Masaryk university

2. Analysis of the Conflict between the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

2. 1. Background and context

First of all we have to consider the contextual factor which ties to the fact that the dyadic conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government is only one aspect of thorny Kurdish issue that is very general in its nature. The thesis builds on an assumption that the PKK’s insurgency is indispensably connected to the Kurdish issue and thus any solution has to take into account a broader context. There is no clear definition on what the Kurdish problem exactly entails and the academic literature studies it very broadly. One reason for this is the character of the Kurdish ethnic group itself. Kurds with 24-27 million people, still not internationally accepted as a nation within a recognized territory, are spread across the international borders of the Middle East – nearly half of them live in Turkey but Kurdish ethnic minorities can be found in Iran, Iraq and Syria as well.⁸ This indicates that the Kurdish issue is not only an internal Turkish problem but also a deep-going international one.⁹

There is about 15 million Kurds living in Turkey which accounts approximately to 20 per cent of the total Turkish population of 75 million and presents the largest minority group in the state.¹⁰ It is important to mention that the birth rate of Kurds is almost double that of Turks¹¹ for which their number is likely to increase in the future. The majority of Turkey’s Kurds are Sunni Muslims who speak different dialects of Kurdish and are traditionally organized along the tribal culture. They live mostly in the peripheral southeastern Anatolia, one of the most underdeveloped and least integrated areas far from the administrative centre.¹² For this reason the conflict is at some point referred to as a mere ‘southeastern problem’ and reduced to socioeconomic issues such as unemployment, poverty or backwardness. Recently many Kurds, indeed due to the restless socioeconomic situation have migrated from the rural areas to the western cities of Turkey; Istanbul is now regarded as a city with the highest concentration of Kurdish people in the world.¹³

In the sense of context it is necessary to bear in mind that the Kurdistan region, geographical rather than political, is located in an area of high geostrategic importance. The significance of the area rich in oil, gas and water resources has gradually grown since the end of the Second World War¹⁴ and has become especially vital in light of the looming energy crisis. This factor, could to some extent explain the continual engagement of the world powers in this region and their concern for a conflict resolution, but also Turkey’s persisting opposition to any form of autonomy of the southeast region.

Taking into account background one of the leading factors, is the establishment of the Turkish republic itself. Sevres Treaty signed in the end of the First World War promised autonomy for Kurds, however, Kemal Atatürk fought against it and the revised Lausanne Treaty included no special provisions for Kurdish people in Turkey.¹⁵ Instead the abandonment of the Islamic caliphate in 1924 gave rise to an establishment of a purely secularist state based on strong Turkish nationalism guided by the doctrine “happy is who call himself Turk”. In an attempt to foster this new Turkish identity the government adopted a assimilation policy and denied any existence of Kurdish minority. Everything that belonged to the Kurdish national identity (language, clothing, or names) was suppressed and Kurds became mere ‘Mountain Turks’ classified as second class citizens.¹⁶ As a result of brutal state policies many Kurds, especially in the West, became assimilated. Severe suppression by draconian laws that tried to eradicate any expression of ‘Kurdishness’, did not undermine the national feeling completely. On the contrary, three main rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s revealed persisting dissent within the Kurdish minority. Even though the situation has been relatively stable in the following decades, these uprisings can be seen as early warning signals for the subsequent escalation of violence in the 1980s. According to Wallensteen there are two different stages of conflict – latent when there is incompatibility but no action and manifested when both incompatibility and action are present.¹⁷ In this regard it can be argued that the conflict was already in its latent stage because incompatibility, basically unmet needs for cultural expression, had already been present, however, the conflict did not become manifested until the initiation of the armed struggle by the PKK.

In accordance with McDowall, the conditions for revolt were created by a combination of “economic deprivation, social injustice and physical displacement as well as ideas of ethnic identity”.¹⁸ Although it appeared that hardliners in the establishment had by means of a strict denial and oppression policy the Kurdish nationalism under control, events of the 1960s and especially 1970s led to the Kurdish national revival in Turkey. The Constitution adopted in 1961, claimed to be the most liberal constitution in the republic’s history allowed a relatively wide freedom of political expression,¹⁹ which gave rise to an exceptionally liberal period that nourished Kurdish nationalism. As a result the first specifically Kurdish illegal political party was established, and more significantly a number of leftist movements which mirrored the socialist moods across Europe occurred. As the dissatisfaction with the state policies toward Kurds increased the Kurdish problem attracted gradually more attention among radicalized students at universities. Consequently the PKK was formed under the vision of one man, Abdullah Ocalan.

The military coup in 1980 is another important background factor which contributed to the escalation of violence four years later. It was followed by a new wave of repression and humiliation which significantly worsened the position of Kurds in Turkey. The majority of insurgent groups were disrupted, however, the PKK fled the country and continued the preparation for insurgency from Lebanon and Syria.²⁰ The PKK returned to the Turkish territory in 1984 and the spiral of violence between its guerilla fighters and the Turkish military troops began. Some authors claim that the armed struggle was the only possibility in a closed political system.²¹ In the same vein Coser argues that true access to the political system is the only remedy which can minimize violence.²²

The conflict was also influenced by external background factors. The Iraq-Iranian war in 1980s had resulted in about 1, 5 million people fleeing from Northern Iraq to Turkey.²³ The exodus of refugees was repeated again after the Gulf War. The refugees’ problem forced the world to pay attention to the situation of the Kurds and gave rise to abundant Diaspora.²⁴ The Gulf war particularly created a power vacuum which enabled the Turkish government to strike PKK bases on the Iraqi territory. On the other hand it meant an important trigger for the mobilization of Turkish Kurds and an increase in margin maneuver in the southeast of Turkey because the number of security forces was significantly reduced there.²⁵ Moreover we can identify the dissolution of the Soviet Empire as another factor that had a temporary impact on the financial support and hasend the group’s shift in ideology toward greater pragmatism.

The Turkish determination to defeat the PKK was reinforced after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. In the perspective of proclaimed ‘war on terror’ the Turkish fight acquired new legitimacy that went arm in arm with intensification of anti-Kurdish policy.²⁶ The intervention to Iraq in 2003, highly unpopular in Turkey, had an impact not only on deterioration in Turkish-U.S. relations but also on the position of the PKK. Northern Iraq became a safe haven for the PKK’s military bases and the maneuver space for Turkey had been profoundly restricted there.²⁷