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Monthly Forecast April 2013


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UN DOCUMENTS ON PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/2033 (12 January 2012) was on UN-AU partnership in peace and security.


Security Council Presidential Statements

S/PRST/2011/4 (11 February 2011) was on the interdependence between security and development. S/PRST/2010/21 (22 October 2010) concerned UN-AU collaboration in the maintenance of peace and security. S/PRST/2010/14 (16 July 2010) was on preventive diplomacy in Africa.


Secretary-General’s Reports

S/2011/805 (29 December 2011) was on UN-AU cooperation in peace and security. S/2011/552 (26 August 2011) was a report on the use of preventive diplomacy.

A/52/871-S/1998/318 (13 April 1998) was on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development

in Africa.


Security Council Letters

S/2012/965 (31 December 2012) transmitted a report on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.

S/2012/444 (13 June 2012) was a letter enclosing the joint communiqué from the most recent consultations with the PSC. S/2012/20 (9 January 2012) transmitted the report of the Chair of the AU Commission on partnership between the AU and the UN. S/2011/50 (2 February 2011) forwarded the concept note for a debate on the interdependence between security and development.
Security Council Meeting Records

S/PV.6621 (22 September 2011) was a high-level meeting on preventive diplomacy.

S/PV.6479 and Resumption 1 (11 February 2011) was an open debate on the interdependence between security and development. S/PV.6360 and Resumption 1 (16 July 2010) was an open debate on preventive diplomacy in Africa.
USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, International Peace Institute, August 2012.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2011).


Central African Republic


Expected Council Action

In April, the Council is scheduled hear a briefing in consultations by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Rep- resentative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), on develop- ments and the latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUCA. (The report is due by 31 March but may be delayed to reflect the most recent developments.)

BINUCA’s mandate expires on 31 January 2014.

Key Recent Developments

In December 2012, the Seleka rebel alliance—formed by factions of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention—took control of several major towns in the Central African Republic (CAR) and advanced on the capital, Bangui, demanding that President François Bozizé step down after failing to implement the 9 May 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Media reports indicated that, at the request of the government, 2,000 troops from Chad went into the CAR on 18

December to help the army fight the rebels. These troops were sent in addition to the roughly 500 troops who were already there as part of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR, a mission of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) that has been in place since 2008. At the request of Bozizé, South Africa sent 200 troops as well. France, which had 250 soldiers already stationed in CAR, increased its deployment to 600 troops to protect its “nationals and interests”. (According to the French foreign ministry, there are roughly 1,200 French citizens in CAR; most of them working for the French nuclear energy group Areva which mines the Bakouma uranium deposit in south CAR.)

On 3 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Politi- cal Affairs, on recent developments. The following day, the Council issued a press statement demanding that the Seleka rebels halt all hostilities (SC/10877).

A ceasefire and a political agreement were signed between the government and the rebels on 11 January in Libreville, Gabon under the auspices of ECCAS after three days of negotiations. The parties agreed that Bozizé would remain in power until the end of his term in 2016, and a government of national unity—in which opposition leaders were to be given key posts—was formed to implement reforms and hold parliamentary elections. On the same day, the Council was briefed by Vogt via videoconference from Libreville and in person by Zainab Hawa Bangura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Council then issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the political agreement (SC/10880).

On 24 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2088, extending BINUCA’s mandate until 31 January 2014. BINUCA is to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security sector reform processes—the delays in which were recognised as partially responsible for the current crisis—and to use its good offices to assist the parties in implementing the 11 January Libreville agreements. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the situation on the ground and provide an assessment of the implementation of the mission’s priorities by 31 March, possibly allowing for an adjustment to the mandate.

Renewed fighting between the rebels and the government broke out in mid-March as the Seleka rebels claimed that the government had not fulfilled its promises under the 11 January Libreville agreements. As tensions mounted, France, the penholder on CAR, organised a briefing with Vogt in consultations on 20 March. Vogt informed the Council about reports of widespread rape, looting, recruitment of children and starvation, with villagers hiding in the bush because they feared the rebels. She pointed out that the most violent actions against civilians have come from foreign elements within the rebel alliance. She added that the international community has been absent when it comes to the CAR. The Council then adopted a press statement condemning the recent attacks (SC/10948).

Urgent consultations were convened again on 22 March and the Council was briefed by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assis-

tant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, after which a Council press statement was issued calling for the cessation of

hostilities (SC/10955).

The rebels took over Bangui on 24 March, causing Bozizé to flee to Cameroon. Thirteen South African troops were killed during the advance. Michel Djotodia, a Seleka leader, announced the annulment of the constitution and said he would rule by decree until the 2016 scheduled elections. Meanwhile, BINUCA has temporarily relocated uncritical staff to Cameroon.

On 25 March, the AU Peace and Security Council suspended the CAR from participation in AU activities and imposed

sanctions on seven Seleka leaders.

The Council heard a briefing by Zerihoun on the situation in the CAR and from Ambassador Michel Tommo Monthe (Cameroon) in a private meeting on the same day. During the following consultations, Council members shared the view that the 11 January Libreville agreements are still the basis for political stability and that the regional organisations are to play the lead role at present. The Council released a press statement condemning the Seleka advancements and noting the AU actions (SC/10960). The statement called for the implementation of the Libreville agreements as the “framework for political transition and the basis for a peaceful solution”. It emphasised the role of ECCAS in facilitating the implementa- tion of the Libreville agreements with the support of the AU. At the insistence of Rwanda, the statement added that the Council will consider further steps if required.
Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is playing a more effective and assertive role.

Achieving synergy with the subregional and regional actors in addressing the aftermath of the coup is a related issue.

Another issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in the new political reality.



Options

One option is imposing sanctions on the Seleka leadership in light of the AU position.

The Council may consider to amend BINUCA’s mandate in light of the apparent collapse of the 11 January Libreville agreements, in particular the security situation and the wishes of the parties in CAR so that it can be a more relevant actor in achieving political stability. It may give BINUCA a more central and direct role in mediating between warring parties.

Another option is for BINUCA to play a supportive role to regional efforts to bring political stability to the CAR while

not moving beyond the Libreville agreements.

Council Dynamics

It appears that in the last several months, the Council has been more focused on other pressing issues, paying relatively little attention to developments on the ground in the CAR, giving preference to other country situations such as Mali and the DRC. As the Seleka forces advanced on Bangui, the Council met several times yet refrained from taking a strong stance in a resolution or presidential statement, reflecting a continued lack of resolve on this issue.

While at present no major discussions have taken place on how to address the situation after the failure of the 11 Janu- ary Libreville agreements to achieve stability, some Council members are realising that BINUCA’s mandate will have to be revaluated for the UN presence—and the Council—to be relevant in efforts at solving the renewed crisis in the CAR. A key factor in this respect is the position of the opposing sides in the CAR and that of ECCAS.

Several Council members, including some permanent ones, are cautious of singling out a specific side to the conflict and prefer deploring the situation in general. Others, including the African members of the Council seem to be advocating a more aggressive approach towards the rebels in line with the recent AU sanctions.


UN DOCUMENTS ON CAR Security Council Resolution

S/RES/2088 (24 January 2013) extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2014.



Secretary-General’s Report

S/2012/956 (21 December 2012) was the latest report on BINUCA.


Security Council Meeting Record

S/PV.6899 (11 January 2013) was a briefing on the latest BINUCA report.


Security Council Press Statements

SC/10960 (25 March 2013) condemned the seizure of power by the Seleka coalition. SC/10955 (22 March 2013) called for the cessation of hostilities.

SC/10948 (20 March 2013) condemned recent attacks by the Seleka and called on all sides to abide by their respective commitments. SC/10880 (11 January 2013) welcomed the signing of the Libreville ceasefire and political agreement.

SC/10877 (4 January 2013) demanded that the Seleka rebels cease all hostilities.

SC/10874 (27 December 2012) called on the rebels to cease hostilities and supported the efforts of ECCAS to solve the crisis.
OTHER RELEVANT FACTS

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUCA Margaret Vogt (Nigeria).

BINUCA Size and Composition Strength as of 31 December 2012: 67 international civilians, 84 local civilians, two military advisers,

two police and five UN volunteers.

BINUCA Duration 1 January 2010 to present.


Mali


Expected Council Action

In April, the Council is expected to be briefed in consultations by the Secretariat and consider the options included in the 26 March report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2085 (S/2013/189). A new resolution establishing a UN mission in Mali is a likely outcome.

AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments

Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed Council members on 27 February on developments on the ground in consultations at which Council members also discussed the content of a letter to the Secretary-General from the interim President of Mali, Dioncounda Traoré (S/2013/113). The letter requested the rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to restore state authority and sovereignty prior to its pos- sible transformation into a UN stabilisation and peacekeeping operation. Although it seems that a clearer request from the interim government will be needed, Council members have started their preliminary thinking about the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. In a letter to the Secretary-General (S/2013/129), the Council concentrated on the refer- ence to the transformation of AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation made by Traoré and requested the inclusion of recommendations on options in terms of size, mandate and composition of such an operation in the upcoming Secretary- General’s report.

A 28 February communiqué of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported the formal request by Mali to the UN to take steps towards the transformation of AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation as soon as con- ditions allowed.

On 7 March, the AU’s Peace and Security Council approved the revised joint strategic concept of operations of AFISMA

and the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). AFISMA revised its total strength to 9,620 personnel, including

171 civilians, 590 police officers and 8,859 military personnel. The revised concept of operations described as the main constraint for the full deployment of AFISMA the insufficient access to financial and logistical support within the envis- aged timeline. In a 7 March letter to the Secretary-General, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, echoed the desire of the AU Peace and Security Council for the new UN operation to have a peace enforcement mandate (S/2013/163). He also requested a logistics support package for AFISMA, to be funded through UN-assessed contributions, in order to help complete the deployment of contingents and sustain operations on the ground.

On 10 March, the UN Secretariat sent a week-long exploratory mission to Mali, headed by Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, to explore options for a UN mission, assess the situation on the ground and identify the potential risks that might arise.

Opération Serval, which France launched on 11 January, has successfully rolled back the gains of the terrorist and insurgent groups who seized northern Mali shortly after the 22 March 2012 coup d’état, but combat operations are still ongoing, particularly in Gao and Kidal. Although jihadist leaders Abou Zeid of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Mokhtar Belmokhtar of the al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade were reportedly killed in the operations, at press time, only

the former had been confirmed by France.

Following the political roadmap approved by the Malian National Assembly on 29 January, the interim government established, on 6 March, a Commission of Dialogue and Reconciliation whose members have yet to be appointed.

On 18 March, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, who stressed that impartiality of humanitarian work and protection of civilians must be a top priority in the UN involvement in Mali.

The Secretary-General’s report was circulated on 26 March among Council members. The two options that appear in the report include beefing-up the current multidimensional presence in Bamako and transforming it into an integrated political presence with a better resourced AFISMA. AFISMA would then have “an offensive combat and stabilisation man- date, focusing on extremist armed groups”, together with bilateral military efforts. AFISMA would then transition to a UN stabilisation mission once certain critical benchmarks are met. The second option advocates for an integrated stabilisa- tion mission with a military strength of 11,200 under Chapter VII alongside a parallel force to conduct counterterrorism operations beyond the scope of the UN’s mandate. The report rules out the possibility of a UN operation under a peace enforcement mandate as was requested by the AU, ECOWAS and many Malian interlocutors.

At press time, the Council was expecting a briefing by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political

Affairs, on 27 March in consultations.

HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

On 12 March, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, presented to the Human Rights Council (HRC) the Mali report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights covering the period from January to November 2012 as well as an update on the current situation (A/HRC/22/33 and Corr.1 of 7 January 2013). Kang said that the High Commissioner deployed a monitoring mission of human rights officers to Mali on 18 February. According to the preliminary findings of the mission, the military intervention was followed by a serious escalation in retaliatory violence by government forces that appeared to be targeting members of the Peuhl, Tuareg and Arab ethnic groups—perceived to be supportive of the armed groups—and led to the displacement of these populations. The mission also reported cases of gender-based violence and lack of progress in investigating human rights violations. She con- cluded that plans were underway to reinforce the UN human rights team in Mali. Speaking after Kang, Justice Minister Malick Coulibaly underlined Mali’s commitment to justice, as demonstrated by its referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court. On 21 March, the HRC adopted a resolution condemning the human rights violations in Mali, especially in the north, established a mandate of an independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, and asked the High Commissioner to present an updated report at the next session of the HRC.


Key Issues

A key overarching issue is to stabilise the security situation in the north in order to minimise the threats to a future peace-

keeping operation. A related issue will be to define who will be in charge of counterinsurgency operations.

Ensuring that AFISMA has adequate financial and logistical support to fulfil its mandate in the transition towards a

UN stabilisation operation is another key issue.

As the Council discusses the mandate of the UN mission, other key issues include:

• considering a role for the mission to address both the divisions within the government and the MDSF in parallel with the need to facilitate a wider negotiation process with minority groups;

• addressing the difficulty of providing sufficient electoral support in a timely manner for the 7 and 21 July presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively; and

• ensuring that, if there are AFISMA troops who will be re-hatted, that these have not committed human rights violations.

Addressing the potentially destabilising spillover effects from Mali to an already fragile region will be an ongoing issue.



Options

Regarding the establishment of a stabilisation operation, immediate options for the Council include:

• establishing a full-fledged peacekeeping operation aimed at ensuring stability and security in Mali; assigning a parallel force to operate in Mali (and potentially in the subregion) alongside the UN mission in order to conduct major combat and counterterrorism operations;

• ensuring that AFISMA has the basic financial and logistical support to attain its objectives before the transition starts;

• including in the mandate of the mission a role in facilitating the return to constitutional order, including dialogue with

minorities;

• assigning the work of building electoral management capacities to the current UN office in Bamako or a regional organ-

isation, taking into account that the UN mission might not be fully deployed for the July elections; and

• establishing a vetting mechanism to ensure that all re-hatted AFISMA troops respect international human rights stan- dards beyond the force commander and his deputy, as per the current internal screening policy.

Further options include:

• stressing the importance for donors to quickly honour the pledges they made in support of Mali, AFISMA and its troop- contributing countries at the 29 January Addis Ababa donor conference; and

• reiterating the call for the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, to finalise as soon as possible the much delayed UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, develop- ment, human rights and humanitarian issues as requested by resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012.


Council Dynamics

Council members seem to agree that a new UN stabilisation operation in Mali will be more predictably and sustainably resourced than AFISMA under its current configuration. The idea of having a mission that is structurally integrated seems to enjoy wide acceptance among Council members.

Although France wanted to speed up the transition towards a stabilisation operation, some countries, especially other permanent members, preferred to receive a clearer assessment of the situation on the ground from the Secretariat before starting to discuss the new mandate.

Views differ when it comes to the emphasis on the political mandate of the mission and the dimension of the UN presence in Bamako. Some members are sympathetic to the reservations the interim government seems to have about a heavy UN footprint in Bamako, while others are more aware of the centrality of governance issues that led to the current situation in Mali.

France is the penholder on Mali.

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) authorised the deployment of AFISMA for one year.

S/RES/2056 (5 July 2012) expressed the Council’s full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the transitional authorities

in Mali trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity.


Security Council Press Statement

SC/10878 (10 January 2013) expressed grave concern over the attacks by terrorist and extremist groups in northern Mali, in particular their capture of the city of Konna.


Security Council Letters

S/2013/163 (15 March 2013) transmitted a letter from the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security to the Secretary-General request- ing the new UN operation in Mali to have a peace enforcement mandate.

S/2013/129 (27 February 2013) was a letter from the president of the Council to the Secretary-General requesting recommendations for a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali.

S/2013/113 (25 February 2013) transmitted a letter from the interim president of Mali requesting the rapid deployment of AFISMA.



Secretary-General’s Report

S/2013/189 (26 March 2013) contained the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a UN mission in Mali.




Sudan/Darfur


Expected Council Action

In late April, the Council expects to hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the

AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Council began negotiating a draft presidential statement on 20

March that appeared to express concern at the recent violence in North Darfur. However, at press time, it seemed that

this statement had reached an impasse, and it is unclear whether the Council will attempt to revive its discussions on the statement.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July.


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