Masaryk university

2. 2. Parties

The PKK’s had grown from very modest beginnings, few individuals gathered around Ocalan’s leadership, to a mass movement that won support among Kurds across the country. In line with Romano “Ocalan and his original six comrades were effectively creating something from nothing”.³⁰ The fact that other Kurdish groups were abandoned has had an impact on the growth of the popular support for the PKK. Indeed the PKK has always aspired to be the only group representing Kurdish interests in the country.

The group’s ideology has developed over time, away from socialist separatist aspirations toward general modernization in both strategies and goals. Ocalan after his arrest shifted priorities of the PKK – he declared that the foremost aim of the struggle is to achieve ‘Democratic Self-rule’ for the Kurdish minority in Turkey by dialogue and democracy rather than violence. The change was probably led by an attempt to improve image and attract support from more allies³¹- it is true that the general moderation of PKK’s policy allowed better relations with the West.³² Development in ideology was accompanied by several name changes.³³ However, it has to be noted that albeit frequent announcement of cease-fires the repeated eruption of violence may imply that those changes were mere cover-up.

Turkey has applied significant pressure on its main allies to place the PKK on the list of terrorist organizations in order to increase the support for counter-terrorist measures. It appeared as a major victory for the state when the United States (in 2001) and European Union (in 2002) joined the growing number of western countries that considered the group terrorist organization – most recently New Zealand announced its support for terrorist designation of the PKK.³⁴

The government of Turkey as a state actor to the conflict has a special role. According to Weber it is the only legitimate user of physical violence in society.³⁵ In addition it has also fiscal, territorial and ideological monopolies.³⁶ In light of the unique intrinsic character of the system, based on strict secularism and Turkish nationalism, the sole authority on territory and ideology is of special importance. It affects the perception of the PKK which is consistently labeled not as a national liberation movement but rather as a terrorist group challenging the very existence of the republic. PKK’s separatist tendencies present a threat to the true nature of the territorial integrity of the republic. Similarly a demand for recognition of cultural diversity goes against the concept of ‘one nation’ which does not allow any ethnic distinction.

Among secondary parties, the ones that can place pressure from the outside world,³⁷ the most important are the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU) and Iraq, more specifically the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which constitutes the northern part of today’s Iraqi federation.

Turkey has been a U.S. ally for more than 50 years. The partnership has primary been based on security issues – since the Cold War, the U.S. has provided military support to Turkey in exchange for access to Turkish military bases.³⁸ The U.S. is also traditionally a major advocate of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Yet, relations were sharpened following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Turkey denied the use of its territory as a base for U.S. troops. As a consequence Turkey has been ever since restricted in its maneuvering space within territories controlled by the U.S., mainly in Northern Iraq which serves as a safe haven for the PKK. The future of Iraqi Kurdistan drifted both partners considerably apart. But both Turkey and the U.S. share the vision of a stable and democratic Iraq which would serve their interests the best.³⁹ In this respect the U.S. is especially worried about the destabilizing effect of Turkey’s incursions to Northern Iraq. Ankara and Washington also understand that their partnership helps to counterweight two other partners in the region – Iran and Russia. Moreover, the U.S. remains the major supplier of arms to Turkey.⁴⁰ Given those facts both countries have a strong incentive to work on improving their relationship. Nevertheless, the U.S. policy is stigmatized by certain ambiguity; on one hand it tries to stabilize the region which is especially important since Obama declared withdrawal of American troops from Iraq until 2011, on the other hand it has a deep conviction to fight terrorism and therefore is committed to both moral support and intelligence cooperation to Turkey’s struggle against the PKK.

The role of Northern Iraq, particularly KRG,⁴¹ is also crucial to the conflict. The KRG was formed following the Gulf War and according to the 2002 constitution it became a northern part of the Iraqi federal state. It has since then established relatively stable and a functioning government where Kurds effectively take care of security issues.⁴² Turkey’s relations with KRG has been influenced by three main factors – the hidden aspiration to annex oil rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk (or at least not to allow their incorporation under Iraqi Kurds’ control), the presence of PKK bases on Northern Iraqi territory and fear that the creation of independent Kurdish identity can spark off the separatist tension of Turkish Kurds who would like to follow the Iraqi model (for this reason Turkey’s government initially resisted the creation of KRG per se).⁴³ Obviously, the PKK problem presents the most pressing issue. The safe havens on KRG territory seem critical for PKK’s survival, for which reason Turkey has for a long time exerted pressure on KRG to combat their bases; however, KRG seems reluctant to fight the Kurdish organization.⁴⁴ The role probably plays the sense of solidarity that Iraqi Kurds feel to the Turkish Kurds. The PKK also serves as a bargaining chip over Ankara in negotiations.⁴⁵ Moreover, KRG does not want to break the relative stability by triggering violence that would probably follow after confrontation with the PKK on its territory.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, despite the political tensions there is a vital cross border trade which makes both countries mutually dependent – especially landlocked KRG is economically dependent on Ankara. Cooperation is also important for Ankara because it seems that the long-term damage to the PKK can be made only with assistance of KRG.⁴⁷

Last but not least the secondary party to the Turkish conflict is the EU. Turkey has been trying to join the EU since 1987 when it applied for membership. The EU thus exercises a decisive power of leverage in Turkey’s reform process. The pressure to implement the Copenhagen Criteria,⁴⁸ the key requirements which have to be met before accession, has already set in motion considerable progress. The attempt to harmonize Turkish law with the EU norms has taken the form of a reform package enacted in the period of 2000-2004. However, in the following period of 2005-2008 the reform process slowed down hand in hand with weakened EU support for Turkey’s membership.⁴⁹ The opposition to the membership grew and the idea of ‘privileged partnership’ took roots. This development naturally caused doubts about the prospects of full membership and led to weakening in pro-EU commitment in Turkey that will not be satisfied by anything less than full membership. Yet, recently there has been indication that the EU-Turkey relationship can enter a new promising phase since France and Germany stopped advocating a ’privileged partnership’.⁵⁰ In addition, Spain, supporter of Turkey’s candidacy, took over the presidency of the EU. Although the EU can exercise a lot of influence, there are many hindrances (for instance the problem of Cyprus, migration or human rights) that will be very difficult to overcome. However, EU’s interest in Turkey accession is not inconsiderable and lies in both security and economic incentives of such development. On the other hand EU’s accession can considerably contribute to the solution of the Kurdish problem. In this respect it is not surprising that the support for accession is higher among Kurds than among Turks.⁵¹

The U.S. and especially the EU could in the future use their leverage and became third parties to the conflict that could influence de-escalation. However, since there is no ongoing negotiation at the present time, no third party is included.