. She added that the US objected to the draft press statement because Russia was “unwilling to commit to a swift issuance” of the presidential statement. In response, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russia), also addressing the media at the stakeout, said that Russia was “working for the Security Council to try to make a positive contribution to the talks between Sudan and South Sudan” and that the US reaction “was not reasonable”.

On 14 March, South Sudan instructed pipeline operators and oil firms to restart oil production for international trans- port via Sudan. (South Sudan shut down its oil production in January 2012, after accusing Sudan of stealing $815 million worth of its oil.)

South Sudan withdrew its troops to its side of the SDBZ on 17 March in concurrence with the 8 and 12 March agree- ments. The Sudan Tribune reported on the same day that Sudan submitted a letter to the UNISFA Force Commander, indicating that it had withdrawn its armed forces from the border areas. Also on 17 March, however, South Sudan accused the Sudanese Armed Forces and affiliated militias and ethnic groups of a cross-border incursion into Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.

From 16-19 March, the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body that the parties use to address border- related security concerns, convened in Addis Ababa. During the meeting, Major General Yohannes Gabremeskel Tesfa- mariam (Ethiopia), the Force Commander and head of UNISFA, reported that Sudan and South Sudan had withdrawn their troops from the border and that national monitors from both countries were in transit to the headquarters of the JBVMM in Kadugli, South Kordofan state.

Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chairperson of the AU Commission, welcomed in a 20 March press release the JPSM meeting and the efforts undertaken by the parties to make the SDBZ operational. In the press release, she also urged the Security Council “to authorise the additional 1,126 personnel…requested by UNISFA, to facilitate force protection for the monitors of the JBVMM.”

Also on 20 March, Hussein, the Sudanese defence minister, indicated that Sudan would be willing to negotiate directly with the SPLM-N so long as the negotiations were “based on the [2005] Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the protocol for the two areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] as a reference”. (This condition might be an effort by Sudan to avert dis- cussion of the broader demands of the Sudan Revolutionary Front—an umbrella group including the SPLM-N and some of the key Darfur rebel groups—which has vowed to overthrow the current regime.)

The Council held an informal interactive dialogue on 27 March with Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AUHIP, on Sudan and South Sudan. Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar, also a member of the AUHIP, participated, although Mbeki was the pri- mary briefer. Mbeki told Council members that he was optimistic about the prospect for improved relations between Sudan and South Sudan since the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. He was also hopeful that Sudan and the SPLM-N would hold direct negotiations in the near future, although Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had yet to concur with his defence minister’s comments on 20 March and give his approval to such negotiations. Mbeki added that there was a possibility that al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir would meet in early April to resolve their differences related to the establishment of the Abyei Area Council and the Abyei Area Police. It seems that he claimed as well that economic sanctions against Sudan were unhelpful.


Key Issues

A key issue is whether Council members can overcome their differences and speak with a unified voice on Sudan-South

Sudan issues in a manner that enhances their influence on the calculations of the parties.

On the ground, given their failure to honour several previous agreements, a key issue is whether Sudan and South Sudan

can continue to make progress in implementing the arrangements agreed to on 8 and 12 March.

Another important and ongoing issue is how to address the fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states between

Sudan and the SPLM-N and the resulting and ongoing humanitarian crisis.

A related issue is whether Sudan and the SPLM-N will engage in direct talks and make progress in negotiations on a

cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access to the two states.

Options

Options for the Council on Sudan-South Sudan issues include:

• requesting a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of the 8 and 12 March agreements by 8 June, the deadline set for the full operational capacity of the JBVMM in these agreements;

• travelling to Sudan and South Sudan to meet with officials from both governments and to impress upon the parties the importance of fulfilling prior commitments; and

• mandating the Secretary-General to launch a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
Council Dynamics

Sudan-South Sudan issues have remained divisive within the Council, as reflected by the consultations on 12 March. Some members, notably the US, hold Sudan largely responsible for its poor relations with South Sudan. Russia and others advo- cate for what they consider a more balanced approach.

In February, the US circulated a first draft of a presidential statement to Council members, followed by a revised sec- ond version, in an effort to achieve the consensus needed to adopt the statement. However, the contentious consultations on 12 March appear to have generated new difficulties in negotiations on the statement. At press time,it seems that the Council’s discussions on this statement have reached an impasse.

While Council members are encouraged by the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements, they underscore the impor- tance of implementing these agreements, recalling the history of non-implementation of previously signed agreements. In this sense, members will view as a positive development recent efforts by the parties to disengage their troops from the border and move their national monitors to the JBVMM headquarters in Kadugli.

The ongoing conflict and related humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states remain a continuing source of distress in the Council. Council members are eager for Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct talks without preconditions.

With respect to UNISFA, at least one member appears wary of the suggestion that more troops may be needed by the mission to carry out its mandate to support the JBVMM. (This may result in part from concerns about the budgetary implications of expanding the size of the mission.)

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues, although Russia took the lead in circulating a draft press state-

ment acknowledging the 8 and 12 March agreements.



UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

Security Council Resolution

S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations.


Security Council Press Statement

SC/10779 (28 September 2012) welcomed the 27 September agreements.


Security Council Letter

S/2013/148 (11 March 2013) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council that contained the 8 March agreement.



Somalia


Expected Council Action

In April, the Council expects the Secretary-General’s report with the findings of the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM), which had been tasked with developing further details for the new a UN special political mission that will replace the cur- rent UN presence in Somalia. Based on the recommendations of the report, the Council is likely to adopt a resolution in late April or early May authorising a new UN mission to be deployed by 3 June. The Council will also be briefed, most likely by the Department of Political Affairs, in late April. The government of Somalia is also due to report on the implementation of safeguards related to a partial lifting of the arms embargo.


Key Recent Developments

On 6 March, the Council adopted resolution 2093 extending the authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 28 February 2014 while specifying that its mandate includes the provision of assistance to the government in extend- ing state authority in areas recovered from the Islamist rebel group Al-Shabaab. The Council also reiterated its request for AMISOM to establish a guard force for the protection of international staff and requested the AU to consider provid- ing funding for AMISOM through its own assessed costs as it has done for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali.

Resolution 2093 did not reflect the requests submitted to the Council by the AU Peace and Security Council based on the strategic review that had been conducted by the AU Commission. In a 27 February communiqué, the AU decided to broaden AMISOM’s mandate to a “multidimensional Peace Support Operation” and called on the Council to authorise an “enhancement of the support package to AMISOM”. (The strategic review and the communiqué were submitted to the Council on 5 March [S/2013/134].)

In addition, in resolution 2093, the Council authorised a partial lifting of the arms embargo for a period of 12 months for weapons and training solely intended for the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). (Some types of heavy weaponry are excluded as specified in an annex to the resolution.) The partial lifting of the arms embargo also applies to AMISOM’s “strategic partners”. The resolution asked the government to report to the Council within one month and semi-annually thereafter on the structure of the SNSF and the infrastructure and procedures it has established for registration, storing, maintaining and distributing weapons. Resolution 2093 also expanded the mandate of the Monitoring Group to over- see the new provisions. It furthermore endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his report of 31 January that the UN Political Office for Somalia should be replaced by a new expanded UN special political mission that would incorporate the UN Support Office for AMISOM (S/2013/69). It requested that by January 2014 the UN country team be integrated as well.

In the interim, resolution 2093 asked the Secretary-General to conduct a TAM and report back to the Council by 19

April, after which it will likely mandate a new Special political mission in Somalia to be deployed by 3 June. Guiding principles for the TAM suggested an expanding role for the UN in providing advice, support and capacity-building to the government of Somalia in areas such as peacebuilding, statebuilding, elections, governance, human rights and security sector reform. Under the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs, a TAM was conducted from 18 to 29 March, with visits to Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Somalia.

On 12 March, Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee on Somalia and

Eritrea, briefed Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee. He reported that Al-Shabaab continued

to benefit from charcoal exports and expressed concerns regarding the SNSF’s institutional control over arms. He also noted there will be changes in operational rules for the Monitoring Group, given its newly expanded oversight and report- ing requirements.

The overall security situation has continued to improve, with AMISOM and SNSF advances against Al-Shabaab, but much of the country nonetheless remains under the control of the Islamist insurgency. However, in Mogadishu and some other areas, Al-Shabaab has continued to resort to asymmetrical warfare. In an attack on 18 March, just a few days after Brigadier General Hadir Adan Elmi was announced as the new Chief of General Staff for the SNSF, a car bomb apparently targeting senior Somali security officials exploded near Villa Somalia (the presidential palace) in Mogadishu, killing at least ten civilians. Attacks on journalists have continued, the most recent assassination occurred in Mogadishu on 24 March.


HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

On 3 March, an appeals court repealed the one-year sentence against a 27-year-old Somali woman who was convicted on 5 February for allegedly fabricating claims of being raped by five government soldiers. It did not, however, repeal the sentence against the journalist who had interviewed her, and only reduced it from one year to six months, prompting continued international criticism of the govern- ment. On 17 March, the High Court released the journalist, who had been jailed since 10 January.

On 4 March, citing a lack of institutional controls and the widespread availability of arms, Amnesty International issued a press release opposing the lifting of the arms embargo in Somalia by the Security Council. It stated, “instead of lifting the embargo, it should be strengthened by incorporating strict rules granting exemptions to prevent arms from getting into the wrong hands and being used

to commit human rights and humanitarian abuses.”

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