Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy

On August 14, the Turkish forces moved out from Kyrenia, Nicosia, and the corridor connecting the two cities. The Turkish leader, Ecevit, reportedly confirmed the agreeing policies of the U.S. and Turkey regarding Cyprus, while Greece pulled out of NATO’s military wing.²⁰¹ Ultimately Greece did not have the strength to counter the Turkish operation. The Turks continued to advance, however, until August 18, when O’Malley and Craig state the Americans moved the aircraft-carriers Forrestal, Independence, and Inchon into the Eastern Mediterranean. They argue that this shows the influence the U.S. was capable of exercising as well as the support for Turkish troop movements only into specified areas.²⁰² They then blame the collapse of the talks on Kissinger’s encouragement of Turkish objectives and refusal to support British military deterrence actions.²⁰³ The 1964 plan developed by Acheson and Ball allegedly came to fruition through Kissinger’s actions in 1974, achieving the desired partition of the island and protection for the U.S. facilities.

Chapter 9

The Reality of the U.S. Policies Post-Invasion
In contrast to the conspiracy theory, the U.S.’s policies during the time period between July 20 and August 15 were not developed in order to achieve the plan developed by Acheson and Ball. First, the conspiracy argues that Kissinger and the State Department encouraged the Turkish troop movements in between the country’s two military interventions. Kissinger’s statements that appeared to encourage the Turkish troop movements, however, were in fact his attempts at first negotiating a cease-fire and then an agreement between Greece and Turkey. It is most likely true that Kissinger allowed Turkish troop movements and Mehmet Ali Birand’s account, 30 Hot Days, is generally accepted by all sides as a reliable Turkish source. The troop adjustments were permitted, however, so that the Turks did not feel their troops were at risk within their beachhead or that their government was in disadvantaged position in the international negotiations.

Mehmet Birand in fact supports this interpretation when he stated that “they had to [move]…the area held no room for manoeuvre such as was necessary for their security.”²⁰⁴ In one of these conversations Ecevit himself also claimed that “[w]e must ensure the full security of our forces in the island.”²⁰⁵ The Cyprus Task Force formed on July 22 to coordinate Departmental activity in the crisis agreed when they stated that “[t]he Turks will probably insist on consolidating their position on the island so that they will have a realistic basis for partition or at least negotiation.”²⁰⁶ General George S. Brown of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred during another SAG meeting that same day: “I think the Turks will pour enough stuff in during the ceasefire to put them in a better bargaining position.”²⁰⁷ Thus the U.S. adopted a pragmatic position by accepting that Turkey was bound to continue moving their troops and this must be permitted in order to achieve a ceasefire. Birand agreed with this assessment of America activity when he stated that Kissinger adopted “a realistic policy,” not endorsement of a conspiracy with Turkey, during this time period.²⁰⁸

The rest of the public statement the conspiracy theorists cite above does not appear to support Turkish troop movements, but rather it confirms support for the constitution and the territorial integrity of Cyprus, argues that diplomatic measures have not been exhausted, and expresses opposition to military action.²⁰⁹ Birand in fact quotes a conversation from this period between Kissinger and Ecevit where Kissinger states, “I know that you are not satisfied with the territory you presently hold, but it would be much better to resolve your disputes at the conference table.”²¹⁰ After the August 13 press conference statement, Birand also quotes the Turkish UN Ambassador Coskun Kirca who stated that Turkey interpreted the statement as an endorsement of the Turkish “right to march” if their “principles are not accepted” even though the Greek UN Ambassador strongly disagreed.²¹¹ The statements only reiterated previous U.S. policy, however, and the State Department should not be held responsible for the Turks misinterpreting their public positions as encouragement or support.

Secondly, there is no doubt the U.S. received warnings of the coming second invasion as the conspiracy theorists’ claim. The State Department reacted as they did not because of their support for Turkey’s actions, but rather because the State Department believed Ecevit’s assertions to Kissinger that he would delay the military action and control his generals. Ecevit assured Kissinger at least twice that he could enforce both a 24-hour and a 36-hour delay in Turkish action in order to negotiate with his generals.²¹² As demonstrated above, Kissinger also made clear to Ecevit during this time that further military movements were not an acceptable solution. Thus the State Department believed that, through Ecevit, they could control further movements.

Regardless of the warnings received or U.S. perceptions of the situation, there was little to nothing the U.S. could have done to prevent the second invasion. By August 9, Sisco had reported that “a Turkish army plan to being another military operation on August 20” had been discovered because, “further military action might be required if Turkey’s objectives were not obtained by diplomatic means.”²¹³ On August 12, Deputy Assistant Secretary to Europe Wells Stabler stated that if “he [Ecevit] is determined to go, there is not much we can do.”²¹⁴ Birand agreed with this assessment of the situation when he described the military and government views on a second invasion as early as the end of July. The military stated that “[o]ur plans had always envisaged a two-stage operation…this was unavoidable.” The government also claimed that “[a]ll the plans discussed allowed for two phases…[t]he breathing space between the two operations was a technical necessity,” although phase II would be postponed If Greece could agree.²¹⁵ Thus the U.S. influence to prevent a second intervention was limited in its potential scope.

Finally, the U.S. did not support the British military intervention at this time again because it was never part of their policy for Cyprus to involve U.S. troops in any way, as described above. In addition, during a time of transition in the Presidency after Richard Nixon’s resignation, the possibility of committing troops to an already controversial crisis simply did not exist. As Kissinger stated on August 10 in a conversation with President Ford, “[w]e could not—really in the first 48 hours of your term in of office—be very relaxed about unilateral military action.”²¹⁶ Thus the second denial of U.S. troops in no way supports a conspiracy, but rather was a logical political decision by the State Department. Thus the U.S.’s actual policies during this last phase of the crisis still support the assertion that the State Department was working toward a ceasefire and negotiations rather than further Turkish control of the island for the sake of relatively insignificant and underused U.S. facilities and British SBA’s. This concludes the analysis of the conspiracy theories in comparison with the actual U.S. policies during the three crises.

Specifically, during the 1963 and 1964 crisis, the conspiracy theorists argue that the U.S. and British governments cooperated to establish partition on the island. They support this assertion by describing how George Ball and Dean Acheson collaborated on a plan that would allow for simultaneous Greek and Turkish invasions in order to create stability and protect the U.S. facilities. This plan was allegedly the blueprint for the U.S.’s policies for the next decade. While suggestions like the Ball-Acheson plan were made by State Department officials, their recommendations were not official U.S. policy at the highest level throughout the next ten years. Johnson never fully supported the idea, these same officials later rejected the plan, and the State Department altered its policies accordingly. In addition, the U.S. did not appear concerned about the future of its facilities and in fact cut down their operations.

During the 1967 crisis, the conspiracy theorists argue that the U.S. had grown increasingly frustrated with the British reductions in their military expenditures and presence around the world. This allegedly led to U.S. concerns about the future of the Cypriot Sovereign Base Areas for their Cold War intelligence needs. In contrast, however, the State Department documents indicate that the U.S. consistently supported negotiations and diplomacy to diffuse the crisis. There is no evidence that the U.S. was angered by the relatively minor reduction of British troops in Cyprus and the U.S. had already safeguarded their own communications facilities through an agreement with the Cyprus government concluded in 1968.

In 1974, the conspiracy argument claims the U.S. must have been involved in the Greek coup because of the “two-track” diplomacy characteristic of both Nixon and Kissinger, the repeated warnings the State Department received and did not act on, and Kissinger’s neutral responses to the events. The U.S. allegedly encouraged the Turkish invasion because they again failed to act on the warnings, did not provide Joseph Sisco with enough to negotiate effectively, and refused to provide military support for a British intervention.

In reality, this assessment of the U.S. policies ignores the fact that Cyprus was not a State Department priority at the time, misinterprets Kissinger’s actions, and fails to outline what the U.S. priorities actually were: prevention of the internationalization of the conflict, a firm understanding of on-island developments before decisions are made, denial of overt support to Nicos Sampson, and encouragement of the restoration of the constitution and the opening of negotiations. In addition, the U.S. handled the warnings of invasion in a manner consistent with its policy up until that time, Joseph Sisco’s mission was nearly impossible from the beginning, the U.S. never intended to provide military support to an intervention mission, and the facilities on the island were no longer a U.S. priority. Finally, the U.S. permitted Turkish troop movements for the sake of negotiating a ceasefire, but did not condone them, and would have been unable to prevent a second invasion regardless. Thus the realities of the U.S. policies during each crisis illustrate government support for negotiations and diplomacy rather than covert operations involving external interference on Cyprus.

The Implications of the Argument

To conclude, we look at both the historical and the policy implications of our argument. This thesis clarifies the history of America’s role in Cyprus during the 1960s and 1970s by establishing the correct narrative of the State Department’s policy development. The narrative rebuts the arguments of conspiracy theorists such as Brendan O’Malley, Ian Craig, Lawrence Stern, William Mallinson. We accomplish this by targeting the two key points of the conspiracy theory: first, that the U.S. had a continuous, decade-long plan to partition Cyprus through external military intervention and second, that this plan was based on the strategic value of Cyprus as a military base and source of intelligence. We refute the first major point by describing how America’s policy evolved and changed over the course of that decade. Next, it is clear that the communications facilities and Sovereign Base Areas did not merit the importance attributed to them by the conspiracy theorists. War between NATO allies Greece and Turkey would have done much more significant damage to U.S. Cold War interests than the loss of three or four relatively minor intelligence facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, war would force the U.S. government to choose sides and lose more important strategic interests, such as the Sixth Fleet or installations in Turkey, as a result. While the U.S.’s rationale was not always commendable or favorable to the Cypriot people and at times the State Department’s decisions may merit criticism, the U.S. did not orchestrate a decade-long conspiracy to protect its own interests on the island. Therefore, this thesis adds an important correction to the existing literature on the crises on Cyprus.

We also answer the larger question of how conspiracy theories should be handled by encouraging research-based, scholarly analysis of these theories. The conspiracy theory was not developed in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the Cold War and U.S. policy during that time period. Historians have demonstrated that the State Department and the CIA were involved in covert activity in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, as well as other areas. Intelligence and the strategic value of both alliances and geography had great value to the U.S. government in its battle against the perceived threat of Communism and the possibility of nuclear war. This gives the impression to some that the U.S. could and did exercise control over countries all over the world to the benefit of its own interests, and the detriment of those of the Soviet Union, at this time. This thesis demonstrates that, in at least one instance, the State Department was caught unawares and forced into a reactive position during a crisis rather than acting as the puppeteer pulling the strings. In fact, if the U.S. possessed that level of control, its foreign policy had a better chance of success in Cyprus by avoiding the damage to its relations with Greece, Turkey, in Cyprus, as well as other nations, such as Iran. A more nuanced depiction of U.S. Cold War involvement on the global stage is needed among Cypriots and Greeks to counter this image of absolute control and the sense of helplessness, bitterness, and lack of responsibility that has developed as a result.

Greek Cypriots in particular have also used this conspiracy theory in ways that have had a negative impact on the success of the intercommunal negotiations since 1974. Pro-reunification websites such as “Action Cyprus,” organizations such as the American Hellenic Institute, and even moderate Cypriot scholars still blame the U.S. for the coup and invasion. These groups are among many others who claim that Washington is responsible for deeply worsening and perpetuating the Cyprus problem through its actions in 1974. The U.S. is allegedly further responsible for the continued division of the island because it does not put enough pressure on Turkey to agree to a solution.²¹⁷ Further criticism comes from Greek Cypriot disappointment with the Annan Plan as well as the U.S. role in its negotiation and terms. Perhaps the Cypriots hold the U.S. responsible, “not because the U.S. did too little, but because it never cared enough to do more.”²¹⁸

Regardless, the conspiracy theory shifts culpability away from the intractable positions of the Cypriots themselves, the influence of Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot role in the stagnant intercommunal negotiations. If the U.S., and to a certain extent the U.K., is to blame for the continued division of the island then the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are not guilty of perpetuating the conflict themselves. Ultra-nationalist propaganda and zero-sum positions, such as those demanding the removal of all foreign troops and settlers and the complete reunification of the island, run rampant as a result and further prevent constructive, cooperative discussions. Our argument clarifies the U.S. role during 1974 and emphasizes the fact that the State Department was not involved in such a conspiracy to create partition on Cyprus, which reduces the ability of this theory to encourage inflexibility and mistrust.

Finally, Cyprus is currently in a position of great potential since the election of President Demetris Christofias and the beginning of negotiations in September 2008. Talks have continued at a steady pace over the months since the direct talks commenced and the exchange of comments through the media has noticeably decreased. Relatively few concrete agreements have been released to the public, but the parties have discussed several issues such as governance and power-sharing, property, and the EU. The Turkish side has stated they plan to negotiate until April, engage in “give-and-take” through July, and create a comprehensive agreement by autumn.²¹⁹ President Christofias has so far refused to place a concrete end date on the talks, but both sides remain cautiously optimistic. In the meantime, other good will advances have occurred. Last April, the Ledra Street barrier was destroyed and pedestrian traffic can now move freely between the two sides at the center of the capital city.²²⁰ In addition, in October of 2008, both sides agreed to cancel their “annual war games,” which involve peacetime mobilizations of forces at Nikiforos and Taurus.²²¹ Advances such as these in the intercommunal talks are the type of rational and constructive movements found in a negotiation process free of conspiracy theories, ultra-nationalist propaganda, and zero-sum positions. The road to peace will not be simple or easy, given the current hard line positions from Turkey and its refusal to negotiate is guarantorship over Cyprus.²²²

For the sake of a Cyprus solution, these advances must continue and increase. The rejection of conspiracy theories can only encourage such developments in order to finally bring this decades-long conflict to a successful, lasting, and peaceful conclusion. Giralamo Dandini wrote in his Materials for a History of Cyprus, “The kingdom [Cyprus] has from all time had a variety of masters.”²²³ Let it be clear that the United States was not one of them. We argue that the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks had more responsibility for their destiny than many of them believe. The international community must encourage the Cypriots to continue asserting control over their own future through a productive peace process and the creation of a “Cypriot solution by Cypriots and for Cypriots.”²²⁴

BIBLIOGRAPHY