Gcse ancient History

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2.5 Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus
The Romans meanwhile appointed Quintus Fabius as Dictator. He was a man of admirable character and supreme intelligence, and his descendants to this day bear the surname Maximus, “the Greatest,” in recognition of his victorious achievements.

Polybius 3.87.6

http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/romansag/g/FabiusMaximus.htm on the background to Quintus Fabius [with a link to Plutarch’s Life of Fabius].

Fabius took over Servilius’ army and marched to Apulia and camped at Aecae near the enemy. Hannibal moved in Campania while Fabius followed. His strategy allowed Hannibal to destroy allied land, causing economic loss and a lowering of morale. Fabius at one point thought he had Hannibal trapped as he tried to move back north. But Hannibal tricked Fabius when he drove 2000 oxen with burning sticks attached to their horns towards Fabius’ camp at night. In the confusion Hannibal’s army slipped past Fabius. (Livy 22.15-17)

Task 2K

Read Polybius’s assessment of the situation and his contrast between the Romans and the Carthaginians at this point in the war (3.89).

What difficulties did Fabius face both against Hannibal and with his own people?

Plutarch gives us the following account:

He concentrated all his own thoughts on Hannibal. He had no plans for a single fight to the finish, since his enemy was at the peak of his strength. So his strategy was to wear him down over time, to use Rome’s financial strength to counter his limited resources, and Italy’s manpower to decrease his relatively small army.

Plutarch, Life of Fabius Maximus, 5.1
The civilian population viewed such time-wasting tactics with contempt. He certainly had a poor reputation in his own army, but the Carthaginians went further, despising him as an insignificant coward. Only one man saw it differently – and that was Hannibal himself.

He alone understood his opponent’s strategy and realised how intelligently he applied it. He realised that he must use every possible tactical device to bring him to battle. Otherwise the Carthaginians would be done for, unable to use the weaponry in which they were superior, while steadily losing their already inferior manpower and wasting their inadequate resources with nothing to show for it.

Plutarch, Life of Fabius Maximus, 5.2-3
His Master of the Horse, Minucius, wanted a much more aggressive strategy and tried to undermine his command among the soldiers. When urged by his friends to counter the insults of Minucius he replied (according to Plutarch 5.6).
“If I did that, I would be an even greater coward than I now appear, since I would be abandoning my calculated strategy for fear of a few jokes and insults. There is no disgrace in being afraid for the future of one’s country; but if a man is frightened of the insults and criticisms of popular opinion, he betrays his high office and becomes a slave to the fools over whom it is his duty as ruler to exercise control.”

Task 2L
How is Fabius characterised by Plutarch?
Livy tells us how Fabius was partly undermined by a cavalry action by Minucius which had some success but which was exaggerated by Minucius when reporting to Rome. He had forced Hannibal to move his camp. When Fabius returned to the camp from Rome after power was to be shred between him and Minucius, they decided to divide the army rather than sharing the command. Minucius fell into a trap set by Hannibal on hilly, broken ground suited to his ambushes and Minucius’ forces were saved only by the arrival of Fabius’ army (Polybius 3. 104-105). However, Fabius’ term of office ended in 217 BC and new consuls were elected for 216 BC: Terrentius Varro and Aemilius Paulus.

Livy’s account of the treatment of Fabius

This describes the treatment of Fabius by the Roman people and the Senate and displays a sympathy for Fabius and portrays him as an honourable patriot who refuses to be diverted from what he knows is right. Minucius is the popular leader, not a member of the traditional aristocracy.

Everyone in Rome and in the army, whether friend or foe to Fabius, regarded this decision as a calculated insult – except the Dictator himself. With the same calmness and mental resolution as he had endured the denunciations of his enemies in the popular assemblies, he now bore this cruel injustice inflicted on him by an angry nation. En route for the army, he received the despatches reporting the Senate’s decree (senatus consultum) about the division of powers. But undaunted and undefeated by citizen or enemy alike, he rejoined the army, entirely confident that no legislation could enforce equality of military genius along with equality of military command.

Livy 22.26.5-7

Compare this with Livy’s portrayal of Varro at 22.26:
As a young man, Varro had inherited the fruits of his father’s “business” activities, and immediately conceived somewhat loftier ambitions. Smart suits and political activity (literally: the toga and the forum) became his stock in trade and he began to make speeches on behalf of the dregs of society. By taking up such populist causes and denouncing the wealth and reputation of the better class of citizens, he soon won himself a national reputation amongst the common people, and thus gained political office. He became a treasury official (Quaestor), and was then twice elected a city magistrate (Aedile), first as a deputy to the Tribunes (Plebeian Aedile), and then as a part of the city administration (Curule Aedile). Finally, having won the praetorship and completed his term of office, he had now set his eyes on the consulship. He had sufficient low cunning to make political capital out of the Dictator’s unpopularity, and when the proposal (to divide the powers of the dictatorship) was carried in the popular assembly (became a plebiscite), he alone got the credit.

Livy 22.26

Varro was a ‘novus homo’ – a new man whose family had never held the consulship: but he must have had support in the Senate to succeed in politics and cannot have been the enemy of the Senate as the sources suggest. Aemilius was the patrician aristocrat who is presented as cautious and sensible, who had already held a consulship in 219 BC. He was the experienced statesman, Varro the young and inexperienced hothead. The ancient accounts always present events as the result of the characters of those involved, and the accounts of 216 BC are no different.

2.6 The Battle of Cannae

The Romans increased their army to eight legions (according to Polybius), although it is thought that 80,000 Roman soldiers and allies is far too large an army. Hannibal’s force amounted to 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (Livy 22.46.6). The Roman army was probably slightly larger in infantry but less in cavalry. Hannibal had taken the supply-depot at Cannae on the right bank of the River Aufidus. He had chosen a site suitable for his cavalry. Livy explains how the commanders differed on their approach, just as Fabius and Minucius had.

Once again disorder broke out in the Roman camp, with the troops proving mutinous and the consuls incapable of agreement. Lucius Aemilius Paulus (Varro’s colleague in the consulship) kept reminding Varro of what had been the results of the rash leadership of Sempronius and Flaminius; Varro sarcastically threw back at him Fabius’ “wonderful” example, as a cowardly and un-enterprising general.

Livy 22.44.5

Once the forces were massed at Cannae, the commanders shared the command on alternate days. Livy (22.44.5) gives the impression that Varro crossed the river and drew up the battle line without Aemilius’ agreement on a day when he had command. The Infantry was massed in the centre, with cavalry on the wings, each consul taking command of a wing (22.45.6-8).
Livy (22. 46) describes the Carthaginian formations, although he does not mention that the infantry were drawn up in a crescent shape at this point. However, at 47.7 he makes it clear that this was the tactic.
Hannibal had aimed to contain the attack of Roman infantry and then use it against them in a trap. Polybius describes the formation as a ‘moon shape’. It was meant to take the shock of the attack from the Romans. The Celts and Spaniards in the centre did not break- if they had done so and the Romans had broken through their superiority in infantry the Romans would have won the battle. The Africans on the wings turned inwards and attacked the sides of the Romans. Then the heavy cavalry of Hasdrubal attacked the rear of the Roman lines.
Aemilius Paulus, Servilius, Minucius, 80 senators, 29 military tribunes, 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry (Livy 22. 49). Polybius (3.117) says 70,000 Romans died and about 10,000 were captured. Varro escaped to Venusia with about 50 cavalry. Scipio Africanus with some infantry reached Canusium.
Carthaginian losses were 4000 to 5,700 Celts, 1,500 Spaniards and Africans and 200 cavalry (Polybius 3.117).

Task 2M
Research the full account of the battle:

http://www.roman-empire.net/army/cannae.html

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-cannae.html

http://www.livius.org/ha-hd/hannibal/hannibal.html
Did Hannibal win because of his own military skill or because of Roman incompetence?

Maps of Cannae

http://www.livius.org/a/1/maps/cannae_map.gif
After the battle

Task 2N

Why did Hannibal not immediately march on Rome? Do you think it was the right decision? Read the following extracts and information and make points for and against his decision.

In his moment of victory Hannibal was surrounded by his staff, crowding round to congratulate him and urge him after such a massive success to spend the remainder of the day and the following night resting himself, and giving his exhausted soldiers time to recover. But Maharbal, his cavalry commander would have none of it, urging him not to waste a moment. “I’ll tell you what this battle has really achieved,” he declared, “when in five days time you are feasting on the Capitol. Follow up quickly. I’ll go ahead with the cavalry, and before they even realise we are coming, the Romans will discover we’ve arrived.” For Hannibal it all seemed far too optimistic, an almost inconceivable possibility. He commended Maharbal for his imaginative idea, but said he needed time to think it through. Maharbal’s reply was short and to the point. “The gods do not give all their gifts to any one man. You can win a battle, Hannibal. But you have no idea how to exploit it.”

That single day’s delay, by common consent, proved the salvation of Rome and her empire.
Livy 22.51

So, why didn’t he march on Rome immediately?

Many towns in Apulia, Samnium, Lucanai and Bruttium revolted to Hannibal; Capua followed in the autumn giving him a good base for the winter. it looked as though the confederacy was breaking up. However Etruria, Umbria and Latium remained loyal to Rome, as did most of the coastal cities of Campania.
Rome’s army in Italy was destroyed and her finances were seriously lessened with demands from Sicily and Sardinia for pay for army and fleet.
However, Hannibal did not have the equipment to undertake a siege, nor the numbers to starve Rome to surrender.
His veterans were reduced in numbers since 219 BC and he needed fresh reserves which were not immediately sent. He received 4000 cavalry and 40 elephants.

Instead Hannibal consolidated his support in the south and used his forces to garrison towns, thus dividing and weakening his army. Supplies would be a constant worry. Protecting his new allies became his concern and as such he lost the initiative.

Rome:

The Senate maintained the army in Spain to prevent resources reaching Hannibal. Hasdrubal was defeated there at Ibera in 215 BC. This meant that resources went to Spain not Hannibal in Italy.
The Romans recruited two urban legions from 17 year olds, 8000 slaves who volunteered, and 6000 criminals released from jail. By 212 BC she had 25 legions
Allies in Sicily and Sardinia provided money for the fleet and army.
Roman naval superiority was maintained.
Taxes were doubled, men served in the army without pay, voluntary contributions were made by senators; public business was conducted by private money according to Livy (23. 48).
The senate was now in charge of the war: they turned again to Fabius’ approach, realizing that he had been right.

Carthage - The government sought to extend the war:

They sent Hasdrubal to Sardinia but he achieved little. He was defeated by Manlius Torquatus.
They sought to gain the alliance of Philip of Macedon (215 BC); the Romans disrupted this alliance through Valerius Laevinus who took control of the Illyrian coast and then stirred up trouble for Philip in Greece.
They tried to cause a revolt against Rome in Sicily; Marcellus was sent to the island; in 212 BC he captured Syracuse and defeated a Carthaginian fleet. Sicily, the bridge between Africa and Italy was safely in Rome’s hands and Hannibal was cut off from his government in Carthage.

The war continued in Italy as a war of attrition, both sides destroying the crops and possessions of their enemies supporters. Hannibal had some notable success – taking Capua, Tarentum and other Greek cities in the south. There was also the moment in 211 BC when his army camped 4 miles from Rome and he himself rode up to the Colline Gate. This was really an attempt to divert Rome from the siege of Capua which failed (Polybius 9.5-6).

In 207 BC Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, crossed the Alps from Gaul and had an army of 30,000 in Northern Italy. The armies of the consuls met him at the River Metaurus and defeated him, Hasdrubal dying in the battle. The attempt to reinforce Hannibal had failed and Rome had won a set battle in Italy for the first time. The battle is described by Livy in Book 27. 47- 49.
Hannibal was forced to retreat to South Italy and wait for developments. He was on the defensive now waiting to see what Rome and Carthage would do. The course of the war was now in the hands of others such as Scipio in Spain.

In 205 BC Mago had been sent by the Carthaginians with 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to the gulf of Genoa. He received a further 6,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 7 elephants and 25 warships from Carthage plus money to hire soldiers. The intention was to keep Scipio in Sicily or Italy. In 203 BC Mago and the Romans fought a battle in the land of the Insubres, near Milan. Mago was wounded and retreated; then he was ordered by Carthage to return to Africa; he died on the journey. So the final attempt to bring reinforcements to Hannibal failed.

2.7 The younger Scipio (Africanus) and the battle of Zama

Gold signet ring from Capua (late 3rd or early 2nd century B.C.) signed by Herakliedes, and bearing the portrait of Scipio Africanus the Elder.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Scipio.jpg
The younger Scipio had defeated Hasdrubal at the battle of Baecula in 208 BC, and at Ilipa in 207 BC, he defeated a second Carthaginian army decisively. He captured Gades in 206 BC and effectively ended Carthage’s control of Spain. He then left for Rome to become consul for 205 BC.
His qualities:

he was a natural leader;
he understood the need to know the terrain and have knowledge of the enemy’s troops and movements;
he recognized how important it was to understand the thinking of the enemy;
he knew how to use the terrain to advantage;
he learnt from the past battles and used Hannibal’s tactics but adapted them for his own use;
he was determined but cautious, and like Hannibal, knew when to take risks and when not to;
he was, like Hannibal, a professional soldier.

He had already begun negotiations with both Masinissa and Syphax, Numidians, so that they might be his allies once the war moved to Africa and provide him with essential cavalry.

Scipio’s view was that a purely Italian policy was out of date and Rome needed not just to get Hannibal to leave Italy but to deal with Carthage once and for all. Fabius was more conservative – his aim had only ever been to force Hannibal out of Italy and he opposed the aggressive line of Scipio. But, with the Assembly’s support, Scipio won the province of Sicily with the option of invading Africa. However he was given only the two legions in Sicily, although he raised 7000 volunteers and had 30 warships. It was not until the spring of 204 BC that he crossed to Africa with 30,000 troops.

Task 2O
Read Livy 30.28 for the opposing views in Rome: how much support does Scipio have in Rome?

At Carthage feelings were very much the same. There were many who regretted that they had sought to make peace, when they thought of Hannibal and his great achievements; but the next moment they would remember that they had twice been defeated by Scipio, that Syphax was a captive, and that they had been driven out of Spain and Italy – all this thanks to the courage and military genius of one man, Scipio. He became their bogeyman, a figure of dread, the agent of Fate, a general born to bring them to destruction.

Livy 30.28.10

This is Livy’s description of the Carthaginians just before Hannibal’s return and the battle of Zama.

Task 2P
What does he mean by ‘two defeats’ and what was the importance of Syphax?

Research the following sites for the information:

http://www.historynet.com/second-punic-war-battle-of-zama.htm [detailed account of Scipio’s campaign in Africa]

http://www.fenrir.dk/history/index.php?title=Publius_Cornelius_Scipio_Africanus for links to events in Africa.

http://www.xenophon-mil.org/milhist/rome/scipio.htm

Scipio proves his tactical ability (and his willingness to use deceit and trickery) in winning a number of engagements in Africa before the arrival of Hannibal. His second-in-command, Laelius, had captured Syphax. The Carthaginians now asked for peace terms. Scipio agreed and offered terms which the Carthaginians accepted. It gave them time during the armistice to recall Mago and Hannibal. The armistice was broken by a Carthaginian fleet attacking Roman supply ships. Meanwhile Hannibal had returned and moved to Zama.

When they returned to camp, both generals ordered their soldiers to prepare for battle and stiffen their sinews for the final struggle. For if they won and the luck was with them, they would be victors not just for a day, but forever after. Next day, before night fell, they would know whether Rome or Carthage would make laws for all the nations; the reward for victory was not just Italy or Africa, but all the world. But for those that lost the battle, the risk equalled the reward. For the Romans, there would be no quick escape route home, here in an unfamiliar foreign land; for Carthage, with their last hope gone, immediate destruction loomed close at hand.
And so, next day, they reached the moment of decision. The two most famous generals, the two most powerful armies of the two richest nations upon earth, came to do battle, destined either to double or destroy the countless battle honours they had previously won.

Livy 30.32.1-4

This is Livy’s assessment of the importance of the battle.

Livy (30.30-31) gives an account of the two generals meeting before the battle

They were the two greatest generals of their age, the equals of any king or commander of any nation, in the whole of human history. 30.2. At first neither said a word, as if each was awe-struck at the sight of the other, each lost in admiration of his opponent. Hannibal was the first to speak.

Livy 30.30.1-2

This is part of Hannibal’s speech:
As for myself, time sees me now an old man returning home to the native land he left while still a boy. Success and failure have long since taught me that philosophy is a better guide to action than any reliance upon blind Fortune. You are young and luck has always been on your side. This, I fear, will make you too aggressive when what we need is quiet diplomacy. … You stand today where I once stood at Trasimene and Cannae. …Whatever risks you took, however bold, good fortune never let you down. … You avenged your father’s and your uncle’s deaths. …Spain was lost; you won it back by driving out four Carthaginian armies. They made you consul, when others lacked the guts to fight for Italy; but you went further, and sailed out to Africa. There you slaughtered two armies, captured and fired two camps, took prisoner Syphax, our most powerful ruler…. And now, finally, you have dragged me out of Italy after sixteen years of stubborn occupation of that land. To men of action, victory can often seem a greater prize than peace. … But if, when all goes well, the gods would only give us the blessing of good sense, we would bear in mind not only what has already happened, but also what may happen in the future. …I am proof enough of how luck changes. …The more Fortune smiles upon you, the less she should be trusted.

Livy 30.30.10-18

Discussion points

How accurate is his assessment?

What is the point he is making?
Does the rest of his speech support his argument?

This is part of Scipio’s reply:
You are actually asking to profit from your treachery, even though you do not deserve to retain even the original conditions. Our ancestors did not start the war in Sicily; we did not start the war in Spain. In Sicily it was our allies, the Mamertines, who were under threat; in Spain it was the sack of Saguntum, which drove us to take up arms in two just and holy wars. You have acknowledged, and the gods are witnesses to the truth of what you say, that you are the aggressors. Justice and the laws of heaven gave us victory in Sicily; they have given us victory in the recent war; and they will do so again if we fight here. As for myself, I am all too aware of human weakness, and there is no need to lecture me on the power of Fortune; I know very well that all our deeds are subject to a thousand strokes of luck. 31.7. I would be all too willing to admit that my conduct was arrogant and brutal, if of your own free will you had come to me to ask for peace before you abandoned Italy …. But now I have no such inhibitions, when we are here in Africa, on the eve of battle, and I have dragged you ducking and weaving and against your will to these negotiations. So now, therefore, if you have anything you wish to add to the peace conditions previously proposed, … then I will have something to take back to our authorities. But if that is too much for you, prepare for war, since peace you clearly find intolerable.

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