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Collective Management of Residential Housing in Russia: The Importance of Being Social


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Yassin, E. (2006). Political economy of the residential housing reform. Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publisher. (in Russian).

Yermishina, A., & Klimenko, L. (2010). In search of effective owners of apartment buildings. Economic Sociology, 11 (4), 105–136. (in Russian).


APPENDICIES
Appendix A

Definitions of variables

Board performance is the first principal component of two board quality measures –board’s accountability and quality of representation of tenants; and completeness and regularity of information disclosure to the tenants; the first is measured in 1 (least) to 5 (most), and the second – in 1 (least) to 4 (most) scales.

Building age is the number of years since construction.

Building size is the number of tenants in an apartment building.

City dummy is 1 for Moscow and 0 for Perm.

Company dummy equals 1 if HOA works with a management company and 0 otherwise.

Education is measured by the percentage of tenants whose educational level is a community college degree and higher.

Inequality aggregates tenants’ assessments of socio-economic inequality in their apartment building in 1 (least) to 3 (most) scale.

Neighbors’ support aggregates five types of mutual assistance provided to or received from one’s neighbors: lending money; lending household items; discussing personal problems; house sitting; and babysitting. Indexes of provided and received assistance are calculated as the numbers of the above types of assistance marked by a respondent, normalized to a maximum total of one. The first principal component of the above indexes is the aggregate measure of neighbors’ support.

Occupation is the percentage of tenants working in finance, law, information technologies sector, etc.

Participation in meetings is the first principal component of the total number of tenants general meetings per year and the number of the meetings that the respondent attended.

Perception of availability of neighbors’ support is measured in 1 (least) to 5 (most) scale.

Private ownership share is the percentage of privately owned apartments in an apartment building.

Social inclusion indicates how many neighbors and how well a respondent knows, it is the first principal component of two measures – the number of neighbors to whom a respondent talks in his/her everyday life, and of those whom he/she visits.

Technical civic competence is the first principal component of two measures of tenants’ ability to operate an HOA – degree of the involvement in meeting deliberations, and attention to other tenants’ opinions and concerns; both are measured in 1 (least) to 5 (most) scale.

Volunteer work dummy equals 1 if volunteer work is reported in an HOA and 0 otherwise.

Wealth is measured by the percentage of tenants whose income and assets are sufficient for adequate food, clothing, household appliances but not enough to afford a new car or apartment.
Appendix B

Summary statistics for main variables


Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Full sample

Moscow

Perm

Building age

82

19.3

17.4

1

93

40

21.4

21.1

3

93

42

17.3

12.8

1

46

Building size

82

456

423

36

2500

40

535

511

36

2500

42

380

306

100

1550

Technical civic competence

81

3.94

0.911

1.5

5.8

40

4.44

0.703

1.5

5.5

41

3.44

0.820

1.9

5.8

Perception of availability of neighbors’ support

76

3.18

0.408

1.7

4

34

3.08

0.522

1.7

4

42

3.27

0.261

2.78

3.8

Private ownership share

76

73.8

36.2

0

100

38

75.5

34.4

0

100

38

72.0

38.2

0

100

Inequality

82

2.09

0.424

1

3

40

2.10

0.499

1

3

42

2.09

0.345

1.56

2.89

Neighbors’ support

82

1.99

0.680

0.683

3.89

40

1.92

0.714

0.683

3.89

42

2.06

0.647

0.792

3.50

Social inclusion

82

1.02

0.707

0.379

4.58

40

0.918

0.743

0.431

4.58

42

1.11

0.667

0.379

3.72

Participation in meetings

81

1.98

1.23

0.595

7.01

40

2.16

1.46

1.12

7.01

41

1.81

0.940

0.595

6.20

Board performance

82

4.94

0.953

2.00

6.26

40

5.43

0.532

4.15

6.26

42

4.48

1.04

2.00

6.04

Education

82

86.2

17.6

30

100

40

94.3

11.5

50

100

42

78.4

18.9

30

100

Wealth

80

72.8

28.0

20

100

38

92.3

15.7

30

100

42

55.1

24.8

20

100

Occupation

82

11.9

12.2

0

40

40

17.1

12.9

0

40

42

6.98

9.19

0

40



1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, ekaterina.i.borisova@gmail.com, leonid.polishchuk@gmail.com, apereset@gmail.com. We are indebted to Eduardo Araral, Anna Ermishina, Ruben Enikolopov, Subal Kumbhakar,Amnon Lehavi, Elinor Ostrom, Richard Rose, Chen Youhong, and participants of the Workshop in political theory and policy analysis at the Indiana University and of seminars at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow), University of Uppsala, and the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial and organizational support from the Center for Fundamental Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged.

2 The traditional focus of the literature is on accessing output markets where community members sell their products using a common-pool resource as in input; see e.g. Agrawal and Yadama (1997).

3 For more on interpretation of housing infrastructure as a local public good and/or common-pool resource see Bengtsson (1998), Vihavainen (2009).

4 Two other components of the social capital “triad” are trust and networks; see e.g. Woolcock (1998). Successful self-management of common-pool resources could require an even stronger version of pro-social norms whereby an individual not only refrains from free-riding, but is willing to apply sanctions to other free-riders in the community (Sethi, Somanathan, 1996).

5 Urban neighbourhoods more generally could often be viewed as “wellsprings” of social capital (Portney, Berry, 2001).

6 It is sometimes argued that a few activists could be enough to successfully run an HOA (Bengtsson, 1998; Vihavainen, 2009); yet other sources indicate that good governance ensues only if civic culture is broadly shared (Weingast, 1997), and that efficient provision of public goods requires sizeable democratic participation (Lizzeri, Persico, 2004). This general rule applies to common-pool resources as well – Grafton (2000) points out that active involvement of resource users in management and decision-making is a unifying feature of successful governance regimes. Importance of broad participation in collective management of residential housing is stressed in (Polishchuk, Borisova, Peresetsky, 2010).

7 For the potentially adverse impact of ethnic and religious diversity for residential housing conditions see Algan, Hémet, and Latin (2011).

8 Besley, Burchardi, and Ghatak (2012) give another illustration of the same principle: greater security of property rights over assets that could be used as loan collaterals could make asset owners worse-off, if credit is available from a monopoly lender.

9 Similar patterns of residential housing transformation were observed throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Hegedüs, 2011).

10 http://www.irn.ru/news/10368.html

11 Russian housing management companies surveyed in (“Role of management companies in energy efficiency of residential housing”, 2010) mention the poor conditions of the housing stock as the main obstacle to their operations.

12 For more on misuse of institutions in transition economies see (Polishchuk, 2012).

13 Similar approach is employed at the macro level in Bjornskov (2006) where various components of ‘multi-facet’ social capital are allowed to compete with each other in explaining economic performance of countries of the world.

14 We decided against using the third available indicator of specific social capital – the ease of reaching an agreement among tenants over HOA affairs – due to a possible endogeneity bias.

15 We are grateful to Richard Rose for suggesting such validation.

16 Stochastic frontier approach is preferable to the alternative non-parametric data envelopment analysis due to unavoidable measurement errors in survey-generated data.

17 We present here an abridged version of stochastic frontier analysis of homeowners’ associations; for more details and alternative estimation techniques see (Borisova, Peresetsky & Polishchuk, 2010).

18 Sample size in different estimations could vary due to omissions in survey data. In this and subsequent estimations HOA efficiency measures are from the baseline stochastic frontier model.

19 We owe this idea to S. Kumbhakar.

20 We drop education as a yet another instrument as it does not significantly contribute to the quality of our instrumental variable regressions.

21 In the classic example of economic signalling the decision to pursue a post-secondary degree is considered as a signal of ability and aptitude which earn a premium in the labor market (Spence, 1973). Signalling by HOA creation also reveals a latent ability. Although in this case not an individual but a collective one. Notice that when all HOAs established by tenants irrespective of their motives are pooled in a single group, the average level of specific social capital for such group is statistically indistinguishable from the sample average, and hence the signal dissipates. Such outcomes are common for attempts to stimulate pro-social behaviour by extrinsic incentives (Benabou, & Tirole, 2006).

22 More detailed analysis of HOA creation motives is presented in Borisova (2011).

23 For economic analysis of organizations with overlapping inputs and outputs see Rothschild and White (1995).

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