Lubya a palestinian demolished Village in Galilee Memory-History-Culture-Identity Mahmoud Issa Preface
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The leader of platoon 5: “I received orders to move my platoon forward in order to receive orders in the field. From the direction of platoon 4, fire was heard continuously, although the other frontiers were quiet. While moving forward, the sergeant of the platoon discovered that men were running along the frontier from east to west. It was difficult to identify them, and we imagined that they were Arabs trying to encircle us. ‘The Arabs are surrounding our men’, one cried and started firing from his machine gun on the running men. Then we realised that they were from platoon 2. I ordered the firing to stop, but the result was the injury of the sergeant of the platoon. “The envoy who was sent to me from platoon 2 informed me of my mistake, and he also told me to support platoon 4 from the rear. The machine gun Biza, supposed to help in occupying the western zenith, was added to my force. I moved my men back and joined platoon 4. It was then past 7 in the morning. I positioned my platoon and went to reconnoitre before advancing. Amos, the leader of platoon 4, saw me, and while he tried to come towards me he was injured by a bullet and left the battlefield. He asked me to take his platoon to attack the village under covering fire from machine gun Biza. While we discussed the situation we saw platoon 4 retreating... “When I saw the withdrawal I ordered my troops to shoot on the eastern road in front of us. After the withdrawal was completed, I asked if they had left any wounded from the platoon, and then I ordered the rest of the troops including the Biza (machine gun) men to open fire on the whole area. The fire of the Biza succeeded in stopping the enemy, who controlled the peak after our withdrawal from it. In this way we achieved the retreat of platoon 4. “We were in a defensive stand-by position, waiting for further instructions. We saw support convoys streaming from the north, through the al-Maghar - ‘‘Aylabun road, towards the enemy. They stopped one km north of Khirbat Maskana, and from there they advanced on foot towards the village. I saw three cars arriving before noon, and the total may have been more than ten. “After the retreat of platoon 4, I opened fire with the Biza towards the support convoy. The results were not effective, but at least disturbed the enemy and delayed its activities. The leader of platoon 2, who was also the company’s second commander, sent me an envoy with orders to occupy the hill that was left by platoon 4.... I said that I could not carry out the orders. At that moment a wireless man arrived, and I contacted the battalion’s leader. I explained the situation, and he allowed me to act according to my own assessment. One of the soldiers in platoon 4: “When we moved west to impede the enemy’s attempt to encircle us, we met fire from Khirbat Maskana. We found ourselves caught between two attacks. The Arabs, under cover of their machine guns, tried to encircle us, with many troops participating. They advanced through the valley under protection from their friends. We opened fire on them, and we succeeded in stopping a wave of attack, but after several more waves, this time with up to 30 men, we could not hold our position. We retreated in a wide area... “We collected our dead, and we hid one of the heavily injured in a cleft, and with the rest of the wounded we withdrew to the headquarters of the battalion in al-Shajara, under covering fire of our troops... The leader of platoon 1: “Immediately after we gained control over the stone walls which formed a strong barrier for the right wing of our forces, I organised our three squads in a defence position and directed the half-range machine gun towards the eastern peak of Lubya, and the valley which divides the two peaks. I heard heavy shooting, but it was not directed particularly towards us. I gave my troops a chance to rest and eat their breakfast. I had no visual contact with battalion headquarters, and the company’s officer didn’t know our exact location. After 7 o’clock I went to the company’s headquarters and delivered a report on our situation. “It was made known to me that our attack had failed. I received orders to stay where I was until further instructions. The way back to the company’s headquarters was already becoming more difficult because of the Arabs’ accurate shooting; that irritated us a lot. That was the first time I felt that the shooting was directed towards me personally. “It became clear that an attack on the platoon had taken place while I was absent. There were 20 to 30 men who approached us from the fields, and came up to about 200 m. from us. Their shooting was very accurate; my wireless man was wounded. I transferred the wounded man to company headquarters while the others began to dig themselves. An attack on the village from this position was possible, but was very exposed and would have been senseless at the moment. I asked the company officer to give me permission to move my platoon to a more protected area south-west of the fields, but he refused. His justification was that many more causalities might occur than if we stayed where we were. The enemy launched two attacks between 9.30 and 10. I couldn’t understand how the enemy had arranged covering fire, because the bullets were fired on us from all directions, and yet I couldn’t see any one. The enemy advanced 100 steps, but we succeeded in repelling them. Two middle-range machine guns were out of order, also the 2-inch rocket launcher stopped after firing three rockets. During the attack I relocated the Shortsaloza and directed it towards the attackers; two sergeants of two squads were wounded. “I asked for a second time for permission to withdraw, especially because of the casualties in my platoon. The company officer asked me first to repel the attack and then to retreat. After 11 o’clock the Arabs launched the decisive counterattack. The Arabs encircled us, moving from one field to another in a northerly direction. We saw them passing through the open area between the fields where we tried to stop them, but in vain. When they disappeared into another field I expected that their attack had been driven back; so I decided to retreat. “We gathered in groups around the wounded, and at that moment we encountered 30 Arabs running towards us, at a distance of only a few steps. They were spread out in a chain wearing khaki clothes and white scarves (hatta), and shooting from guns fixed at their waists. I tried to open fire, but it didn’t help. The situation was bad, and I realised that there was no hope of victory. So I fled with my troops back to the field and regrouped the platoon. I didn’t know why the Arabs stopped pursuing us. I started the retreat with fifty men, and now there were only 19; I realised later that some troops, independently, had retreated to al-Shajara. The total losses of the platoon were 9 men. On our way back we encountered fire, but we arrived in al-Shajara without any additional losses. (End of p.225) One of the more insightful official notes written about Lubya showed openly that the battle of Lubya was considered as the only time during the independence war that “out attack failed”. I have chosen to present the whole passage of assessment because of its insightful notes and varied evaluation of both Luyans and the events of its occupation and the consequences to the whole regional plan of Upper Galillee: “It was surprising, considering the situation and that was one of the rare incidents, I could say, the only time during the independence war, that our attack failed since we exceeded them in force. We had almost equal numbers in men: the defenders of the village were no more than 300 to 350 armed men, while our number was 400 (here one can notice the exagerated numbers reported by Lubyans in relation to the numbers documented officially in this assessment). Part of our troops was not trained, though they had taken part in guard responsibility in other Arab locations. A number of them had a guard mission in al-Shajara. “In spite of that, the number of the company’s men who participated in the main attack exceeded 200 fighters who should, without any doubt, have been able to cover the length of the front and enter the village. In the end, it is most plausible to assume that the enemy strengthened their numbers by the support they received from others. But we have to remind ourselves that the attack was repulsed a long time before the support and assistance arrived (Actually Lubyans repulsed the first atacks before any help arrived from neighbouring villages). And the men of the village alone accomplished this. “The weapons of the enemy fighters were no more than rifles. Facing them there were, in addition to armed men, 10 to 15 light middle-range machine guns, 2 middle-range machine guns, numbers of 3-inch rocket-launchers, and two 65mm canons. The sound of these weapons alone should have been enough to scare the enemy away. “This operation was begun by us. We had chosen the time for the attack, the places to enter, and the detailed plan. Furthermore, we had the highest morale, especially after consecutive victories over different Arab villages, while the Lubyans had heard and seen how this and that village had fallen into our hands. “It is possible that the main reason for what happened in the battle over Lubya was our carelessness when the enemy gave signs of preparation for counterattack. Another type of attack had been suggested earlier: an encircling plan that was to start from Tiberias and control the hill in the north of the street, near Hittin Horn, Nimrin location, and 325 locations which overlooked ‘‘Aylabun. Such an attack would have faced almost no resistance, because it would have taken place in the enemy’s backyard and not on its bases. That plan could have separated Lubya from the strategic Arab villages surrounding it. That plan could have finished its role as a barrier on the road to Tiberias. In addition, it could have given us total control over the Nazareth-Khirbat Maskana-al Maghar road, used by the enemy. The reason for not using the plan was not that we found it to be inoperable, but rather, to be accomplished in a simple way, it required more forces. “The attack was a classic example of a direct confronting attack against the prepared enemy positions. But it was unsuccessful, either because the plan lost its initiative of surprise (due to the lack of co-ordination with the tank company), or because of unexpected resistance from the enemy. We have to remember that the Lubyans have always been brave fighters, and took pride in the name of their village. The loss of other Arab villages didn’t enfeeble their morale; on the contrary, it gave rise to a feeling of superiority over the others and that they had no one who resembled them. “Another factor, actually derived from the previous reason, was the absence of coherence between the troops. The whole operation was under the leadership of one regiment, those who made the attack were from a company from another regiment, and the armoured vehicles did not belong to the regiment. The 5 platoons of the attacking company were formed temporarily and the majority of them were formed only for this specific operation, and were not well trained. “The leaders of the companies hardly knew one another. There is no doubt that their ability to act together and lead such incoherent troops was limited. From this came two additional failings: the available troops were not used properly; and there was difficulty in adapting to the changing conditions. Only a little more than one third of the powers assembled for the operation had participated directly against the enemy. The other third were used to safeguard locations against expected counterattacks on back bases, and the last third arrived late and participated in the attack gradually, without any decisive effect. What was missing here was obviously maximal concentration of troops, ammunition, and weapons at the decisive time and place... “It was probable that the enemy snipers’ ability played a decisive role in hindering our attack. They were well trained and with high capability in using their private guns. It was almost impossible to move on the battlefield. “The superiority of the enemy manifested itself not only in accurate shooting, but also in adaptability to the topography of the area. As a result, our troops failed to see the enemy in most cases. Apart from direct attacks, we could not locate the enemy’s weapons. Our troops were almost powerless: there is nothing worse than not seeing a target in front of you. “Another note on a common phenomenon: the attack was to have taken place at night, but was changed to the daytime because of different delays. This caused the estimation of the plan to change. An interesting example is the snipers’ fire: snipers cannot be very efficient during the night, contrary to their capacity in the daytime where their superiority made a great difference. Therefore the necessary lessons we should deduct from the attack on Lubya are the following: “We could have defeated them had we taken more caution. We had expected to defeat them easily. With more careful planning we could have occupied Lubya by the middle of June 48, and spared a lot of extra effort. But this experience became a blessing to our forces. “After 24 hours in the battlefield, all the time under the enemy’s fire, our forces retreated, tired, broken and depressed. The failure had deeply wounded our troops, yet they now had only one goal: to return and do better. Nevertheless, the operation, interestingly, had achieved something as important as Lubya’s occupation: it had disturbed the enemy’s plans in the upper Galilee. In addition to that, the separation of the upper Galilee was prevented, although the attack on Lubya failed. When Kawukji heard of the attack on Lubya, he changed his plans to separate the upper Galilee, by cancelling an attack near Rosh Pinah, co-ordinated with the Syrian attack from the east, and came with most of his troops to help the village. 1 Joseph Conrad’s fiction was the subject of my PhD in English Literature from the Faculty of Humanities, Copenhagen University (1993). The thesis, “Involvement and Detachment in Joseph Conrad’s Fiction,” was later published as a book. Mahmoud Issa, Involvement and Detachment in Joseph Conrad’s Fiction. Copenhagen: Regnbue Publishing House, 1995. 2 See, UNGA Resolution 194(III), 11 December 1948. Paragraph 11 “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; [and] Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation ... .” 3 Den Faedrene Jord (The Ancestors’ Land), 31 March 1995. A copy of the documentary may be obtained through Danish Radio. Danish Radio, TV-byen, 2860 Søborg. E-mail: dr@dr.dk. 4 Mahmoud Issa, “Dreams and Realities, Palestinians from Lubya in Denmark,” Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council, 1995. 5 Middle East Information, The Problem of Arab Refugees, State Archives, Foreign Ministry, Refugees, 2444/19 cited in Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis. New York: The Free Press, 1998, p. 30. 6 The memorial tree was planted in 2000 in response to an official protest to the Deputy Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Pahad, by Uri Davis, an Israeli researcher, and Iqbal Jassat, Chairman of the Media Review Network in South Africa. On 23 August 2002, Iqbal Jassat wrote a letter to Deputy Minister Pahad concerning the abuse of the name South Africa by the Zionist organizations involved. The letter stated, in part: “Given the information detailed in the Eyewitness Report of Uri Davis, notably the apparent complicity of the Jewish National Fund, the friends of the JNF and the Women’s Zionist Organization of South Africa with the cover-up of the ethnic cleansing of the 1948 Palestine refugees and related war crimes, should the JNF, the friends of the JNF and the Women’s Zionist Organization of South Africa be declared illegal organizations acting in violation of the Constitution of the new South Africa and be ordered to disband?” I also saw that in addition to Lubya’s tree there were trees dedicated to the destroyed Palestinian villages of Tantoura and Dayr Yasin, both sites of massacres during the 1948 war in Palestine. 7 For a list of the Palestinian villages depopulated in 1948 see, S.H. Abu Sitta, The Palestinian Nakba 1948, The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine. London: The Palestinian Return Centre, 2000. For a description of the life in each village, the circumstances of its depopulation and the status of the village lands today see, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948. Walid Khalidi (ed.). Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. Also see, www.palestineremembered.com, which includes a special page on Lubya (www.palestineremembered.com/Tiberias/Lubya/index.html). Many Lubyans in exile communicate through this website where they can also contribute photos and comments. 8 The book was originally published in 1954 [see original] and subsequently republished in 1994 by Birzeit University. Ibrahim Shihabi, Qaryat Lubya [The Village of Lubya]. Bir Zeit: Bir Zeit University, 1994. 9 Muhammad Khalil passed away before I had an opportunity to get to come to know him. Years later, however, I was introduced to his wife, Um Isam, and his sons who are living in Nazareth. I am grateful to the family for allowing me to use Abu Isam's diary for my research. 10 [For an overview see, e.g., Michael Fischbach, Records of Dispossession,Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 11Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.). New York: International Publishers, 1971, pp. 324 and 423; Selections from Cultural Writings. David Forgacs & Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.). London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985, p. 189, cited in Ted Swedenberg, Memories of Revolt, the 1936-39 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, p. 27. 12 The interview with Abu Sameh al-Samadi was conducted in Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus in 1999 . 13 The interview with Haj Karzoun was conducted in Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus in 1999 . 14 Fayiz al-Fawaz (Abu Majid) was born in 1925. Interviews were conducted on 6 February and 8 October 1998 in Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus, Syria. During the first interview six other Lubyans participated by correcting, adding and sometimes contradicting Abu Majid’s views. The intervention of Sheikh Mahmoud Samadi, an Islamic writer and researcher in both Palestinian and Syrian circles, was very useful in fixing the dates of incidents, the location of places, and the names of prominent personalities who played a fundamental role in shaping the modern history of the village and its surroundings. 15 The Islamic calendar is based on twelve lunar months totaling 354 days. 16 Ibn al-Athir, Kamil fi al-Tarikh [A Comprehensive History]. Vol. II. Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1979, pp. 532-537. 17 al-Maosoa'a al-Falastiniyya [The Palestinian Encyclopaedia]. Vol. II. Damascus: Committee for al-Maosoa'a, 1984, p. 408. 18 Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani Hasan. Tarajim wa al-Siyar [Dictionaries and Biographies]. Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1955. 19 Ibid, p. 834 quoting Sheikh Ahmad al-Bidairi al-Hallak, Hawadith Dimashq al-Yawmiyya [Daily Incidents of Damascus]. Ahmad Izzat al-Arabi (ed.). Cairo: al-Jam’iyya al-Misriyya al-Tarikhiyya, Lajnat al-Bayan al-Arabi, 1959, pp. 42-47. See also Khalidi’s reference to Musa Abu Dayya (ed.), Zahir al-‘Umar wa hukkam jabal Nablus, 1771-1773 [Zahir al-‘Umar and the Rulers of Mount Nablus]. Edited and Annotated Text of a Manuscript by Ibrahim al-Danafi al-Samiri (d. 1790). Nablus: al-Najah University, Center for Documentation and Research, 1986, p. 19. Cited in All that Remains, The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, supra note 8, p. 527. 20 Muhammad Omar Hamada, A’lam Filastin [Palestine Media]. Part I. Damascus: Dar Kutaiba, 1985, pp. 162-63 and pp. 720-27. 21 The interview with Yousef Abu Dhais was conducted in Homs, Syria on 16 November 1998. 22 Yousef Abu Dhais, Lubya, al-Ard wa al-Sha’b. Damascus: Dar al-Mustaqbal, 1998. 23 Abu Walid is the brother of Abu Sameh al-Samadi. The interview was conducted in Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus, Syria in 1999. 24 Abu Muhammad Kilani was born in 1932. The interview with him was conducted in Lubya on 19 October 1995. 25 Rafik Abdel-Karim, “Palestine in the Ottoman Era, From the 19th Century until 1918,” al-Maosoa'a al-Falastiniyya [The Palestinian Encyclopaedia]. Vol. II, supra note 11, pp. 850-976. 26 Shumacher cited ibid. 27 From a report written by Sha’ban and Nasir al-Khalidi to the Muslim leadership in Jerusalem. Letter to Qism Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami-al-Quds on the 26 August 1936. [On file with the author]. 28 In 1922 the League of Nations entrusted the temporary administration of Palestine to Great Britain until such a time as the population of the country was deemed ready for independence. The League considered Palestine as a “Class A” Mandate or closest to independence. A copy of the Mandate for Palestine is archived on the website of the UN Information System on Palestine (UNISPAL), www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/unispal.htm. In early 1947 the British government informed the UN of Great Britain’s intention to withdraw from Palestine, which it completed in May 1948. 29 British statistical information is reproduced in Survey of Palestine. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Reprinted in Full by the Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991. Also see, Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine, Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 30 Lubya (Tiberias District) 1943-1944; Haganah Archives, File No. 105/222. [Copy on file with the author] The document further notes that of the entire population, 480 persons were men aged 18-48. 31 Abu Sitta, supra note 8, pp. 52-53. 32 Jorgen Pedersen, Bryllupet I Ramallah (Wedding in Ramallah). Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003, p. 82, citing the tapes of the interview between Israeli researcher Teddy Katz and Mordechai Sokoler. Sokoler put the number of dead at 230. According to Katz's research, which generated considerable controversy at the University of Haifa, the Alexandroni brigade was responsible for the massacre. For eye-witness accounts of the massacre see, “The Tantura Massacre, 22-23 May 1948,” 30 Journal of Palestine Studies 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-18. For an overview of the research by Teddy Katz see, Ilan Pappe, “The Tantura Case in Israel: The Katz Research and Trial,” 30 Journal of Palestine Studies 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 19-39. A book about Tantoura, written by Yihya Mahmoud, from the same village was printed many years before Teddy Katz made famous the events and the massacres that followed Tantoura’s occupation. But because the first book was written in Arabic, no one in the international media mentioned it. 33 Issa Lubani was born in 1931. The interview with him was conducted in Nazareth on 19 September 1995. 34 Issa Lubani's books included: Urs al-Dam [Bloody Wedding], a trilogy entitled, al-Sukoot [The Fall], al-Kalak [The Anxiety and Worry], and Waja' al-Qalb [The Pained Heart], and another trilogy, Yamshoon A'la Had al-Mousa [Walking on the Razor's Edge]. In total he had fifteen books ready to be published. 35 Tahir Mahmoud Husayn (Abu Tal'at) was born in 1914. The interview with him was conducted in Irbid, Jordan on 1 April 1996. 36 Ibn Khaldun, one of the main Arab scholars who studied this phenomena refers to the central concept of ‘asabiyya or “group feeling”. Cited in Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East, An Anthropological Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989, p. 24. Eickelman observes that this “group feeling need not depend upon blood relationships existing between those persons who share it, but the bonds of solidarity must be such that they take precedence over all other bonds of association”. Ibid, p. 25. 37 Lubya (Tiberias District) 1943-1944, supra note 32. 38 For more details and documentation see Masalha, supra note 5. 39 Ibrahim Pasha became “Palestine's most impressive modernizer. Ruling the lands in his father's name,” writes Israeli historian Ilan Pappe, “[Ibrahim Pasha] introduced agricultural reforms, centralized taxation, safe roads and a constitutional system that gave fair representation to the local elite.” Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine, One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 3. 40 Lubya (Tiberias District) 1943-1944, supra note 32. 41 Ibid. 42 The interview with Yousef al-Yousef was conducted in Damascus, Syria together with Ibrahim Shihabi on 13 October 1998. 43 The interview with Yousef Muhammad Issa was conducted in Copenhagen, Denmark on 15 January 1995. Yousef is my father. 44 Bin Katta, cited in Shihab al-Din al-Hamawi al-Roumi al-Baghdadi, Mu’jam al-Buldan. Vol. V. Muhammad Abdul Rahman Mar’ashli (ed.). Beirut: Dar Ihia al-Torath al-Arabi-Libanon, 1376/1975, p. 25. 45 Ihsan Hakki, al-Jaza’ir al-Arabiyya – ‘Ard al-Kifah al-Majid. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijari, 1971, p. 15, cited in Shihabi, supra note 9, p. 11. 46 Ahmad Daoud, al-Arab wa al-Samiyoon wa al’Ibraniyoon wa Banu Israel wa al-Yahood. Damascus: Dar al-Mustaqbal, 1991, p. 13, cited in Shihabi, ibid. 47 Biladuna Filastin [Our Country Palestine]. Vol. VI. Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a, 1965, p. 424. 48 Ibid. 49 The Official Guide to Israel. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defence, Carta, Israel Maps and Publishing Co. Ltd., p. 287. 50 Ernest Klein, A Comprehensive Ethnological Dictionary of the Hebrew Language, Carta, 1987, p. 292. 51 For more details about the renaming process, see Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape, The Buried History of the Holy Land. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. This was not the first time, however, that Zionist officials had dealt with the renaming of places in Lubya. In the 1940s there is a letter written in French advising against the use of the name ‘Sarjonia’ (the name of a piece of land in Lubya) for a new center in the Jewish settlement of Hazariim. Officials argued that the name referred to a king who was hostile to the Israelites. “le nom d’un roi assyrien (Sergon) hostile aux israelites.” File No. J15/7591. Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. [Copy on file with the author]. 52 Village Statistics 1945, A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine. Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970, pp. 72 and 172. 53 Lubya (Tiberias District), 1943-1944, supra note 32. 54 Pappe, supra note 41, pp. 34-35. 55 James Silk Buckingham, Travels in Palestine. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1821, p. 491. Also see All That Remains, supra note 8, p. 527. 56 John L. Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land. London: John Murray, 1822, pp. 332-333. The names of the main villages were also writen in Arabic. Burckhardt also mentions the encampment of Bedouins from the Subeih tribe. Lubyans had several clashes with this tribe. 57 Lieut. C. R. Conder, R.E., & Lieut. H. H. Kitchener, R.E., The Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs of the Topography, Orography, Hydrography & Archaeology. Vol. 1. London: Adelphi, 1881, p. 412. 58 Baedeker’s Palestine and Syria, Handbook for Travelers. Karl Baedeker (ed.). London: Dulau and Co., 1898, p. 286. 59 All That Remains, supra note 8, p. 527. 60 John Murray (Firm), Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine. Mary Brodrick (ed.). London: E. Stanford, 1903, p. 244. 61 Lubya (Tiberias District), 1943-1944, supra note 32. 62 Tamam ‘Ajayni (Um Hassan) was born in 1898. The interview with her was conducted on 7 October 1995 in Dayr Hanna, Israel. 63 Fawzi Qawuqji was the leader of Arab volunteer forces during the 1936-39 uprising in Palestine and was later commander of the Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh) formed under the Arab League to assist Palestinian Arabs in the 1947-49 conflict and war in Palestine. 64 Ahmad Khalil Joudi (Abu Sameeh) was born in 1932. The interview with him was conducted in Dayr Hanna, Israel on 9 May 1999. 65 A 'Retroactive Transfer' plan prepared by Yosef Weitz, director of the Jewish National Fund's Land Department (Developoment Division) and chairman of two Israeli transfer committees established after 1948, in June 1948 outlined a package of six methods to prevent the return of Palestinian refugees. This included the demolition of Palestinian refugees, settlement of Jews in these areas and the adoption of laws to prevent refugees from returning. Weitz, Diary III, p. 294, entry for 30 May 1948, cited in Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 136. 66 The interview with Mustafa al-Sa’id (Abu Khalid) was conducted in Burj al-Shamali refugee camp in Lebanon on 10 February 1999. 67 |