Milosevic et al. Case (it-99-37) amended indictment

a. On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Racak (Stimlje/Shtime municipality) was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. After shelling by the VJ units, the Serb police entered the village later in the morning and began conducting house-to-house searches. Villagers, who attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village. A group of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by the Serb police. They were beaten and then were removed to a nearby hill, where the policemen shot and killed them. Altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Racak. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule A, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

b. On or about 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Bela Crkva (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality). Many of the residents of Bela Crkva fled into a streambed outside the village and sought shelter under a railroad bridge. As additional villagers approached the bridge, a Serbian police patrol opened fire on them killing 12 persons, including 10 women and children. The police then ordered the remaining villagers out of the streambed, at which time the men were separated from the women and small children. The police ordered the men to strip and then systematically robbed them of all valuables. The women and children were then ordered to leave. The village doctor attempted to speak with the police commander, but he was shot and killed, as was his nephew. The other men were then ordered back into the streambed. After they complied, the police opened fire on the men, killing approximately 65 Kosovo Albanians. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule B which is attached as an appendix to the indictment.)

c. On or about 25 March 1999, the villages of Velika Krusa and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Mahde and Krushe e Vogel (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality) were attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Village residents took refuge in a forested area outside Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde, where they were able to observe the police systematically looting and then burning the villagers’ houses. On or about the morning of 26 March 1999, Serb police located the villagers in the forest. The police ordered the women and small children to leave the area and to go to Albania. The police then searched the men and boys and took their identity documents, after which they were made to walk to an uninhabited house between the forest and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel. Once the men and boys were assembled inside the house, the Serb police opened fire on the group. After several minutes of gunfire, the police piled hay on the men and boys and set fire to it in order to burn the bodies. As a result of the shootings and the fire, approximately 105 Kosovo Albanian men and boys were killed by the Serb police. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule C which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

d. On or about the evening of 26 March 1999, in the town of Dakovica/Gjakovë , Serb gunmen came to a house on Ymer Grezda Street. The women and children inside the house were separated from the men, and were ordered to go upstairs. The Serb gunmen then shot and killed the 6 Kosovo Albanian men who were in the house. (The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule D which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

e. On or about 27 March 1999, in the morning hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Crkolez/Padalishte (Istok/Istog municipality). As the forces entered the village, they fired on houses and on villagers who attempted to flee. Eight members of the Beke IMERAJ family were forced from their home and were killed in front of their house. Other residents of Crkolez/Padalishte were killed at their homes and in a streambed near the village. Altogether, forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 20 Kosovo Albanians from Crkolez/Padalishte. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule E which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

f. On or about 27 March 1999, FRY and Republic of Serbia forces attacked the village of Izbica (Srbica/Skenderaj municipality). Several thousand village residents took refuge in a meadow outside the village. On or about 28 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the villagers and then approached them, demanding money. After valuables were stolen by the soldiers and policemen, the men were separated from the women and small children. The men were then further divided into two groups, one of which was sent to a nearby hill, and the other of which was sent to a nearby streambed. Both groups of men were then fired upon by the forces of the FRY and Serbia, and approximately 130 Kosovo Albanian men were killed. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule F which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

g. On or about the early morning hours of 2 April 1999, Serb police launched an operation against the Qerim district of Dakovica/Gjakovë . Over a period of several hours, Serb police forcibly entered houses of Kosovo Albanians in the Qerim district, killing the occupants, and then setting fire to the buildings. In the basement of a house on Millosh Gilic Street, the Serb police shot the 20 occupants and then set the house on fire. As a result of the shootings and the fires set by the Serb police, 20 Kosovo Albanians were killed, of whom 19 were women and children. (The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule G which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

h. On or about 2 May 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia coming from the northern part of the municipality of Vucitrn/Vushtrri attacked several villages, including Skrone/Skorovna, Bozhlan/Boshlan, Gumnishta/Gumniste, Pasome/Pasoma, Milenica, Kurilova/Kurillovo, Sllakoc/Slakovac and Ceceli/Cecelija. The villagers were forced out from their homes, and many of their houses were burnt. They were subsequently forced into a convoy of approximately 30,000 to 40,000 people travelling on the Studime Gorge road, in the direction of Vucitrn/Vushtrri. In the course of these actions, forces of the FRY and Serbia harassed, beat and killed approximately 104 Kosovar Albanians. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule H, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

i. On or about the early morning hours of 27 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a massive attack against the Kosovar Albanian population of the Carragojs, Erenik and Trava Valleys (Dakovica/Gjakove municipality) in order to drive the population out of the area. A large number of soldiers and policemen were deployed, and several checkpoints were established. Throughout the entire day, villagers under direct threat of the forces of the FRY and Serbia left their homes and joined several convoys of refugees using tractors, horse carts and cars. In Meja/Meje, Korenica/Korenice and Meja Orize/Meje Orize, a large, and as yet undetermined, number of Kosovar Albanian civilian males were separated from the mass of fleeing villagers and abducted. Many of these men were summarily executed, and approximately 300 persons are still missing. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule I, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment).

j. On or about 22 May 1999, in the early morning hours, a uniformed prison guard in the Dubrava/Dubrave Prison complex (Istok/Istog municipality) announced from a watchtower that all prisoners were to gather their personal belongings and line up on the sports field at the prison complex for transfer to the prison in Nis, Serbia. Within a very short time, hundreds of prisoners had gathered at the sports field with bags of personal belongings and lined up in rows to await transport. Without warning, uniformed prison guards opened fire on the prisoners from the watchtower, from holes in the perimeter wall and from gun emplacements beyond the wall. Many prisoners were killed outright and others wounded.

On or about 23 May 1999, in the afternoon, prison guards and Serb special police threw grenades and shot into the drains, sewers, buildings and basements, killing and wounding many additional prisoners who had sought refuge in those locations after the events of the previous day. Altogether, approximately 50 prisoners were killed. (Many of the murdered prisoners remain unidentified, however those persons killed known by name are set forth in Schedule J, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

k. On or about 26 March 1999, in the morning hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the vicinity of the BERISHA family compound in Suva Reka/Suhareke (Suva Reka municipality). Tanks were positioned close to, and pointing in the direction of, the houses. The police ordered the occupants out of one of the houses. Men were separated from women and children and six members of the family were killed. The remaining family members were herded towards a coffee shop by Serb forces. Those family members were herded, along with three extended BERISHA family groups, into the coffee shop. Serb gunmen then walked into the coffee shop and opened fire on the persons inside. Explosives were also thrown into the shop. At least 34 civilians were killed and others seriously wounded during this action. The bodies of the victims were dragged out of the shop and placed in the rear of a truck, which was then driven in the direction of Prizren. Three injured persons, thrown in among the other bodies, jumped out of the truck en route to Prizren. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule K, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

l. During the period between March 1999 and May 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a series of massive offensives against several villages in the municipality of Kacanik, which resulted in the deaths of more than 100 hundred civilians. On or about 24 March 1999, the village of Kotlina/Kotline was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. In the course of the attack, most of the houses were burnt down and 17 persons were killed. Some of those killed were captured in the woods, executed and then thrown into wells. Explosives were thrown on top of the wells. On or about 13 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the village of Slatina/Sllatine and the hamlet of Lama/Vata. After shelling the village, infantry troops and police entered the village and looted and burnt the houses. During this action, 13 civilians were shot and killed. On or about 21 May 1999, the village of Stagovo/Stagove was surrounded by forces of the FRY and Serbia. The population tried to escape toward the mountains east of the village. During this action, 13 persons were killed. Most of the village was looted and burnt down. On or about 25 May 1999, forces of FRY and Serbia surrounded the village of Dubrava/Lisnaje. As the forces entered the village, the population was ordered to gather at the school and leave the village on tractors. Men were then separated from women and children. During this action 4 men were killed. In addition, 4 members of the Qorri family were killed while trying to escape toward the woods. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule L, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

25. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until 20 June 1999, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, utilised the means and methods set forth in paragraphs 18 through 24 to execute a campaign of persecution against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population based on political, racial, or religious grounds.

26. By these actions Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of:

27. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997 and assumed office on 23 July 1997. At all times relevant to this indictment, he held the post of President of the FRY.

28. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was President of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY. The Supreme Defence Council consisted of the President of the FRY and the Presidents of the member republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The Supreme Defence Council decided on the National Defence Plan and issued decisions concerning the VJ. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC had the power to "order implementation of the National Defence Plan" and commanded the VJ in war and peace in compliance with decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council. Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, performed these duties through "commands, orders and decisions."

29. Under the FRY Law on Defence, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercised command authority over republican and federal police units subordinated to the VJ during a state of imminent threat of war or a state of war. A declaration of imminent threat of war was proclaimed on 23 March 1999, and a state of war on 24 March 1999.

30. In addition to his de jure powers, at all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercised extensive de facto control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the offences alleged herein. Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercised extensive de facto control over federal institutions nominally under the competence of the Assembly or the Government of the FRY. Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercised de facto control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including the Serbian police force. Slobodan MILOSEVIC further exercised de facto control over numerous aspects of the FRY’s political and economic life, particularly the media. Between 1986 and the early 1990s, Slobodan MILOSEVIC progressively acquired de facto control over these federal, republican, provincial and other institutions.

31. Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s de facto control over Serbian, SFRY, FRY and other state organs stemmed, in part, from his leadership of the two principal political parties that ruled in Serbia from 1986 to 2000, and in the FRY from 1992 to 2000. From 1986 until 1990, he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Serbia, then the ruling party in Serbia. In 1990, he was elected President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor party to the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. Throughout the period of his Presidency of Serbia, from 1990 to 1997, and as the President of the FRY, from 1997 to 2000, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was also the leader of the SPS.

32. Beginning no later than October 1988 and at all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of Serbia, including its police force. Beginning no later than October 1988, he exercised de facto control over Serbia’s two autonomous provinces -- Kosovo and Vojvodina -- and their representation in federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY. From no later than October 1988 until mid-1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of the Republic of Montenegro (hereinafter Montenegro), including its representation in all federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY.

33. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1989 and at all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was the primary interlocutor with whom the international community negotiated. He negotiated international agreements that were subsequently implemented within Serbia, the SFRY, the FRY, and elsewhere on the territory of the former SFRY. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Slobodan MILOSEVIC was the primary representative of the SFRY and FRY are: The Hague Conference in 1991; the Paris negotiations of March 1993; the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in January 1993; the Vance-Owen peace plan negotiations between January and May 1993; the Geneva peace talks in the summer of 1993; the Contact Group meeting in June 1994; the negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995.

34. As the President of the FRY, the Supreme Commander of the VJ, and the President of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the VJ and any police forces, both federal and republican, who committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 in the province of Kosovo.

35. Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997 and remains President as of the date of this indictment. As President of Serbia, at all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC was the head of State. He represents Serbia and conducts its relations with foreign states and international organisations. He organises preparations for the defence of Serbia.

36. As President of Serbia, at all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC was a member of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY and participated in decisions regarding the use of the VJ.

37. As President of Serbia, at all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC, in conjunction with the Assembly, had the authority to request reports both from the Government of Serbia, concerning matters under its jurisdiction, and from the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, concerning its activities and the security situation in Serbia. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC had the authority to dissolve the Assembly, and with it the Government, "subject to the proposal of the Government on justified grounds," although this power applies only in peacetime.

38. During a declared state of war or state of imminent threat of war, Milan MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia, could enact measures normally under the competence of the Assembly, including the passage of laws; these measures could include the reorganisation of the Government and its ministries, as well as the restriction of certain rights and freedoms.

39. In addition to his de jure powers, at all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC exercised extensive de facto influence or control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the crimes alleged herein. Milan MILUTINOVIC exercised de facto influence or control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of the Government and Assembly of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including but not limited to the Serbian police force.

40. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1995 and at all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC was a principal interlocutor with whom the international community negotiated. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Milan MILUTINOVIC was a primary representative of the FRY are: preliminary negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15-21 August 1995; the Geneva meetings regarding the Bosnian cease fire, 7 September 1995; further negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; the meeting of Balkan foreign ministers in New York, 26 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC was also present at the negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999.

41. As the President of Serbia, and a member of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Milan MILUTINOVIC was responsible for the actions of any of his subordinates within the VJ and within any police forces who have committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

42. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the VJ on 26 November 1998. At all times relevant to this indictment he held the post of Chief of the General Staff of the VJ. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC commanded, ordered, instructed, regulated and otherwise directed the VJ, pursuant to acts issued by the President of the FRY and as required to command the VJ.

43. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC determined the organisation, plan of development and formation of commands, units and institutions of the VJ, in conformity with the nature and needs of the VJ and pursuant to acts rendered by the President of the FRY.

44. In his position of authority, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC also determined the plan for recruiting and filling vacancies within the VJ and the distribution of recruits therein; issued regulations concerning training of the VJ; determined the educational plan and advanced training of professional and reserve military officers; and performed other tasks stipulated by law.

45. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC -- or other officers empowered by him -- assigned commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and promoted non-commissioned officers, reserve officers, and officers up to the rank of colonel. In addition, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC nominated the president, judges, prosecutors, and their respective deputies and secretaries, to serve on military disciplinary courts.

46. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC carried out preparations for the conscription of citizens and mobilisation of the VJ; co-operated with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY and Serbia and the Ministry of Defence of the FRY in mobilising organs and units of Ministries of Internal Affairs; monitored and, proposed measures to correct problems encountered during, and informed the Government of the FRY and the Supreme Defence Council about the implementation of the aforementioned mobilisation.

47. As the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ,