Ana səhifə

Frontiers of economics in the post-neoclassical era


Yüklə 137 Kb.
səhifə2/2
tarix25.06.2016
ölçüsü137 Kb.
1   2

IV. Conclusion

It must be noted that we have barely scratched the surface of areas of current research at the cutting edge of economics. However, most of what has been cited here in terms of research since the turn of the century has moved beyond the orthodox neoclassical approach, even if much of it has been done by mainstream economists, although the econophysicists are clearly an exception to that. We have seen that although they are mostly separate and parallel, our two main streams of experimental/behavioral economics and complexity economics do have some common roots and also have recently seemed to intersect and interpenetrate with each other more frequently. Complexity and bounded rationality are deeply connected with each other.

A final question raises itself that we are not going to attempt to answer in any depth. This involves the nature of the relationship between this newer research and the older heterodox schools of thought. I shall only note here in conclusion that this period of post-neoclassical upheaval opens many doors, and there are arguably chances for some ideas from some of these schools to enter into the current discourse, just as there is also the chance for some of these ideas to enter into and stimulate work in these schools. Thus, I would note Chiarella et al. (2005) as an example of Post Keynesian work that has been strongly influenced by the currents coming from research in nonlinear complex dynamics, just as older Post Keynesian models were sources of inspiration for some of the earlier complex dynamics models (Rosser, 2006). Also, certainly the ideas of Keynes are clearly more in tune with the newer behavioral economics than with the idea of fully rational and well-informed agents that have underpinned neoclassical economics.

Finally, just as one can find roots of modern approaches in Keynes, likewise Hayek (1978) foresaw the complexity approach, and the Austrians have long disavowed standard equilibrium analysis, emphasizing the distinctive nature of individual economic agents, even as their interactions may bring about a spontaneous order. In this new environment there may even be possibilities of cross-fertilization of ideas between these older schools of heterodox thought as they open to providing and receiving influences from the newer post-neoclassical approaches (Koppl and Rosser, 2002).


References

Agliari, Anna, Gian-Italo Bischi, and Laura Gardini. 2002. “Some Methods for the Global Analysis of Dynamic Games Represented by Iterated Noninvertible Maps.” In Tönu Puu and Irina Sushko, eds., Oligopoly Dynamics: Models and Tools. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 31-83.


Albin, Peter S. 1982. “The Metalogic of Economic Predictions, Calculations and Propositions.” Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 329-358.
Albin, Peter S. with Duncan K. Foley. 1998. Barriers and Bounds to Rationality: Essays on Economic Complexity and Dynamics in Interactive Systems. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Andreoni, James.1990. “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving.” Economic Journal 100, 464-477.
Aoki, Masanao and Hiroshi Yoshikawa. 2006. Restructuring Macroeconomics: A Perspective from Statistical Physics and Combinatorial Stochastic Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arifovic, Jasmina. 1996. “The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental Economies.” Journal of Political Economy 104, 510-541.
Arifovic, Jasmina. 2001. “Performance of Rational and Boundedly Rational Agents in a Model with Persistent Exchange Rate Volatility.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 5, 204-234.
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Gérard Debreu. 1954. “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy.” Econometrica 22, 265-290.
Aumann, Robert. 1995. “Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality.” Games and Economic Behavior 8, 6-19.
Axtell, Robert. 2001. “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes.” Science 293, 1818-1820.
Bachelier, Louis. 1900. “Théorie de la Spéculation.” Annales Scientifique de l’École Supérieure III-I, 21-86.
Banks, Jeffrey M., Mark Olson, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon Smith. 2003. “Theory, Experiment and the Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Auctions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51, 303-350.
Bateman, Bradley W. 2008. “2007 HES Presidential Address: Reflections on the Secularization of American Economics,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 30, 1-20.
Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson. 1999. “Equilibrium Selection and Evolutionary Drift.” Review of Economic Studies 66, 393-394.
Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton. 1985. “Testing Non-Cooperative Game Theory: A Preliminary Study.” American Economic Review. 75, 1178-1180.
Blum, Lenore, Felipe Cucker, Michael Shub, and Steve Smale. 1998. Complexity and Real Computation. New York: Springer.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition.” American Economic Review 90, 166-193.
Bouchaud, Jean-Philippe and R. Cont. 2002. “ A Langevin Approach to Stock Market Fluctuations and Crashes.” European Physical Journal B 6, 543-550.
Brenner, Thomas and Ulrich Witt. 2003. “Melioration Learning in Games with Constant and Frequency-Dependent Payoffs.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50, 429-448.
Brock, William A. and Steven N. Durlauf. 2001. “Discrete Choice with Social Interactions.” Review of Economic Studies 68, 235-260.
Brock, William A. and Cars H. Hommes. 1997. “A Rational Route to Randomness.” Econometrica 65, 1059-1095.
Brock, William A., Cars H. Hommes, and Florian Wagener. 2008. “More Hedging Instruments may Destabilize Markets.” Mimeo, SSRI University of Wisconsin-Madison, CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam.
Bullard, James and John Duffy. 2001. “Learning and Excess Volatility.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 5, 272-302.
Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, Colin F., George Lowenstein, and Drazen Prelec. 2005. “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroeconomics Can Inform Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 48, 9-64.
Carpenter, Stephen R., Donald Ludwig, and William A. Brock. 1999. “Management of Eutrophication for Lakes Subject to Potentially Reversible Change.” Ecological Applications 9, 751-771.
Chaitin, Gregory J. 1987. Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin. 2002. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817-869.
Chatterjee, Arnab, Sudhakar Yarlagadda, and Bikas K. Chakrabarti, eds. 2005. Econophysics of Wealth Distributions. Milan: Springer.
Chiarella, Carl, Peter Flaschel, and Reiner Franke. 2005. Foundations for a Disequilibrium Theory of the Business Cycle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, Colin W. 1976. Mathematical Bioeconomics. New York: Wiley-Interscience (2nd edition, 1990).
Colander, David. 1995. “Marshallian General Equilibrium Analysis.” Eastern Economic Journal 21, 281-293.
Colander, David. 2000. “The Death of Neoclassical Economics.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 22, 127-143.
Colander, David, ed. 2006. Post Walrasian Macroeconomics: Beyond the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Colander, David, Richard P.F. Holt, and J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. 2004. The Changing Face of Economics: Conversations with Cutting Edge Economists. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Davidson, Paul. 1996. “Reality and Economic Theory.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 18, 479-508.
Dawid, Herbert and M. Reimann. 2004. “Evaluating Market Attractiveness: Individual Incentives vs. Industrial Profitability.” Computational Economics 24, 321-355.
Day, Richard H. 1994. Complex Economic Dynamics, Volume I: An Introduction to Dynamical Systems and Market Mechanisms. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Debreu, Gérard. 1974. “Excess Demand Functions.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 15-23.
Delli Gatti, Domenico, Edoardo Gaffeo, Mauro Gallegati, Gianfranco Giulioni, and Antonio Palestrini. 2008. Emergent Macroeconomics: An Agent-Based Approach to Business Fluctuations. Milan: Springer.
Drăgulescu, A.A. and Victor Yakovenko. 2001. “Exponential and Power-Law Probability Distributions of Wealth and Income in the United Kingdom and the United States. Physica A 299, 213-231.
Duffy, John. 2006. “Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments.” In Tesfatsion and Judd, eds., pp. 950-1011.
Engelmann, Dirk and Jean-Robert Tyran. 2005. “To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets.” Economica 72, 1-16.
Epstein, Joshua and Robert Axtell. 1996. Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fagioli, Giorgio and Giovanni Dosi. 2003. “Exploitation, Exploration and Innovation in a Model of Endogenous Growth with Locally Interacting Agents.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 14, 237-273.
Farmer, J. Doyne and S. Joshi. 2002. “The Price Dynamics of Common Trading Strategies.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49, 149-171.
Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter. 2002. “Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms.” Human Nature 13, 1-25.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. 2002. “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature 415, 137-140.

Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868.


Föllmer, Hans. 1974. Random Economies with Many Interacting Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 51-62.
Föllmer, Hans, Ulrich Horst, and Alan P. Kirman. 2005. “Equilibria in Financial Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: A Probability Perspective.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 123-155.
Friedman, Daniel. 1974. “On the Efficiency of Double Auction Markets.” American Economic Review 74, 60-72.
Gabaix, Xavier. 1999. “Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 739-767.
Gallegati, Mauro, Steve Keen, Thomas Lux, and Paul Ormerod. 2006. “Worrying Trends in Econophysics.” Physica A 370, 1-6.
Gallegati, Mauro, Antonio Palestrina, and J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. 2008. “The Period of Financial Distress in Speculative Markets: Interacting Heterogeneous Agents and Financial Constraints.” Mimeo, Polytechnic University of the Marches, University of Teramo, and James Madison University, available at http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb.
Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr. 2004. Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: On the Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gode, D.K. and Shyam Sunder. 1993. “Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Markets as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality.” Journal of Political Economy 101, 119-137.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 2002. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Gunderson, Lance H. and C.S. Holling, eds. 2002.Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington: Island Press.
Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bemd Schwarze. 1982. “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367-388.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1967. “The Theory of Complex Phenomena.” In Friedrich A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 22-42.
Hendry, D.F. and H.M. Krolzig. 2001. Automatic Econometric Model Selection Using PcGets 1.0. London: Timberlake Consultants.
Henrich, Joseph. 2004. “Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes, and Large-Scale Cooperation.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53, 3-35.
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2006. Economics in the Shadow of Darwin and Marx: Essays on Institutional and Evolutionary Themes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Hommes, Cars H. “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance.” In Tesfatsion and Judd, eds., pp. 1109-1186.
Hoover, Kevin D. 2006. “The Past as the Future: The Marshallian Approach to Post Walrasian Econometrics.” In Colander, ed., (2006), pp. 239-257.
Horgan, John. 1997. The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age. New York: Broadway Books (paperback).
Ijiri, Y. and Herbert A. Simon. 1977. Skew Distributions and the Sizes of Business Firms. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47, 263-291.
Kant, Shashi and R. Albert Berry, eds. 2005. Sustainability, Economics, and Natural Resources: Economics of Sustainable Forest Management. Dordrecht: Springer.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 2000. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 4th edn. New York: Wiley and Sons.
Kirman, Alan P. 1992. “Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6(2), 117-136.
Kirman, Alan P. and Nicolaas J. Vriend. 2001. “Evolving Market Structure: An ACE Model of Price Dispersion and Loyalty.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25, 459-502.
Kolmogorov, Andrei N. 1965. “Three Approaches to the Quantification of the Definition of Information.” Problems of Information Transmission 1, 4-7.
Koppl, Roger and J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. 2002. “All that I have to Say has Already Crossed Your Mind.” Metroeconomica 53, 339-360.
Rachel Kranton and D. Minehart. 2001. “A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks.” American Economic Review 91, 485-508.
Langton, Christoper G. 1990. “Computation at the Edge of Chaos: Phase Transitions and Emergent Computation.” Physiica D 42, 12-37.
LeBaron, Blake. 2006. “Agent-Based Computational Finance.” In Tesfatsion and Judd, eds., pp. 1187-1233.
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 153-174.
Levy, M. and Sorin Solomon. 1997. “New Evidence for the Power-Law Distribution of Wealth.” Physica A 242, 90-94.
Lux, Thomas. 2009. “Applications of Statistical Physics in Finance and Economics.” In J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., ed., Handbook of Complexity Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, in press.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. 1963. “The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices.” Journal of Business 36, 394-419.
Mantegna, Rosario N. and H. Eugene Stanley. 2000. An Introduction to Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Markose, Sheri M. 2005. “Computability and Evolutionary Complexity: Markets as Complex Adaptive Systems.” Economic Journal 115: F159-F192.
Martinez-Alier, J. 1987. Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society. Oxford: Blackwell.
McCabe, Kevin, Daniel Houser, Lee Ryan, Vernon. Smith, and Theodore Trouard. 2001. “A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange.” Proceedings of the [US] National Academy of the Sciences 98, 11832-11835.
McCauley, Joseph L. 2004. Dynamics of Markets: Econophysics and Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCloskey, Deirdre N. 2003. “Notre Dame Loses.” Eastern Economic Journal 29, 309-315.
Minsky, Hyman P. 1972. “Financial Instability Revisited: The Economics of Disaster.” Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism 3, 97-136.
Mirowski, Philip. 1989. More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mirowski, Philip. 2007. “Markets Come to Bits: Evolution, Computation and Markomata in Economic Science.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63, 209-242.
Nash, John F., Jr. 1951. “Non-Cooperative Games.” Annals of Mathematics 54, 286-295.
Nyarko, Yaw and Andrew Schotter. 2002. “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning using Elicited Beliefs.” Econometrica 70, 971-1005.
Osborne, M.F.M. 1959. “Brownian Motion in Stock Markets.” Operations Research 7, 145-173.
Porter, David P. and Vernon L. Smith. 1995. “Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty.” Journal of Business 68, 509-541.
Rabin, Matthew. 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 1991. From Catastrophe to Chaos: A General Theory of Economic Discontinuities. Boston: Kluwer.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 1999. “On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(4), 169-192.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 2001. “Complex Ecologic-Economic Dynamics and Environmental Policy.” Ecological Economics 37, 23-37.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 2006. “Complex Dynamics and Post Keynesian Economics.” In Mark Setterfield, ed., Complexity, Endogenous Money and Macroeconomics: Essays in Honour of Basil J. Moore. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 74-98.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 2008a. “Is a Transdisciplinary Perspective on Economic Complexity Possible?” Mimeo, Department of Economics, James Madison University, available at http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. 2008b. “Debating the Role of Econophysics.” Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, in press.
Roth, Alvin E. and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. “Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17, 189-198.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, enlarged edition, 1983.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1936. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25-55.
Sethi, Rajiv and Eswaran Somanathan. 1996. “The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use.” American Economic Review 86, 766-788.
Shannon, Claude E. 1948. “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Bell Systems Technical Journal 27, 379-423, 623-656.
Silverberg, Gerald and Bart Verspagen. 2005. “A Percolation Model of Innovation in Complex Technology Space.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 29, 225-244.
Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man. New York: Wiley.
Simon, Herbert A. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, 467-482.
Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Reprinted 1976, Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and Cadell.
Smith, Vernon L. 1962. “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70, 111-137.
Smith, Vernon L. 1998. “The Two Faces of Adam Smith.” Southern Economic Journal 65, 1-19.
Smith, Vernon L. 2008. Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Vernon L., Gerry L. Suchanek, and Arlington W. Williams. 1988. “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations.” Econometrica 56, 1119-1131.
Sornette, Didier. 2003. Why Stock Markets Crash: Critical Points in Complex Financial Systems. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stahl, Dale and Paul Wilson. 1995. “On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 218-254.
Stern, Nicholas. 2008. “The Economics of Climate Change.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 98, 1-37.
Strotz, Robert H. 1955. “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization.” Review of Economic Studies 23, 165-180.
Tesfatsion, Leigh. 2006. “Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory.” In Tesfatsion and Judd, pp. 831-880.
Tesfatsion, Leigh. and Kenneth L. Judd, eds. 2006. Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Thaler, Richard. 1981. “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency.” Economics Letters 8, 201-207.
Trivers, Robert L. 1971. “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology 46, 35-57.
Varian, Hal R. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd edition. New York: W.W. Norton.
Veblen, Thorstein. 1898. “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 12, 373-397.
Velupillai, K. Vela, ed. 2005. Computability, Complexity and Constructivity in Economic Analysis. Victoria: Blackwell.
Watts, Duncan and Steven H. Strogatz. 1998. “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks.” Nature 393, 440-442.
Wolfram, Stephen. 1984. “Uncertainty and Complexity in Cellular Automata.” Physica D 10, 1-35.
Zak, Paul J. 2004. “Neuroeconomics.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 359, 1737-1748.
Zak, Paul J. 2005. “Trust: A Temporary Human Attachment Facilitated by Oxytocin.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 228, 336-368.
Zak, Paul J., ed. 2008. Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zipf, George K. 1941. National Unity and Disunity. Bloomington: Principia Press.

1 A fairly notorious recent example of such suppression has been the case of the well-known heterodox economics department at Notre Dame University in the United States, where in 2003, the administration took away the graduate program from the department and gave it to a newly created department openly described as being “neoclassical.” A number of prominent mainstream economists protested this move (along with many more heterodox ones, unsurprisingly), with Robert Solow being a prime example (McCloskey, 2003).

2 It must be noted at this point that the heterodox have formed their own schools, of which there are many quite well known and established ones, such as Marxism, Institutionalism, Post Keynesianism, and Austrianism, among others. These schools can in turn create their own sub-orthodoxies, with their own sub-mainstreams that may well enforce their orthodoxies through specialized journals and selected universities or research entities where followers of these schools may predominate and enforce their views on potential “heretics.”

3 Because of the emphasis on specifically Walrasian general equilibrium in these models, Colander (2006) has argued for successor approaches in macroeconomics to be labeled “Post Walrasian.” Hoover (2006) defends a Marshallian approach to the relationship between theory and empirics, with the Walrasian approach being an “engineering” approach whereas the Marshallian is “archeological” and exemplified by the econometric methods of Hendry and Krolzig (2001), with Colander (1995) also holding up Marshall as exempt from many of the alleged sins of Walras. Hoover sees Milton Friedman as defending a Marshallian methodology against the Walrasianism of Robert Lucas. It should also be noted that whereas “Post Keynesian” refers to people who admire Keynes, “Post Walrasian” refers to critics of Walras.

4 Arguably the most serious criticisms based on aggregation problems came out of general equilibrium theory itself, with Debreu (1974) contributing substantially to the analysis of the famous Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results that showed serious limits to the theory in the aggregate. This would later culminate in studies showing how even when there exists a representative agent, aggregate behavior may not correspond to that of this representative agent (Kirman, 1992).

5 More precisely, if the experiment is repeated it is Selten’s (1975) extension of the Nash equilibrium to the repeated games case, sub-game perfect equilibrium, that is violated, with an irony being that it has been reported by Ken Binmore (Colander, Holt, and Rosser, 2004, p. 53) that it was Selten himself who suggested the ultimatum game experiment to Güth. There is evidence that repeating the game or putting it into a two-stage form, offers and acceptances may become closer to the Nash equilibrium (Binmore et al., 1985).

6 Davidson (1996) and Rosser (2006) have debated the source of such limits, with Davidson arguing that it is ontological and axiomatic, with complexity-based theories providing merely epistemological elements as in the inability of people to compute. Rosser responds that while such factors enter in, complexity in fact amounts more profoundly to an ontological explanation of its own for fundamental uncertainty.

7 Andreoni (1990) has labeled this purer altruism as the “warm-glow effect.”

8 This view is also identified with the term reciprocal altruism introduced by the evolutionary biologist, Robert Trivers (1971).

9 At a certain level this debate can be seen as another round of the old “Adam Smith problem,” how to reconcile the Adam Smith of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) with the apparently harder nosed Adam Smith of The Wealth of Nations (1776) Vernon Smith (1998) draws on Hayek to say that it is a matter of personal dealings within more closely knit groups where moral sympathy predominates versus more arms-length dealings in larger society as in markets where reciprocity and ultimate selfishness predominates.

10 Horgan is a critic of the notion in most of its forms and coined the term chaoplexity partly to mock it.

11 Föllmer (1974) was the first to present a model of equilibrium of heterogeneous agents based on a statistical mechanics approach, long before the establishment of the Santa Fe Institute or the development of econophysics. Aoki and Yoshikawa (2006) show how the approach can be used in macroeconomics.

12 For a fuller analysis of systems with multiple basins of attraction with fractal boundaries and multi-dimensional chaotic dynamics using global analysis, see Agliari et al. (2002).

13 It has long been argued that labor income tends to be distributed lognormally. To the extent that wealth represents mostly accumulated capital income, and financial markets show power law distributions, then it may be perfectly reasonable for the lower part of the income distribution to be lognormal, where labor income is most important, while the upper end is power law where wealth and capital income predominate.



1   2


Verilənlər bazası müəlliflik hüququ ilə müdafiə olunur ©atelim.com 2016
rəhbərliyinə müraciət