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2. 3. Incompatibility


The concept of incompatibility (scarcity) is sine qua non for the origins of the conflict. It is defined as an “inability to meet the demands of two or more parties at the same time with the available resources”.52 In our case there are two parties – Turkish government and the PKK – and the incompatibility was from the beginning of the conflict territorial – creation of an independent Kurdistan. However, the incompatibility has developed over time toward ‘Democratic Self-rule’ within the Turkish borders. The main impact on the shift was Ocalan’s arrest in 1999. The PKK’s Presidential Council although reluctantly, confirmed the change one year later. It is doubtful whether this change reflects genuine reconsideration of Ocalan’s personal opinion or it is only a rhetorical mask in an attempt for personal survival.53

Nevertheless, Ocalan’s vision of solution for the Kurdish situation in Turkey places emphasis on democratic nature of the republic embodied in a new constitution which should grant equal rights to expression for Kurds.54 In the same vein PKK’s acting leader Murat Karayilan presented 3 principles and 4 steps which can bring an end to the conflict.55 The change in stated incompatibility away from purely territorial is obvious; however, because it is not clear what the real demands actually are, it is uncertain whether the incompatibility shifted over to the government (political power).

The PKK’s insurgency was successful in bringing the Kurdish issue to the centre of attention. Shift in its priorities also brought about the lively debate on the Kurdish issue. Since the issue became internationalized, the incompatibility has been generalized. Especially the EU uses the Kurdish issue as a basis for its request for reforms in the field of human rights and fundamental freedom.56

It is interesting to analyze subjective definition of incompatibility. The definition from the side of the PKK is far from clear because the complexity of the issue has lead to the vagueness in demands. The PKK representatives emphasize the need for recognition of Kurdish minority as an equal part of the republic; the main interest therefore lies in changing deficient conditions provided by the government toward Kurds which presents an offensive type of incompatibility in relation to the status quo. The group seeks for recognition of the Kurdish issue, however, in a closed political system and absence of dialogue, it still feels that the military option is the only way to call attention to the problem and assure the survival of the Kurdish fight for their rights.57



The Turkish government sees incompatibility in a different light. For a long period of time the state had recognized only a ‘terrorism issue’ and therefore incompatibility was interpreted strictly as a problem of terrorism which had to be countered by military means. The democratic reforms were at that time left off the agenda.58 The state painted the outlawed group as “self-seeking bandits, terrorists, and drug smugglers”59 and maintained the stance that it will never negotiate with terrorists. It partially originated from the fear of disintegration of the republic. However, since 2005 when premier Erdogan for the first time admitted that Turkey had a Kurdish problem, there is a gradual consensus among liberal elite circles that only military solution cannot solve the Kurdish problem and that the democratic reforms are also needed. Although president Ozal initiated the discussion over the Kurdish issue his sudden death in 1993 prevented his vision from materializing. Currently the Turkish government or more precisely the ruling Justice and Development Party, seems to understand that the Kurdish issue should be separated from the PKK and that the political solution is needed. This approach is reflected in the government’s policy known as Kurdish initiative or ‘opening’ that was launched in the beginning of the summer in 2009.60 There has been a lot of expectations and optimism about liberal ‘opening’, yet, in light of the strong opposition in the parliament and army circles who accuse the ruling party of negotiating with terrorists, the prospects of real results are uncertain. Nevertheless, the state’s definition of incompatibility is clearly defensive.

2. 4. Power relations


The primary parties significantly differ in the power resources they control. Turkey as a state actor to the conflict reckons upon legitimate use of its military power across the country. Turkish Armed Forces are the second biggest in NATO with strength of 514 000 soldiers in arms and 380 000 in reserve.61 To tackle the terrorist threat, a professional and highly trained Special Forces Command was created. It has concentrated mainly on PKK activities during cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and caused significant loses to the PKK fighters.62 Turkey also derives a benefit from cooperation with other countries. It favors from the intelligence cooperation with the U.S., for instance the capture of Ocalan was carried out with help of the CIA.63 The cooperation with Iraq was initiated by counter-terrorism agreement, Memorandum of Understanding, signed in 2007, however, without participation of KRG.64 Moreover in 2008 the trilateral committee among Iraq, U.S. and Turkey to tackle the PKK was established. Turkey also receives diplomatic support from regional countries, for instance from Syria, Israel or Iran.65

There is no exact estimation on how many PKK militants the group currently has. It stems from the illegal character of the party and also from the fact that PKK fighters no longer control any territory in Turkey and are in majority dispersed across the borders in Northern Iraqi Mountains. It is estimated that there are between 4000 to 5000 PKK militants, from which 3000 to 3500 are located in Northern Iraq.66

The financing is crucial to the PKK’s survival. It has been mostly dependent on external aid provided by Syria, Iraq and Iran.67 Recently the financing has shifted from the state support to financial independence due to links to Diaspora in Europe and drug trafficking activities.68 The Diaspora influence is especially important in terms of moral support for the Kurdish fight in Turkey and internationalization of the issue. Interestingly, Kurdish Diaspora in Europe tends to be more radical than Kurds in Turkey themselves.69 In terms of financing, the PKK argues that most of its capital originates from private contributions, both from Turkey and abroad.70 Nevertheless, the controversial involvement in illicit activities is a strong argument in the hands of state that underpins the legitimacy to fight against this group.

In terms of military, the conflict is obviously asymmetrical. The Turkish Armed Forces far outnumber the PKK forces. In combination with support from other countries, especially the U.S., the Turkish government has a clear superiority over the PKK. However, for more than 20 years of the insurgency, the Turkish state failed to combat PKK’s uprising – typical guerilla war has gradually won popular support across the country.71 Employment of hit-and-run tactics and weak experience of Turkish troops enabled the group to maintain military superiority in the 1980s, however, since 1995 the power relations has changed so that the state gained the upper hand.72 On the other hand the PKK has increasingly profited from the safe havens in Northern Iraq, because cross-border incursions on a territory of another state challenge its sovereignty and therefore became subjected to the controversy over its legitimacy. Turkey faces an increasing displeasure from the international community when combating the PKK across the border.

The state dealt a major blow when Ocalan was captured and imprisoned for life. Many outside observers believed that it meant the defeat of the group.73 However, the violence between the PKK and security forces escalated again in 2006 and 2007. Although the PKK is in military strength considerably weaker than in the 1990s, the Turkish policies cannot be assessed as successful.74 Despite military superiority, the Turkish government has so far failed to deal with the PKK and bring about a solution to the conflict.

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