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Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy


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The other crucial aspect of the conspiracy theorists’ argument concerns the U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus. The conspiracy theorists’ fail to effectively define what they mean by term “communications facilities.” State Department documents describe several US installations on the island that include a Radio Relay Office operated by Naval personnel, “communications facilities” at Mia Milia and Yerolakkos, and a Foreign Broadcast Information Service station.84 The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Grant, stated that they were for monitoring and reporting on “radio broadcasts from the countries in this area,” and handling “relay traffic for the Department of State.”85 In this paper, when referring to communications facilities, these are the installations I refer to that were most likely used for intelligence and monitoring purposes.

During this crisis the facilities are mentioned periodically. The first instance describes them as an interest that the U.S. has on the island, as on January 24, 1964 in a meeting with British Ambassadors.86 While the potential for a problem was discussed once as well, it is worth noting that Makarios never used them as leverage to gain U.S. support during this particular crisis.87 On September 11 of the same year, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Phillips Talbot reported on the facilities to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He stated that the communications operations were “significantly curtailed as a result of the February 1964 evacuation and by subsequent additional personnel reductions or transfers of activity away from Cyprus.” He claimed “the curtailment would affect the value of the operations but that it would be tolerable on a reasonably temporary basis.”88 These statements indicate that, while the facilities did have some value, they were not so significant that their functions could not be moved elsewhere for a period of time. This counters the conspiracy argument that claims their operations were significant enough to endorse an invasion of the island for their protection. At this time, then, the U.S. moved into the next crisis without serious concerns about the future of its facilities, but encouragement of the use of negotiations to achieve stability in the region.

PART IV. 1967: Another Crisis Averted

Chapter 3

The Reemergence of Hostilities and the Conspiracy Theorist’s Interpretation


Between 1965 and 1966, Cyprus experienced a period of uneasy peace as intercommunal negotiations slowly progressed. The Turkish Cypriots continued to operate their own administration outside of the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus. The two communities were not absolutely divided, however, as the UN Green Line was porous, arms remained widely distributed, and intercommunal incidents could easily escalate.89 UNFICYP worked diligently to contain the tensions through local leaders.

During this period, the conspiracy theorists’ argue that Britain’s declining economy and reduction of military presence around the world under Prime Minister Harold Wilson angered American leaders. This included the 1966 announcement that Britain was reducing its forces in Cyprus, Aden, Malta, Guyana, and other areas of Southwest Asia such as Singapore and Malaya.90 According to O’Malley and Craig, “[t]his marked the beginning of the end of Britain’s role as a worldwide military power, and alerted the Americans to the prospect that one day they might lose the use of the Cyprus facilities.”91 American concerns were allegedly compounded by the new Middle Eastern crisis that included the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser and the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. The authors argue that loss of both the Canal and Middle Eastern oil led to an increase in the British economic crisis and a cut of over 150,000 military and civilian personnel, which again infuriated the Americans.92

The political situation was complicated by a military coup in Greece on April 21, 1967. Whether or not the U.S. was involved in or supported the right-wing military faction under George Papadopoulos that took over the Greek government is outside the scope of this paper, although some of the conspiracy theorists—such as Lawrence Stern—argue this was the case. The change in government had implications for the situation in Cyprus, as the junta developed an aggressive, nationalistic stance on the Cyprus issue that would help bring about a crisis. Tense negotiations continued both at the intercommunal level as well as between Greece and Turkey.

The situation exploded after Greek Cypriot forces led by George Grivas launched attacks on two Turkish Cypriot villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in November 1967. The incident escalated and, in response, Turkey again began amassing forces for an intervention. The U.S. sent Cyrus Vance on a diplomatic mission of “shuttle diplomacy” to convince Turkey to back down and avoid war within NATO. Turkey demanded the withdrawal of all Greek forces greater than the limits set down in the Treaty of Alliance, a total of 10,000 troops, as well as the removal of Grivas. Greece agreed and the crisis was averted, for the moment. The Greek junta would use other tactics to increase their influence on Cyprus instead.

O’Malley and Craig are the only conspiracy theorists who mention an agreement concluded in 1968 that permitted the U.S. to continue using their communications facilities on the island. They claim that the CIA was also permitted to access the British bases, establish their own radio monitors, and build secret antennae for the U.S. intelligence network at the cost of $1 million dollars in a secret fund.93 They fail to state whether or not this assuaged U.S. fears about the loss of those facilities.

O’Malley and Craig also argue that Johnson was the “crucial restraining influence on both the Turks and his own senior officials, such as George Ball and Dean Acheson, who wanted NATO to force a partition on Cyprus.”94 They state that the U.S. had already abandoned the concept of guaranteed independence for a united Cyprus and accepted that Turkey could one day be allowed to occupy part of Cyprus. Their evidence lies in the plans devised by Acheson and Ball. The conspiracy theory’s description of the second crisis ends with ominous concerns about the future because, as they argue, Nixon and Kissinger “had fewer qualms about the kind of covert action needed to get rid of Makarios.”95


Chapter 4

The Realities of U.S. Policy in 1967
In January of 1966, the Secretary Rusk renewed the U.S. recommendation that “what is needed at this time to move [the] Cyprus problem off dead center is [the] resumption [of] active UN mediation,” and stated, “[the] Department tends to agree that, to obtain GOT acceptance of any formula, it may be necessary to continue [the] prohibition against enosis at least for [a] time.” Thus the U.S. believed the UN should be the primary mediator and enosis was still not a valid overall solution.96 Turkey, however, disagreed with this assessment and began demanding more significant U.S. involvement. In February, the new Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil told the U.S. Ambassador that the U.S. “had an important role to play,” and “if U.S.-Turk agreement on [the] best alternative [was] reached, [the] U.S. would then, he hoped, use its influence to achieve results.”97 Several months later, on April 22, Caglayangil met with Secretary Rusk and argued that the U.S. should “influence Makarios and the Greek Government to see that nothing happens.”98 Turkey also released an aide-mémoire that Ball described as “a clever diplomatic move to involve [the] U.S. more deeply in [the] Cyprus problem.”99

The State Department, however, responded with a message that deliberately refused to endorse significant U.S. involvement. Ball stated, “The United States Government sympathizes with those who have suffered hardships as a result of unsettled conditions on the island,” and, “The U.S. is closely following and encouraging the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s personal representative, Ambassador Bernardes, to bring about improved conditions on the island.” He went on to endorse the Turkish and Greek government intentions to begin talks regarding Cyprus and described it as “a most encouraging development which will permit consideration of the means of achieving a settlement.”100 Explicit support from Rusk and the ambassadors for the secret Greek-Turkish dialogue would continue throughout the following year.101 In September 1967, Rusk again endorsed the discussions and stated that the “important thing now is that talks continue, and that real effort be made [to] compromise on differences which, if substantial, do not seem [to] be irreconcilable.”102 Thus the U.S. maintained its distance from the Cyprus problem and limited its actions to endorsement of Guarantor Power negotiations.

The negotiations ultimately failed, however, and violence erupted once again in November 1967. On November 17, President Johnson sent a message to Archbishop Makarios appealing to him “to do everything within the power of your Government to reduce the threat to peace now hanging over your region.”103 He also sent a similar message to Caglayangil, who responded:

At such an hour I expected that a message coming from a country with which we have a common destiny would be different…I had expected that given this situation our American friends would come and tell us that they regret that they have prevented in the past a Turkish initiative and that they would say: ‘Now the decision is yours.’104

Johnson’s message had clearly not met the Turkish expectations. The Turks immediately demanded the removal of all Greek troops and the U.S. sent Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to negotiate a ceasefire starting on November 23. In the meantime, Rusk sent a telegram to all the involved ambassadors stating that “the stakes are such that the future of our bilateral relations is secondary to the prevention of hostilities between Greece and Turkey,” and:

We need not apologize to any of your host governments for the harshest pressures we may put on the interest of maintaining peace. The issues in Cyprus itself are, strictly from the point of view of the U.S. national interest, trivial compared to peace between Greece and Turkey. Our responsibility is to support that central U.S. national interest.105


This message was clearly not an endorsement of double enosis or an explicit encouragement of military intervention by either party in order to maintain communications facilities. Rusk was making clear that stability and prevention of war between NATO allies was the ultimate goal at any necessary expense.

Vance was able to achieve a ceasefire that involved the removal of all Greek troops from Cyprus. The State Department heaped praise on Vance for his efforts and stated that “without his activity, Turkey would now be at war with Greece.”106 Vance, however, emphasized in a telegram that his object was “to stop [the] outbreak of war and not to solve all [the] problems of Cyprus,” thus significant issues remained.107 His most serious problem was convincing Makarios to go along with the Greek-Turkish agreement. Makarios protested the need for “an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP” without further discussion in the UN Security Council as such changes could cause issues with manpower and authority in the future.108 He continued to reject this portion of the agreement into December, and ultimately Vance left Cyprus for Athens without Makarios’ support.

The crisis had been averted, however, and the ceasefire held. In January of 1968, the U.S. began to discuss its overall strategy for Cyprus once again. Rusk recommended that the U.S. either provide “strong support for the United Nations mediation of a longer-term settlement, or support for its mediation of interim measures while we take over the search for a long-term settlement.”109 The majority of State Department officials, however, lacked confidence in the ability of UN mediation to reach an effective solution. This was most evident during an NSC meeting from January 24, where Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle, Cyrus Vance, Joseph Sisco, and Secretary Rusk agreed that “we are not optimistic about what U Thant [the current UN mediator] can achieve and should not let him fail without having something of our own ready to put in his place.”110

In light of these recommendations, a proposal was put forward that the Canadians would initiate a plan for a conference between Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriot, and Turkish Cypriot representatives. The conference would attempt to complement U Thant’s mediation work and discuss a viable constitution for Cyprus.111 The initiative ultimately fell through, however, while the UN Secretary General pushed forward a proposal for discussions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots only.112 The post-crisis momentum for negotiations rapidly dissipated in the following months.113

U.S. policy before, during, and after this particular crisis raises several questions for the conspiracy theorists. If the State Department, run by primarily the same group of officials as in 1963-4, was intent on a NATO partition of the island through a Greek-Turkish invasion, how would the conspiracy explain the emphasis on maintaining a negotiation process? In addition, why did the Acheson-Ball plan, as laid out in the August 19 memo, never resurface as a viable option during the November crisis? These are questions that the theorists do not address in their respective works. The clearest answer is that the U.S. State Department no longer considered endorsement or encouragement of double enosis or enosis an effective way to create stability on Cyprus. Officials had come to the conclusion that any solution must be negotiated between the most significantly involved parties, which now included the Cypriots and did not include the United States.

The conspiracy theorists also point out both the decline of British influence in the Middle East during this period and the rise of U.S. involvement in the region. They argue that this is relevant because the British decline involved a reduction in its military presence in the Mediterranean, including the SBAs on Cyprus. This allegedly caused consternation among U.S. officials, since the SBAs were a crucial strategic asset. I argue that this point is largely irrelevant because the communications installations and the SBAs were not the U.S.’s prime concern on Cyprus. As the above description of the realities of U.S. policy during 1963 and 1964 shows, the U.S. was first and foremost interested in preventing war between NATO allies and avoiding a significant conflict in the Mediterranean.

Additional documents show that the U.S. was not worried about the SBAs or their future status. In February 1967, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared a memorandum regarding the U.S. and UK installations in Cyprus. The report describes the value of the SBAs to the Cyprus economy and states that the bases “provide the margin that puts Cyprus economically in a better position than most other countries of the Eastern Mediterranean.” As a result, the Cypriots were not likely to protest their existence in the future for economic reasons. In addition, the document describes the withdrawal of personnel from the bases: approximately 3000 of the 4950 troops from only the Dhekelia base would “probably be completed by September,” while the British would continue to maintain approximately 8000 men. The INR expressed no concern or anger at this reduction in forces within the memorandum.114 This indicates that the U.S. did not appear overtly angry about the reduction in forces at this time and the British still maintained a sizable number of troops on the island.

The U.S. communications facilities were also not a serious concern during this time, as indicated by further documents that describe the diplomatic negotiations to finalize the stations’ existence from 1965-1968. The two groups of representatives met on January 9, 1965 to create an official agreement based on Makarios’ informal promise in 1960 to allow the facilities to remain with the possibility of financial compensation to Cyprus.115 Negotiations slowly continued until February 4 when the Mr. G. Phylaktis of the Ministry of Finance raises the first serious objection to the facilities’ existence. He argued that the U.S. was “asking for too much, ‘a state within a state,’” and claimed the Cyprus government “must now make the determination whether it wished to have the radio stations at all.” According to the memorandum of the meeting, the other members of the Cypriot negotiating team immediately countered Phylaktis statement by stating that there was “no doubt that that one question had been settled in the affirmative some time ago” by Makarios and the rest of the Cyprus government. The question was not raised again throughout the remained of the discussions.116 This indicates that the existence of the facilities was no longer a negotiable issue, as agreement had already been established that their functions could continue. The U.S. had no reason to be concerned about their future.

The final agreement was concluded in 1968 and authorized the existence of facilities in Nicosia, Yerolakkos, and Mia Milia. It also gave the U.S. the ability to “establish, maintain, and operate radio land lines, high frequency, very high frequency, ultra high frequency, microwave communications networks and to receive and dispatch communications and other allied equipment for this purpose.” 117 The Cypriots would be reimbursed $1.4 million dollars annually “for the life of the agreement for services rendered.” This is possibly the $1 million dollars the conspiracy theorists mention. It was not a “secret fund,” for Makarios, but rather a negotiated annual compensation.118 There was therefore no reason for the U.S. to consider a NATO plan to protect SBA’s that were under thorough British control or communications facilities secured by an international treaty. The status quo on the island was in fact better for the U.S. facilities and their operations, whereas dramatic changes in the power structure—such as a coup or an invasion—would have a detrimental impact on their continued existence.

PART V. 1968-1973: The Calm Before the Storm


President Richard Nixon was known as a fervent anti-Communist and, once in office in 1968, he normalized relations with the Greek junta and restored the country’s military aid. The conspiracy theorists use Nixon’s extreme anti-Communism and support for the junta to support their argument that he was consistently infuriated by Makarios’ non-aligned policy and contacts with the Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger’s dislike of Makarios’ political allegiances was allegedly sufficient to encourage his removal from the Cypriot Presidency.119

This period is also notable for the number of attempts on Makarios’ life. The first incident was an attack on his personal helicopter in March of 1970, in which Stern and Hitchens hint the CIA may have had a part.120 The Archbishop managed to escape the fiery inferno unscathed. Second, in 1972, a group of bishops within the Greek Orthodox Church demanded Makarios’ resignation from the Presidency as it conflicted with his ecclesiastical duties. As Archbishop, Makarios convened a Holy Synod in 1973 and defrocked the rebellious bishops in retaliation. Two additional potential plots emerged later that year; the first was reportedly organized by General George Grivas, while the second involved land mines that exploded just moments before Makarios’ car drove past. These assassination attempts have been credibly linked to the work of the junta through their officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The conspiracy theorists use this connection to the junta as evidence that Nixon overtly backed the removal of Makarios, since he supported the Greek military government.121

One month later, in June of 1971, Makarios made an eight-day visit to the Soviet Union to gain further support for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. In the meantime, General Grivas returned to Cyprus, possibly with junta support, and began reorganizing the EOKA forces into a new group, EOKA-B. U.S. concerns about the Communist influence on Cyprus were already high, but they peaked early in 1972 when Makarios acquired a significant amount of Czechoslovakian arms for his police force. The threat of a military takeover by Greece loomed once again, but warnings against such a move by the U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca managed to end the crisis.

Despite the Greek junta’s contentious domestic and international policies, the U.S. decided to begin home-porting the Sixth Fleet at the Greek port of Piraeus in September of 1972. This was interpreted as a controversial vote of confidence in the regime to the benefit of U.S. naval power in the Mediterranean.122 The criticism of home-porting only increased after an internal coup in November of 1973 pushed Papadopoulos out of power and installed the leader of the military police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, as the new head of the Greek junta. Ioannides was a more radical and unpredictable member of the government’s right-wing military faction, which would have consequences for Greece’s policy towards Makarios and Cyprus within the next year.

The conspiracy theorists, O’Malley, Craig, and Mallinson in particular, argue that this period from 1973 to 1974 was also one of the most dangerous times during the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. They cite the Yom Kippur war between Arabs and Israelis in 1973, growing Soviet success in the advancement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and the instability in Greece under Ioannides as evidence of the critical nature of these years.123 As a result of this danger, they argue the U.S. needed to closely monitor Soviet nuclear capabilities and missile test launches more than ever. British spy stations and airfields in Cyprus as well as U.S. facilities in Turkey and Iran were allegedly important to maintain an American advantage.124

O’Malley and Craig claim, however, that the British were not cooperative with the U.S. concerning the use of their facilities, particularly during the Yom Kippur War. In fact, the British reportedly denied the U.S. any use of the airfield at Akrotiri in order to reinforce the Israelis.125 In addition, O’Malley and Craig argue that the British wanted to remove all military forces from Cyprus up until July of 1974, based on information from a political adviser to the British Foreign Secretary.126 Thus, “[n]ot only could the Americans no longer be sure that Britain would let them use the Cyprus facilities when they most needed them, but now they could not be sure there would be any facilities left to use at all”127 This allegedly contributed to the U.S. concerns about their strategic interests in Cyprus and convinced them that a Greek coup as well as a Turkish invasion of the island would be in their best interest.

PART VI. 1974: The Coup and the Invasion

Chapter 5

January to July 15,1974: The Greek Coup and its Immediate Aftermath
The tumultuous year of 1974 opened with the death of legendary EOKA and EOKA-B leader George Grivas. The conspiracy theorists make the generally accepted claim that Ioannides and Greek National Guard took control of EOKA-B’s activities at this time.128 O’Malley and Craig also state that in April, “some American officials demanded that Washington put pressure on the colonels to warn them off taking action against Makarios, but the State Department did nothing.”129

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