Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy

To further complicate the situation, relations between Turkey and Greece began to break down over oil rights, territorial control of islands in the Aegean, ownership of the continental shelf, and the Turkish population in Thrace. Turkey exacerbated the situation by authorizing studies of oil existence and granting oil exploration permits in areas of the Aegean involved in territorial disputes. Greek leader Ioannides was radically anti-Turkish and was willing to go to war over many of these issues in addition to Cyprus.

After the string of assassination attempts and further evidence of Greek interference on Cyprus, Makarios began to act. On July 1, he attempted to reduce the size of the Greek-infiltrated National Guard. The next day, he sent an open letter to the powerless Greek President Phaedon Ghizikis that challenged the actions of the Greek government in Cyprus. He stated, “More than once I have sensed, and on one occasion almost touched, the invisible hand stretched out from Athens seeking to destroy my human existence,” and “I am not a district governor appointed by the Greek government, but the elected leader of a great section of Hellenism, and as such I demand appropriate treatment from the mother country.”¹³⁰ He demanded the recall of all the Athenian officers within the National Guard.

On July 15, Makarios’ palace in Nicosia was attacked by the National Guard, the President was declared dead, and the installation of a new government under Nicos Sampson was announced. Makarios had in fact escaped to Paphos and was taken from there to Akrotiri, one of the British SBA’s. The RAF flew him to Malta and then on to London. Meanwhile, fighting spread throughout the island between pro-Makarios forces and the National Guard. The Turkish-Cypriots immediately became concerned for the safety of their community and called for support from Turkey. Turkey responded by sending their leader, Bulent Ecevit, to London to suggest a joint military response from the base at Akrotiri as Guarantor powers. British Prime Minister Wilson refused and instead called for tripartite talks as he sent a British task force towards Cyprus. Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco on July 18 as his representative to attempt negotiations between the Greeks and Turks and stave off war within NATO.

Turkey invaded the port city of Kyrenia on July 20, 1974 and took control of the Kyrenia-Nicosia road, which enabled them to connect with the Turkish-Cypriot enclave in the capital. Atrocities were reported by both sides as fighting raged across the island. At this time a British task-force arrived in Cyprus solely to secure their bases and civilians, not to deter further Turkish military actions. By the end of July the Cyprus crisis of 1974 had reached a violent climax.

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Chapter 6

Who is to Blame for the Coup?
The Conspiracy Theorists’ Argument

The conspiracy theorists’ have three primary reasons why the U.S. must have been involved in the Greek-orchestrated coup on Cyprus on July 15: the “two-track diplomacy” that was characteristic of both Nixon and Kissinger, the repeated warnings of the coup’s imminence, and Kissinger’s neutral response to events. Each argument will be explained in more detail here and countered in the discussion of the realities of U.S. policy in subsequent sections.

The conspiracy first claims that Nixon and Kissinger operated with a system of “two-track diplomacy.”¹³¹ This method of policy-making primarily involved keeping the majority of political advisers in the dark.¹³² O’Malley and Craig state that, “Kissinger believed it was easier to change policy by circumventing the normal channels and excluding from the decision-making process many of those who were theoretically charged with carrying it out.”¹³³ By ignoring most of his staff and emphasizing secrecy, Kissinger was able to simultaneously present one policy line in public and covertly pursue his own foreign policy objectives. In support for this claim, O’Malley and Craig cite the unexplained removal of several key State Department staff members: Greek Ambassador Tasca, chief of the Cyprus desk Tom Boyatt, chief of the Greek desk George Churchill, and the unnamed chief of the Turkish Desk.¹³⁴ In fact, they argue that the State Department consistently operated over the head of Greek Ambassador Tasca and only conducted discussions through the CIA in Athens. As additional support, the authors cite Kissinger’s policy decisions regarding the coup in Chile in 1970 and weapons supplies in Pakistan in 1971. Here, Kissinger was involved in covert activity and used intelligence groups rather than traditional State Department channels. The conspiracy theorists argue that this indicates Kissinger was likely to employ such tactics elsewhere.¹³⁵

Next, the conspiracy authors describe a string of warnings that to which the State Department should have reacted in order to prevent Ioannides from initiating the coup. These warnings counter Kissinger’s later claim that “the information was not laying around in the streets.”¹³⁶ U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Taylor Belcher reported that junior State Department officials had been trying to convince Kissinger to warn Ioannides against such plans for weeks.¹³⁷ In May, Kissinger reportedly received a memorandum from Chief of the Cyprus Desk Thomas Boyatt that “summarized all the cumulative and persuasive reasons for believing that a Greek junta attack on Cyprus and Makarios was imminent,” and that “such a coup…would beyond doubt trigger a Turkish invasion.”¹³⁸ On June 7, the National Intelligence Daily—a widely read periodical among State Department officials—outlined a warning of a coup based on claims made by Ioannides.¹³⁹ On June 20, the New York Times reported a conversation between Ioannides and a CIA station chief in which the Greek dictator stated he was contemplating military action against Makarios.¹⁴⁰ By June 27, the “State Department” reportedly received their “first explicit warning of a coup,” but Tasca was not immediately informed and the State Department did not act.¹⁴¹ The authors who made this claim did not specify who in the State Department received this warning or why it was different from those they previously cited.

O’Malley and Craig also describe a confusing series of events on June 29. Two days after the State Department’s receipt of the initial coup report, the authors claim chief of the Cyprus desk Thomas Boyatt ordered Tasca to warn Ioannides against the action, but ruled out the use of explicit pressures in the memo. Tasca then questioned the order because the situation, as he saw it, lacked the urgency that would require a diplomatic move. O’Malley and Craig state this was a result of Kissinger conducting communication exclusively through the CIA and ignoring Tasca. Boyatt apparently repeated the order, but Tasca had inexplicably left Athens for a family engagement in Switzerland. Boyatt reported the situation to Joseph Sisco, who contacted Tasca’s deputy Elizabeth Brown. Brown allegedly repeated the statement that the situation lacked urgency and, as a result, Ioannides was not warned against a coup.¹⁴² According to Lawrence Stern, Tasca was repeatedly cabled to warn Ioannides and ultimately failed to meet with him. Instead, he made representations at lower levels of the Greek government that proved ineffective. Thus the regime “considered the warnings from Tasca as window dressing and not serious American objections to a coup.”¹⁴³

The conspiracy theorists cite further warnings, primarily CIA reports, from July. On July 3, CIA analysts reported that Ioannides had personally assured an unnamed source that there would be no action, but prefaced the statement with warnings that events had moved towards a showdown.¹⁴⁴ Again, on July 11, the analysts reported Ioannides claims that there would be no action, but argued that an attempted coup could not be ruled out. O’Malley and Craig cite a CIA post-mortem, which reviewed the events leading up to the coup and concluded that the State Department relied on these analysts when formulating policy.¹⁴⁵ By this time, Makarios had sent his letter to the Greek government and rejected Ioannides counter demands. Both the letter and the rejection of Ioannides’ demands should also have warned Kissinger of an unavoidable confrontation between the Greek junta and Makarios, according to the conspiracy theorists.¹⁴⁶ Finally, on July 12 Makarios allegedly told the U.S. Ambassador about Ioannides’ plots against him, which CIA analysts reportedly confirmed.¹⁴⁷ In sum, the conspiracy theorists use this series of warnings to illustrate the State Department’s knowledge of the coming events and failure to act before the coup occurred. This evidence is intended to support the argument that U.S. involvement should be considered a sin of commission and merits blame for the subsequent crisis.

Lastly, the conspiracy argues that Kissinger’s neutral and delayed response provides additional evidence that he supported Greek interference on Cyprus.¹⁴⁸ Kissinger’s initial public statement contained no rebukes, pressures, or changes in military alert status. He simply stated, “The United States has long been on record as opposed to any resort to violence on the island. Our policy remains that of supporting the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangements, and we urge all other states to support a similar policy.”¹⁴⁹ The U.S. was equally non-committal at the U.N. and in regards to the recognition of the new government under Nicos Sampson. O’Malley and Craig cite a State Department spokesman who insisted that, “the question of recognition as of the moment does not arise.”¹⁵⁰ They claim that a lack of discouragement on Kissinger’s part amounted to encouragement of invasion in order primarily to protect the U.S. interests in their facilities.¹⁵¹
The Actual U.S. Role in the Coup

In this section I will counter the conspiracy theorists’ arguments regarding the Greek-orchestrated coup. Their argument focuses on Kissinger’s role in their explanation American policy and emphasizes his non-committal and delayed response to both the warnings and the subsequent crisis. His actions are allegedly explained by his “two-track” diplomatic policy and desire to save Cyprus as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” The three most serious problems with these claims, however, are that they ignore the fact that Cyprus was not a U.S. priority at the time, misinterpret Kissinger’s responses to the coup, and fail to describe the key positions of the State Department early in the crisis. The conspiracy’s errors will be demonstrated through an examination of newly released documents including Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation, State Department Telegrams, and other documents available through the Freedom of Information Act. The conspiracies generally rely on the same few memoranda and, in the case of O’Malley and Craig, one report from the Senate Investigative Committee. A more complete picture of the U.S. and its activity during the 1974 crisis emerges through these new documents.

The conspiracy theorists heavily emphasize the warnings that the State Department should have immediately acted upon as early as May of 1974. The first problem with this point is that foreign policymakers, Kissinger in particular, did not see Cyprus as a priority. While individuals such as Thomas Boyatt of the Department of Near Eastern Affairs felt that the situation was urgent, more influential officials did not share his opinions as other matters required their constant attention. Examples of these issues include, but are not limited to, Watergate, the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War, the oil crisis, détente with the U.S.S.R., and the communist government in Chile. Kissinger himself raises a second problem in his discussion of the Cyprus crisis on August 5^th with members of the State Department. He states, “I don’t question that there were such intelligence reports [warning of the coup].” However, he goes on, “an intelligence report that isn’t called to my attention, has no standing, and it is the function of intelligence people, when they have something that they think is of importance, to bring it to the attention of the top policymaker, the President, the Secretary of State, or whoever else.” He concludes, “If the information doesn’t reach me, or the President, it isn’t useful and it isn’t just enough to put it in the daily paper—it must be flagged as being of some significance.”¹⁵² While this speaks volumes about who had the most influence on decisions while Kissinger was Secretary of State, it also makes clear that the right people did not recognize or learn about the significance of the growing turmoil in Cyprus.

Finally, in regards to the warnings, the U.S. did in fact warn Ioannides against any coup attempts in a telegram from Joseph Sisco to Tasca on June 29. While the telegram does not resolve the confusing string of events that O’Malley and Craig outline, it does make clear what the U.S. position was in regards to an overthrow of Makarios regardless of whether or not Tasca conveyed the message. Sisco stated that “it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering [a] way to topple Makarios from power,” and, “In our view [an] effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos [and] eventually causing [a] Greco-Turk confrontation.” He concludes by specifically instructing Tasca to state that because of these risks “we would be strongly opposed to any move of this nature.”¹⁵³ Thus, once notified of the potential for a Greek-orchestrated coup, the State Department notified those involved, gave orders they thought the situation required, and did little more because of their foreign policy emphasis on other areas.

Secondly, the conspiracy theorists misinterpret Kissinger’s responses after the coup as neutral, purposefully non-committal, and acquiescent to the island’s new situation. This behavior is allegedly indicative of Kissinger’s support for the 1964 Ball and Acheson plan discussed above. The first problem with their interpretation is that the U.S. plans after 1967 emphasized the use of diplomacy and U.S. political influence with the leadership of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to handle any subsequent crisis. This contrasts sharply with the argument that the American plan during this period involved military intervention by Greece and or Turkey.

The emphasis on diplomacy is most clear in the contingency plans drawn up between the 1967 and 1974 crises. Three of these plans are most significant and relevant to the 1974 crisis because of when they were developed and their detailed nature. The first was completed in July of 1971 by the Department of Near Eastern Affairs and lists, among other things, seven possible events on Cyprus that range from a breakdown in the intercommunal talks, to a Greek orchestrated removal of Makarios, to a risk of Turkish intervention.¹⁵⁴ The use of U.S. military forces were not considered as an option for any of these contingencies and diplomatic pressure in the form of aid cutoffs were the most extreme of these potential reactions. Sisco reiterated these recommendations to Kissinger in a second contingency study memorandum from August 1971 where he stated, “U.S. responses vary… However, all responses generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic activity (usually in conjunction with the UK) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia…and support of UN efforts.” In addition, he later states, “Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission…This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation.”¹⁵⁵ Thus the last ditch effort was more diplomacy, rather than allowing the Greeks and/or the Turks to invade in order to resolve a confrontation between the two over Cyprus.

The third contingency study, also completed by the Department of Near Eastern Affairs, is noteworthy since it was completed on May 6, 1974. This would therefore have been the final contingency study for the State Department to examine when the crisis began in July. The report, drafted by Thomas Boyatt and Richard Erdman, summarizes in its introduction that “the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the U.S.G [government] can bring to bear on the situation.” In addition, it states that “the important decisions relate almost exclusively to diplomatic strategy and tactics and focus on the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use our diplomatic influence in an evolving contingency scenario.” The contingencies the paper examines include “a mainland Greek putsch against Makarios” and, “a joint Greco-Turk attempt to occupy and partition Cyprus.” The recommended response to both of these events was, “low-key joint diplomatic representations to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from undertaking potentially disastrous para-military or military adventures in Cyprus.” ¹⁵⁶ This policy was the most logical conclusion after the U.S. experiences on Cyprus in 1964 and 1967 where diplomacy successfully diffused both crises. In addition, it is consistent with the way Kissinger and the State Department reacted to the 1974 crisis and also explains why the U.S. would be unwilling to utilize its own military forces in order to enforce the peace or prevent an invasion of Cyprus.

Third and finally, the conspiracy theorists fail to clearly explain the positions and objectives of the U.S. government after the coup occurred. The four most significant of these priorities are emphasized throughout the State Department documents and include: prevention of the internationalization of the conflict, a firm understanding of on-island developments before decisions are made, no support for Sampson, and encouragement of the restoration of the constitution and the opening of negotiations.

Evidence of these priorities can be found in the minutes and memoranda of conversation from the first few days of meetings as well as telegrams between the State Department and its embassies. The State Department’s primary objective from July 15 onward was to prevent the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict in order to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and check any potential increase in Soviet involvement. On July 15 at 10 am, during the first meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (SAG) concerning Cyprus, Sisco opened discussions by outlining what he saw as America’s two primary objectives: first, “do what we can to avert war between Greece and Turkey,” and second, “do what we can to avert Soviet exploitation of the situation.” Kissinger concurred and stated that “our immediate objective is to keep this thing from becoming internationalized, the Greek-Turk problem, the Soviet angle.”¹⁵⁷ The next day, in a second SAG meeting, Kissinger reiterated that “[o]ur first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized,” with the assent of the other policymakers in attendance, which included sixteen people from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and the National Security Council staff.¹⁵⁸ He again made the same point in a SAG meeting on July 18, despite the fact that the issue had already reached the UN.¹⁵⁹ The early evidence therefore suggests that Kissinger, the State Department, and other groups within the U.S. Government consistently believed that their primary objective should be to prevent external involvement. These officials also believed, up until July 19, that prevention of internationalization was in fact still possible.

These meetings also demonstrate Kissinger and other officials’ demands for a firm understanding of the developments on the island before major decisions could be made and U.S. positions on the issues became public. Immediate confusion concerned the whereabouts and condition of Makarios, the potential for an internal war against Cypriot Communists, the possibility of enosis, and the possible Turkish reactions to the coup. In the initial meetings on July 15 and 16, Kissinger stated “[t]here really is nothing we can do at this time internally,” and the situation was described as “murky.” Sisco bluntly claimed, “We just don’t know what’s going on.” In response, Kissinger argued that, “we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump,” and Sisco advocated “cautious,” “low-profile” action.¹⁶⁰ Rather than establish immediate public positions in support of Greece or Turkey, the U.S. elected to issue a statement supporting the Cypriot constitution as well as its independence. Questions remained, however, as late as July 18 regarding the permanence of Nicos Sampson as the new Greek Cypriot leader, the possibility of Makarios’ return, whether or not he would need to lean on the Left for support, the future of the Greek government, and Turkey’s possible actions. As a result, Kissinger continued to state that the U.S. should “avoid taking a stand” and “avoid assuming a public posture which commits us to any particular course of action.”¹⁶¹ Rather, he wanted “the situation to crystallize…in order to enable concerted action later.”¹⁶² The State Department was clear regarding the need for a coherent situation in order to develop a similarly coherent policy.

This State Department demand for clarity, however, is one of the more heavily criticized U.S. policies by both the conspiracy theorists and other historians and politicians. Critics claim that the U.S. should have acted more rapidly to establish their position against the Greek actions and in favor of Cypriot independence in order to prevent the subsequent Turkish military action. Kissinger and the State Department feared that a strong stance against Greece would encourage a Turkish intervention because the threat to Cypriot sovereignty would appear more serious.¹⁶³ In addition, they simply did not have the detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the island necessary to confidently make the major decisions the critics demand. This is certainly not an excuse for the Department, since it employs individuals who are responsible for obtaining this sort of detailed knowledge, and the U.S. may indeed merit criticism for its policy. However, the U.S. reaction in no way indicates that a conspiracy was at work. Rather, it indicates that Kissinger and the Department had been caught unprepared for how to handle just such a crisis and therefore adopted a “wait and see” strategy in the hopes that the path most beneficial to the U.S. would become clear.

Next, the conspiracy theorists question the U.S. policy regarding recognition of Nicos Sampson as the new Cypriot leader. The documents provide ample evidence that the U.S. never intended to recognize Sampson during the crisis, regardless of what was portrayed to the public. Kissinger stated in the July 16 SAG meeting that “[w]e don’t want to recognize Sampson,” and believed he was “just a figurehead anyway.”¹⁶⁴ On July 17, Kissinger made clear that Sampson was “a most unattractive guy” and “it’s not in our interest to have him.” Thomas Boyatt agreed that “Sampson certainly is not acceptable.”¹⁶⁵ Kissinger later told Callaghan to convey to the Turks that the U.S. “was not supporting Sampson.”¹⁶⁶ These statements were confirmed in a telegram to the U.S. ambassadors on July 18 that stated, “The U.S. also cannot accept the Sampson regime,” but continued on to argue that it should not be removed until a substitute could be found.¹⁶⁷ By July 19 Joseph Sisco had begun his shuttle diplomacy and Kissinger instructed him to inform the parties that “we now believe the Clerides solution is the only one,” which indicates that the U.S. had begun supporting Clerides as Cypriot President. This would be their position for the remainder of the crisis.