Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy

The conspiracy theorists note here the influence of American strategic interests on UNFICYP’s operations and policies based on the fact that the U.S. covered 35 percent of the operation’s costs.³⁶ In addition, they claim that the UN force “assisted the grouping and organisation of Turkish Cypriots that made the separate Turkish and American contingency plans for Ankara’s troops to temporarily occupy a large portion of the island a more practical option.”³⁷ The British embassy in Washington also reported that:

…we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFICYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately if any such intervention takes place.³⁸

Intercommunal tension continued throughout the spring, however, despite the presence of UNFICYP. The periodic battles for strongholds were highlighted by the struggle for the Kyrenia road and Castle of St. Hilarion in April and a reported kidnapping of Turkish Cypriots in early May. Relations on the island reached a breaking point at the beginning of June, however. On June 1, 1964, Makarios declared that all Greek Cypriots between the ages of eighteen and fifty were now on standby for conscription in order to create a new National Guard. Turkey responded with preparations for a full-scale invasion of Cyprus. On June 5, however, President Lyndon Johnson sent Turkish leader Ismet Inonu a “brutal” note stating:

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.³⁹
The letter convinced Inonu to wait 24 hours before initiating an intervention plan. During the interim, agreements were reached to begin talks between the Greeks and the Turks without the participation of Makarios. The crisis had effectively been averted.

O’Malley and Craig argue that the U.S. responded with a condemnation of the Turkish intervention because the timing was no longer appropriate for the contingency plan with a UN force in place on the island and a UN mediator working for a solution.⁴⁰ Mallinson attributes the de-escalation to a firm Soviet stance in support of Cypriot freedom and independence.⁴¹

Negotiations began between the Greeks and the Turks, but a consensus was impossible to reach between their polarized positions. In addition, the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked Turkish Cypriot positions in early August and the island erupted in chaos once again. O’Malley and Craig state that Ball and Dean Acheson had grown frustrated with the lack of agreement and developed “an astonishing plot to use NATO to force Greece and Turkey to split their differences over the Acheson proposals and accept the result.”⁴² The plan involved the use of NATO pressure on the Greeks and the Turks. If that tactic failed, the U.S. would insist that fighting be confined to the island, not involve U.S. weapons, and not allow Greece and Turkey to use violence against each other. This solution was described as a fait accompli and the only possible way to achieve peace. O’Malley and Craig base these claims on a note contained within a general briefing for President Johnson prior to a National Security Council meeting on August 19. The plan was also reportedly discussed during a lunch on September 8.⁴³

O’Malley and Craig argue that the plan was not used in 1964 because of “concern over the dangerous turn of events in Vietnam.” Thus their discussion of the 1964 crisis ends with the ominous statement that the “secret plans to divide Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, if necessary by force, were left on the shelf—for now.”⁴⁴ They argue that many of the elements of the 1964 plans would reemerge during the 1974 crisis ten years later.

Chapter 2

The Realities of U.S. Policy in 1963 and 1964

State Department documents show that the U.S. was aware of Makarios’ potential plans to amend the Constitution in early June. Fraser Wilkins, the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus during this time, stated in a telegram, “Makarios said that he had reached [the] conclusion in his own mind that it would be necessary to revise [the] Cypriot Constitution.”⁴⁵ The State Department responded in early August with a telegram to Ambassador Wilkins. Secretary of State Dean Rusk endorsed Wilkins’ views on the “validity [of the] constitution and treaty,” as expressed to Makarios in April. In addition, the memo stated:

We continue [to be] convinced [that the] solution overall [to the] Cyprus problem lies in patient piecemeal solution [to] specific problems such as [the] municipalities issue and that this [is] possible [to] achieve on [the] island if both sides [are] willing [to] exercise moderation. We [are] against any attempts [to] by-pass [the] Guarantor Powers or involve [the] U.S. or UN.⁴⁶
The telegram provides a clear statement of U.S. opposition to any drastic changes in the Constitution and treaties as well as the need for the Cypriots themselves to reach an agreement. The State Department would consistently reaffirm their support for the 1960 agreements during the months prior to the eruption of violence on the island. In April, Undersecretary of State George Ball instructed Wilkins to “reaffirm our view, as expressed on April 5, that [the] London-Zurich agreements and Constitution have continuing validity and that necessary changes can be accomplished through [the] agreement [of] both communities.”⁴⁷ After the initial State Department response in early August, Wilkins again reminded Makarios of the U.S. position during a meeting on August 27: “I recalled our support for [the] continuing validity of [the] Constitution and treaties, as stated last April and subsequently, subject to normal change by agreement between [the] two parties.”⁴⁸

By early October, the developing issues in Cyprus had reached the attention of President Johnson. He issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 266 stating, “we should do all we can in cooperation with the Guarantor Powers to prevent a showdown between the Greek and Turkish communities,” and requesting “recommendations on what measures might be taken.”⁴⁹ The State Department responded on October 28 with recommendations involving a “three-power approach,” consisting of the Guarantor powers, to Makarios and Kutchuk. The plan was intended “as a fallback position to the British plan,” which promoted negotiations between the two communities and the Guarantor Powers. The U.S.’s three-power approach, on the other hand, would “require the Cypriot leaders to reaffirm support of the London-Zurich agreement and the Cyprus Constitution,” attempt to settle the municipalities dispute, and revise London-Zurich to allow normal amendment procedures.⁵⁰ These recommendations were then distributed to the embassies in Cyprus, Athens, Ankara, and London.

Makarios remained unconvinced that intercommunal negotiations would be sufficient to solve the Constitutional issues and continued to develop his proposed amendments. On November 26, Wilkins reported that Makarios “had virtually completed [a] memorandum listing approximately ten constitutional provisions which required amendment.”⁵¹ In addition to Wilkins’ urgings against this action, Rusk also sent a telegram instructing the ambassador to state that “we are greatly disturbed at his constant references to ‘amendments’ of [the] constitution” as it would “stop GOT [Government of Turkey] and Turkish-Cypriot cooperation before it got started.”⁵²

Makarios released the amendments on November 30 despite these warnings and Turkey promptly announced their rejection of any changes. The Secretary of State met with the Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou regarding the amendments in early December. During the meeting, Rusk stated that the “U.S. feels that the two communities should work out this problem in the first place and then the guarantor powers.” In addition, he made clear that the “U.S. does not need this additional problem,” and that the U.S.’s “primary concern is that whatever comes out of this be worked out by agreement.”⁵³ Wilkins confirmed this position in a meeting with Makarios on December 22. He stated that, “it seemed to us preferable to work out solutions with [the] Turkish Cypriots through discussions and that it still seemed to me that changes could be effected within [the] framework of [the] Constitution.”⁵⁴ The U.S. State Department’s policy, as communicated to the involved parties, was therefore in favor of an independent, unified Cyprus with a government structure based on the original Constitution. All problems should either be worked out amongst the Turkish and Greek Cypriots or, if necessary, in consultation with the Guarantor Powers.

The violence escalated during this period in December and the State Department responded with concern, but limited involvement. Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot expressed this reaction to the Turkish Ambassador when he stated that the “U.S.G [U.S. Government] shared GOT [Government of Turkey] concern over violence in Cyprus and would continue [to] be helpful in any way possible,” but the “primary responsibility” belongs to the Cypriot communities and the “special role” of the Guarantor Powers.”⁵⁵ The U.S. interpreted the violence as “hostilities not planned by either side,” and stated that the “armed underground organizations [of] both communities are out of control.”⁵⁶

The UK, Greece, and Turkey did ultimately meet regarding the crisis in January, but the conference did not proceed smoothly. By the end of January, the UK had suggested a NATO force with a U.S. contingent in order to establish peace on the island. According to Ball, the British Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported that U.S. and NATO forces were necessary because “putting additional British forces in is probably just going to make the situation worse rather than better.”⁵⁷ During a meeting with Gore, Ball agreed to discuss a possible “token contribution” from the U.S. of a battalion of 1200 men.”⁵⁸ Johnson immediately vetoed the possibility, however, and stated “we should give no encouragement to the UK to think that we would join in an allied force,” and, “we must do more in a diplomatic way than we have so far.”⁵⁹ He added, “I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can’t handle Cyprus.”⁶⁰ Thus the U.S. continued to avoid direct involvement, maintained that the British should be primarily responsible, and even criticized the UK for its inability to handle the situation.

Rather than troops, Johnson encouraged a plan of action that involved sending someone to the region to “make an all out diplomatic effort.”⁶¹ In the end, Ball made the trip and began meeting with leaders in London, Ankara, and Athens in early February. On February 9, Ball met with Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou and informed him that “U.S. concern with [the] Cyprus problem [is] prompted primarily by our concern with peace.” Ball endorsed a peace-keeping force and a mediator, but refused to make any concrete promises regarding U.S. participation. The Under Secretary then met with Makarios on February 13 and learned that the Archbishop planned to go “ahead with his foolish plan of sending an expedition to ask the Security Council to try to undermine the Treaties of Guarantee by seeking a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus,” an deal with an international force later. Ball berated Makarios with “a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the folly he has proposed.” Ball expressed concerns that Makarios was either “a prisoner or a fool or both,” and for the first time recommended that “both governments…exercise the rights of unilateral intervention granted them under the Treaties of Guarantee and move into Cyprus peacefully.”⁶²

The U.S. was opposed to the involvement of the UN Security Council for two foreign policy reasons. First, any Security Council decision had to involve Cold War politics and the Soviet Union. The State Department believed the Soviet Union, non-aligned bloc, and other countries were likely support Makarios’ move to undermine the Constitution and three treaties. In this case, the U.S. would be forced to vote against the measure and damage its own international relations and standing at the same time. Second, the U.S. had maintained for the past year that the conflict should be decided by the communities on Cyprus and the Guarantor Powers. The involvement of the UN would allow for the influence of the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. As a result of this and other possible scenarios, the U.S. opposed the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict outside of the Guarantor Powers.

Ball’s recommendation of “double enosis” raises another issue, however, in that it seems to confirm the conspiracy theorists’ hypothesis that the U.S. was interested in allowing an invasion in 1964 in order to protect their strategic interests. This is not the only time that Ball suggests this course of action; the conspiracy theorists mention his endorsement of the possibility on February 14, but he also stated on May 10 that “I find Papandreou’s repeated references to ‘enosis’ a healthy sign,” and “…[f]rom the point of view of all of NATO, we should regard ‘enosis’ as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest’s clothing.” He qualifies his argument for enosis by stating that “there would have to be some kind of territorial concessions by Greece” in order to receive Turkish agreement.⁶³ On June 1, Ball again states that “we seem to detect…that a territorial quid pro quo might be an ingredient in an eventual settlement…we are anxious that these very fragile seeds be permitted to germinate.”⁶⁴ Thus Ball consistently felt that some form of double enosis or territorial acquisition by both Greece and Turkey was the best way to achieve stability on the island.

Ball was not alone in his recommendations either, as other state department officials made similar suggestions. In April, recently appointed Cyprus Ambassador Taylor Belcher argued for either enosis or some form of associated status between Greece and Cyprus, which would tie Cyprus to the West, reduce the danger of Communism, end the island’s non-aligned policies, set back Soviet policy in the area, and provide the U.S. a friendly government to negotiate with regarding its communications facilities. The Embassies in Athens and Ankara immediately reported similar conclusions, while the Turkish Ambassador Hare made clear that Turkey would insist on its presence on Cyprus as an “essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of [the] present treaties.”⁶⁵ Belcher then made an identical recommendation twice in June, but the communications facilities were notably absent from the discussion.⁶⁶ In late June, even the UN mediator Sakari Severi Tuomioja stated that in his opinion, the “only basis is enosis, with whatever compensation is necessary to make it palatable to the Turks.”⁶⁷ With the exception of Belcher’s first recommendation, all of the above officials described this form of solution as the best way to achieve stability on the island with no mention of the strategic interests of the U.S..

While negotiating with the parties in Geneva, Dean Acheson also made several references to the possibility of enosis or partition as possible forms of a solution for Cyprus. These suggestions were made in the context of Acheson’s attempts to find a middle ground between Greek and Turkish demands that the Cypriots could potentially accept. On July 14, during a meeting with the Greek representative Demitiros Nikolareisis, Acheson proposed an “arrangement within [the] framework of some sort of enosis which would give Turk-Cypriots assurance that…their…way of life would be safeguarded.” This assurance would come from the presence of areas of Turkish self-rule or the existence of some international authority.⁶⁸

As negotiations continued, in early August, Acheson again stated that some form of “plebiscite or other action on enosis could be precipitated” after an announcement had been made that Turkish-Cypriot welfare would be safeguarded.⁶⁹ An agreement between Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus must also be announced before hand, Acheson pointed out a few days later, or the Turkish Government “would certainly fall.”⁷⁰ On August 7, Acheson also added the element of Turkish troops when he suggested that “popular upheaval [in] Turkey could be overcome by [the] announcement that Turkish forces would shortly arrive not as enemies but by prior agreement.”⁷¹ He summed up these proposals on August 18 in a telegram to the Department of State as well as the memorandum intended to brief President Johnson before the National Security Council, which the conspiracy theorists also cite.⁷²

Thus the conspiracy theorists are correct when they state that U.S. officials made recommendations in favor of double enosis, enosis, or mutual territorial acquisition for Greece and Turkey during this time. The conspiracy theorists falsely argue that these recommendations constituted U.S. official policy at the highest level of the administration for the next decade. As early as the 1964 crisis, evidence exists that this was not the case: Johnson never endorsed such a plan, other officials—including Acheson himself—ultimately rejected the proposals, and the State Department later acknowledged the mistakes it made during this particular crisis and altered its policy accordingly.

From the beginning of the crisis, President Johnson argued that the British should take primary responsibility for the Cyprus situation and reach a negotiated solution with the other Guarantor Powers. Apart from the evidence shown above, Johnson also sent letters to the British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou with statements to that effect.⁷³ As the crisis developed, he informed George Ball via telephone that the U.S. would not be directly involved in an international peacekeeping force. His letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu on June 5 argued against Turkish intervention, and the partition that would result, in the strongest diplomatic terms possible. In a telephone conversation several days later, Johnson told Rusk, “I think that the last thing we want him [Inonu] to do is let me be the peacemaker and later wind up on my lap. I think we ought to carry it right to Ankara and Athens,” and later, “…I have no solution. I can’t propose anything.”⁷⁴ He made the same position clear to Greek Ambassador Alexander Matsas on June 11: outside powers cannot solve the situation and the Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves in the least humiliating and most permanent manner possible.⁷⁵ Johnson supported the Acheson negotiations and endorsed a decision based on his proposals for the minority community and the principle of a Turkish base.⁷⁶

At the September 8 lunch, however, Acheson and Ball’s proposed intervention plan was discussed and Johnson was overtly pessimistic about the idea. He “indicated his own doubt that the plan as put forward could in fact be neatly and tightly controlled, without risk of escalation,” and “noted that the next two months were not a good season for another war.” Acheson, Ball, and Bundy discussed the meeting later and Acheson expressed his opinion that the President “wanted to make sure nothing happens.”⁷⁷ The negotiations are emphasized as the most effective route to a solution from this point on, which indicates that Johnson vetoed the proposed NATO plan. Thus Johnson never explicitly accepted a double enosis plan. Any secret plan to “NATO-ize” Cyprus would have needed Johnson’s support to proceed.

In addition, other State Department officials later rejected Acheson and Ball’s recommendations. In a conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin, Rusk reminded the official that “the President had referred to intervention as a ‘last resort,’” and this act would “constitute no solution…the very catastrophe which all of us should now work to prevent.”⁷⁸ On June 9, Rusk expressed concern about the negotiations and requested Ball’s return to the U.S. in order to “be sure that we are all on the same track here and see where we are going.” He argued that:

…you [Johnson] and he [Ball] and I and our people working on this should come to a final conclusion on what we ought to shoot for. And there is no conclusion on that at the moment, and the conclusion that they have been talking about in London is something that will almost guarantee the Turks would intervene and this is what concerns me.⁷⁹
Rusk never explicitly argued against the double enosis concept, but he expressed doubts about its potential success and concern for its consequences.

Acheson himself later argued against enosis as a solution in August. On the 19^th he telegrammed the Department of State and stated, “Instant enosis…seems to us here to contain [the] fatal flaw that [the] Turks will not stand still for it or after it unless they have prior assurance…that it will be quickly followed by [a] settlement meeting their essential demands.”⁸⁰ By September 3, Rusk offered a new arrangement to the embassies in Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. The main points of the arrangement for Greece required it to restore normal conditions on the island, assist in rehabilitation and resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees, avoid military support to Cyprus against Turkey, and prevent Cyprus from receiving military aid from other countries. Turkey would agree not to intervene militarily, prevent the Turkish Cypriots from restarting violence, and avoid provoking Greece.⁸¹ These recommendations marked a significant shift from the suggestions of double enosis, but the ambassadors—Ambassador Hare in particular—generally agreed that this strategy was the most effective to maintain peace for the moment. On December 29, even Ball stated, “we see no solution in [the] direction [of] either enosis or double enosis,” and “if progress appears possible toward [an] independent Cyprus with [the] protection of the Turk minority, we should strive for this,” and that the next step should be negotiations.⁸² The U.S. would consistently favor this policy for the next several years.

Therefore, while the U.S. considered and even favored the possibility of double enosis or enosis with Turkish acquisition of territory, the plan was ultimately rejected based on the changed conditions on the island in favor of negotiations. This directly counters the conspiracy theorists’ argument that the policy was set aside until the crisis in 1974. There is no denying, however, that the State Department’s endorsement of double enosis at this time demonstrates a poor grasp of the Cyprus situation’s political realities. The U.S. deliberately chose to deal only with the leaders of the Guarantor Powers and negotiate over the heads of Makarios and the Cypriots. U.S. officials believed it would be simpler to negotiate a Greco-Turkish solution and impose it on Makarios rather than including him in the process. The flaws in this position became clear and the State Department realized its error. Ambassador Belcher reported on October, 6 1964, that “Makarios himself is becoming ever stronger with a popular base spread throughout all sectors on the island,” and Hare reported that “Makarios and Makarios alone will call [the] tune as to [the] timing and nature of any significant steps…[which] has obvious implications for our long-standing assumption that [the] nub of [the] problem was to get GOT and GOG talking.”⁸³ Therefore the U.S. made demonstrable errors based on a poor understanding of Makarios’ influence as well as the need to include Cypriots in any negotiation.