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Appendix A. Case bibliography


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Draft web appendix for Sleeping Hegemons: Third-party Intervention following Major Territorial Integrity




Appendix A. Case bibliography

‘Abū (‘a)l-Rīš (Aburish), S.K. 2005. Ğamâl cAbd (‘a)l-Nāṣir: āḵir al-cArab. Bayrūt: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda (‘a)l-cArabiyya.


Alnasrawi, Abbas, 2001. ‘Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000’, Third World Quarterly, 22(2): 205-218.
Alnasrawi, Abbas, 2002. Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment. Westport & London: Greenwood Press.
Ariel, Yaakov, 1991. On behalf of Israel: American fundamentalist attitudes toward Jews Judaism, and Zionism, 1865-1945. Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing Inc.
Avineri, Shlomo, 1986. ‘Ideology and Israel’s Foreign Policy’, Jerusalem Quarterly, 37: 3-14.
Azzam, Maha, 1991. ‘The Gulf Crisis: Perceptions in the Muslim World’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 67(3): 473-485.
Bar-On, Mordechai, 1994. The gates of Gaza: Israel’s road to Suez and back, 1955-1957. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, 1998. ‘The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship"?’, Diplomatic History, 22 (2): 231–262.
Bennett, W. Lance and David L Paletz, 1994. Taken by Storm: the Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
Ben-Zvi, Abraham, 1998. Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American Israeli Alliance, New York: Columbia University Press.
Bird, Judith, 1999. ‘Indonesia in 1998: the pot boils over’, Asian Survey, 39(1): 27-37.
Boyer, Paul, 1992. When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy belief in Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
BPS-Statistics Indonesia
Brzoska, Michael, 1981. ‘Reporting on Military Expenditures’, Journal of Peace Research, 18(3): 261-275.
Bresheeth, Haim & Nira Yuval-davis, eds., 1991. The Gulf war and the New World Order. London & New Jersey: Zed Books.
Chalk, Peter, 2001. Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention. Santa Monica [etc.]: RAND.
Christensen, Thomas J., 1996. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Christensen, Thomas J., 2001. ‘China’, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Fieldberg, eds., Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02. Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research.
Colhoun, Jack, 1992. ‘Washington Watch: How Bush Backed Iraq’, Middle East Report, 176: 35-37.
Cotton, James, 1999. ‘Peace keeping in East Timor: an Australian perspective’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53(3): 237-246.
Cotton, James, 2000. ‘The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22(1): 1-22.
Cotton, James, 2004. East Timor, Australia and Regional Order. London & New York: Routledge Curzon.
Cristie, Clive, 1976. ‘Great Britain, China and the Status of Tibet, 1914-21’, Modern Asian Studies, 10 (4): 481-508.
Crombois, Jean F., 2005. ‘The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement’, Mediterranean Politics, 10(2): 219-223.
Damis, John, 1992. ‘The UN Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara: Problems and Prospects’, Middle East Policy, 1: 36-46.
Darbouche, Hakim & Yahia H. Zoubir, 2008. ‘Conflicting International Policies and the Western Sahara Stalemate’, The International Spectator, 43(1): 91-105.
Dibb, Paul, 2001. ‘Indonesia: the key to South-East Asia's security’, International Affairs, 77(4): 829-842.
Duara, Prasenjit, 1997. ‘Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945’, The American Historical Review, 102(4): 1030-1051.
Dunn, James, 2003. East Timor: a Rough Passage to Independence. New South Wales: Longueville.
Durch, William J., 1993. ‘Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara’, International Security, 17(4): 151-171.
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000. EIU Country Profile 1999-2000: Indonesia. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Eurostat, 2003. External and Intra-European Trade—statistical yearbook: 1958-2002. Luxemburg: Office for the Official publications of the European communities.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion & Peter Sluglett, 1990. ‘Iraq since 1986: the strengthening of Saddam’, Middle East Report, 167(4) 19-24.
Franck, Thomas M., 1976. ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’, The American Journal of International Law, 70(4): 694-721.
Fuller, Graham E., 1991. ‘Moscow and the Gulf War’, Foreign Affairs, 70(3): 55-76.
Fuller, Graham E. & Ian O. Lesser 1997. ‘Persian Gulf Myths’, Foreign Affairs, 76(3): 42-52.
Gilboa, Eytan, 1987. American public opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Glaser, Bonnie S., 1993. ‘China’s Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions’, Asian Survey, 18(3): 252-271.
Gow, James, ed., 1993. Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community, London & New York: Brassey’s.
Grose, Peter, 1983. Israel in the Mind of America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Gunn, Geoffrey C., 1997. East Timor and the United Nations: the Case for Intervention. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.
Hahn, Peter L., 1998. ‘Special Relationships’, Diplomatic History, 22(2): 263–272.
Hahn, Peter L. 2001. ‘Organized Labor and U.S. Policy Toward Israel’, in Peter L. Hahn & Mary Ann Heiss, eds., Empire and Revolution: the United States and the Third World since 1945. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press (154-177).
Hahn, Peter L., 2004. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1945-1961. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press.
Harding, Harry, 1994. ‘China’s Co-operative Behaviour, in Robinson & Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press (375-382).
Haykal, M. H., 1985. Qiṣṣat al-Suways : āḵir al-macārik fī caṣr al-cAmāliqa, Bayrūt : Šarikat al-Maṭbūcāt.
Herrmann, Richard K., ‘The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U.S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War’, International Security, 16(2): 42-75.
Hoadley, J. Stephen, 1975. The Future of Portuguese Timor, Occasional Paper No. 27, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hodges, Tony, 1984. ‘The Western Sahara File’, Third World Quarterly, 6(1): 74-116.
Hurst, Steven, 2004. ‘The Rhetorical Strategy of George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf Crisis 1990–91: How to Help Lose a War You Won’, Political Studies, 52 (6): 376-392.
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989. The military balance 1988/89. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989. The military balance 1989-1990. Oxford: Nuffield Press.
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999. The military balance 1998/99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000. The military balance 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, Alastair Iain, 1996. ‘China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence’, International Security, 20(3): 5–42.
Khadduri, Majid and Edmund Ghareeb, 1997. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim, Samuel S., 1994. ‘China’s International Organizational Behaviour’ in Robinson & Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press (401-434).
Kivimäki, Timo, 2000. ‘US-Indonesian Relations During the economic Crisis: Where Has Indonesia’s Bargaining Power Gone?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22(3): 527-549.
Kivimäki, Timo, 2003. US-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining: Strength of WeaknessI. Aldershot [etc.]: Ashgate.
Korn, Alina, 2004: ‘Israeli Press and the War against Terrorism: the Construction of the “Liquidation Policy”’, Crime Law and Social Change, 41(3): 209-234.
Kriesberg, Louis, 1992. International Conflict Resolution: the U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Kristensen, Hans M.; Robert S. Norris & Matthew G. McKinzie, 2006. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. FAS/NRDC.
Lampton, David M., 1973. ‘The U.S. Image of Peking in Three International Crises’, The Western Political Quarterly, 26(1): 28-50.
Lampton, David M., 2001. Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000. Berkeley [etc.]: University of California Press.
Lawless, Robert, 1976. ‘The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor’, Asian Survey, 16(10): 948-964.
Levey, Zach, 2004. ‘The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal’, Diplomatic History, 28(2): 255-275.
Liddle, R. William, 2000. ‘Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored’, Asian Survey, 40(1): 32-42.
Lilley, James R. & David Shambough, eds., 1999. China’s Military Faces the Future, Washington. D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Love, K.enneth, 1969. Suez: the twice-fought war. London: Lowe & Brydone.
Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, 1991. ‘Conflict and Conflict Management in the Western Sahara: Is the Endgame Near?’, The Middle East Journal, 45(4): 594-607.
Maghraoui, Abdeslam, 2003. 'Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute', Mediterranean Politics, 8(1): 113-126.
Matthews, Ken, 1993. The Gulf Conflict and International relations. London & New York: Routledge.
McAlister, Melani, 2001. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000. Berkeley [etc.]: University of California Press.
McLaurin, R. D., 1977. Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, and Syria. New York: Praeger.
Mearsheimer, John J. & Stephen M. Walt, 2006. ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, Middle East Policy, 13(3): 29-86.
Mohsen-Finan, Khadija, 2002. 'The Western Sahara Dispute and UN Pressure', Mediterranean Politics, 7(2): 1-12.
Mundy, Jacob A., 2004. ‘“Seized of the Matter”: The UN and the Western Sahara Dispute’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 15(3): 130-148.
Mundy, Jacob, 2006. ‘Neutrality or complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan takeover of the Spanish Sahara’, The Journal of North African Studies, 11(3): 275-306.
Nasser, G. A., 1956. ‘nationalisation of the Suez Canal speech’ (Speech of Ğamâl cAbd (‘a)l-Nāṣir at the celebration of the fourth revolution in Alexandria)
Neack, Laura, 1995. ‘UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?’, Journal of Peace Research, 32(2): 181-196.
Neff, Donald, 1981. Warriors at Suez. New York: The Linden Press/ Simon & Schuster.
Negbi, Moshe, 1986. ‘Paper Tiger: the Struggle for Press freedom in Israel’, Jerusalem Quarterly, 39: …
Norbu, Dawa, 1997. ‘Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality’, Asian Survey, 37(11): 1078-1095.
Ogelmann, N.; Money, J., & Martin, P., 2002. ‘Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy’. SAIS review, 22(2): 145-165.
Oren, Michael B., 1992. Origins of the Second Arab-Israel war: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers 1952-56. London: Frank Cass.
Pazzanita, Anthony G., 1994. ‘Morocco versus Polisario: A Political Interpretation’ The Journal of Modern African Studies, 32(2): 265-278.
Pollack, Josh, 2002. ‘Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002’, MERIA, 6(3)
Robinson, Thomas W. & David Shambaugh, eds., 1994. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ross, Madelyn C., 1994. ‘International Economic Behaviour’, in Robinson & Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press (435-452).
Rubin, Bary, 1990. ‘US Policy: End of a Peace Process, Start of a Gulf Crisis (1990)’, MERIA; this article appeared in Ami Ayalon, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1990, Volume 14, (NY, 1991)
Spiegel, Steven L., 1985. Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan. Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press.
Spiegel, Steven L., 1986. ‘United-States Relations with Israel - the Military Benefits’, Orbis-a Journal of World Affairs, 30(3): 475-497.
Saideman, S. M., 2002. ‘The Power of the small: The impact of ethnic minorities on foreign policy’, SAIS Review, 22(2) 93-105.
Salla, Michael E., 1997. ‘Creating the ‘Ripe Moment’ in the East Timor Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 34(4): 449-466.
Sautman, Barry, 1999. ‘The Tibet Issue in Post-Summit Sino American Relations’, Pacific Affairs, 72(1): 7-21.
Schoenbaum, David, 1998. ‘More Special Than Others’, Diplomatic History, 22(2): 273–283.
Senate Foreign affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2000. Final Report on the Enquiry into East Timor

<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-02/east_timor/report/index.htm>
Shain, Yossi, 2002. ‘The role of Diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution’, SAIS Review 22(2): 115-144.
Shambaugh, David, 1996. China and Europe: 1949-1995. London: the Contemporary China Institute.
Shambaugh, David, 2000. ‘Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors’, 42(1): 97-115.
Shlaim, Avi. & Avner Yaniv 1980. ‘Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel’, International affairs, 56(2): 242-262.
Singer, J. David; Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, 1972. ‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965.’ in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48l.
Singer, J. David, 1987. ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985’, International Interactions, 14: 115-32.
Smethurst, David, 2000. ‘Mountain Geography’, Geographical Review, 90(1): 35-56.
Solarz, Stephen J., 1979. ‘Arms for Morocco?’, Foreign Affairs, 58(2): 278-299.
Spiegel, Steven L., 1985. Making America’s Middle East policy, from Truman to Reagan. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
Stork, Joe, 1980. ‘The Carter Doctrine and Us Bases in the Middle East’, MERIP Reports, 90: 3-14 & 32.
Stork, Joe, 1980 ‘Saudi Arabia and the US’, MERIP Reports, 91: 24-30.
Stork, Joe, 1987. ‘Reagan Re-Flags the Gulf' MERIP Middle East Report, 148: 2-5.
Stremlau, John, 1994. ‘Clinton’s Dollar Diplomacy’, Foreign Policy, 97: 18-35.
Tanter, Richard; Mark Seden & Stephen R. Shalom, 2001. Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community. Lanham [etc.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Telhami, Shibley, 1993. ‘Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War’, Political Science Quarterly, 108(3): 437-452.
Tiffen, Rodney, 2001. Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East Timor. New South Wales: University of New South Wales Press.
United Nations, 1996. The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996. New York; United Nations department of Public Information.
U. S. Bureau of the Census (1951-2000) Statistical Abstract of the United States: 19--: 72nd-120th annual edition, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office
Vitalis, Robert, 1997. ‘The Closing of the Arabian Oil frontier and the Future of Saudi-American Relations’, Middle East Report, 204: 15-21 & 25.
Vitalis, Robert, 2002. ‘Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy and Hegemony in the Gulf’, Diplomatic History, 26(2): 185-213.
Von Hippel, Karin, 1995. ‘The Non-Interventionary Norm Prevails: An Analysis of the Western Sahara’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(1): 67-81.
Ward, Eilís & Peter Carey ‘The East Timor Issue in the Context of EU-Indonesian Relations, 1975-99’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 29(83): 51-74.
Whetten, Lawrence L., 1974. The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East. Cambridge Mass. & London England: MIT Press.
Wilcox, Clyde; Aiji Tanaka & Dee Allsop, 1993. ‘World opinion in the Gulf Crises’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37(1): 69-93.
Xu, Guangqiu, 1997. ‘The United States and the Tibet Issue’, Asian Survey, 18(11): 1062-1077.
Yacub, Salim, 2004. Containing Arab nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press.
Yang, Yun-yuan, 1987. ‘Controversies over Tibet: China versus India, 1947-49’, The China Quarterly, 111(3): 407-420.
Zoubir, Yahia H., 1990. ‘The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2): 225-243.
Zoubir, Yahia H., 1996. ‘The Western Sahara Conflict: a Case Study in Failure of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict’, California Western International Law Journal, 26(2): 173-231.
Zoubir, Yahia H. & Anthony G. Pazzanita, 1995. ‘The United Nations' Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict’, Middle East Journal, 49(4): 614-628.
Zoubir, Yahia H. & Karima Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005. 'The United States and the North African Imbroglio: Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara', Mediterranean Politics, 10(2): 181-202.
Zunes, Stephen, 1998. ‘The United States and the Western Sahara Peace Process’, Middle East Policy, 5(4): 131-146.
Appendix B. Additional Tables and Figures
Table VII. Truth Table Realist Causal Pattern

~C

S

~M

~E

Count

Consistency

~Int

1

0

1

1

2

1.000

1

1

1

1

0

2

1.000

1

1

1

1

1

2

1.000

1

1

1

0

0

1

1.000

1

1

0

0

0

1

0.673

0

1

0

1

0

1

0.623

0

0

0

1

0

1

0.392

0

0

1

1

0

1

0.372

0

Table VIII. Truth Table Neoliberal Institutionalist Causal Pattern



~E

D

I

Count

Consistency

~Int

1

1

1

1

1.000

1

1

0

1

1

1.000

1

1

0

0

2

1.000

1

0

0

1

4

0.838

0

0

0

0

2

0.530

0

0

1

1

1

0.375

0

Table IX. Truth Table Causal Pattern Domestic Approaches



T

~O

~A

R

Count

Consistency

~Int

0

0

1

1

3

1.000

1

1

1

0

1

2

1.000

1

0

1

1

1

3

0.789

0

1

1

0

0

1

0.425

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.333

0

0

0

0

0

1

0.000

0

Table X. Truth Table Combined Non-Realist Causal Patterns



~E

D

I

T

~O

~A

R

Count

Consistency

~Int

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

2

1.000

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

2

1.000

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1.000

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

1.000

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1.000

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1.000

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0.333

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.200

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0.000

0

Table XI. Expansion of Table V Analysis of necessary causes






Consistencya

Raw Coverageb

Unique Coverage

High security costs

0.120

-

-

~ High security costs

1.000*

0.781

0.098

Important security relations

0.560

-

-

~ Important security relations

0.600

-

-

Military vulnerability

0.240

-

-

~Military vulnerability

0.880

-

-

Economic vulnerability

0.480

-

-

~Economic vulnerability

0.720

-

-

Interdependence

0.280

-

-

~Interdependence

0.840

-

-

Relative Institutional Capabilities

0.720

-

-

~Relative Institutional Capabilities

0.520

-

-

Transgressor links

0.200

-

-

~Transgressor links

0.800

-

-

Occupied territory links

0.280

-

-

~Occupied territory links

0.760

-

-

Media Attention

0.320

-

-

~Media Attention

0.720

-

-

Resolve

1.000*

0.735

0.052

~ Resolve

0.120

-

-

The tilde (~) represents negation of a given factor.

p .05



a ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/ ∑(Yi)

b ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/ ∑(Xi)

Figure 2. Example process tracing Suez Crisis.





Appendix C. Concise elaboration on scoring per causal factor
Absence of military vulnerability

Absence of military vulnerability was measured by taking the relative sinc. score, which is a rough measure of military power taken from Correlates of War (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987). If the transgressor has a nuclear arsenal the case is fully out of the set of military vulnerability irrespective of the relative sinc. score (Table III in article).

Most transgressors are relatively strong states in terms of relative military capabilities. Only Morocco is mostly out of the set with a relative sinc. score of approximately 2-2.5% and scores a 0.25 in both periods. Iraq is at the cut-off point with a relative sinc. score of 7.5-9%, scoring a 0.5. Indonesian material capabilities are slightly below 10% of US capabilities during the cold war period, but still score a 0.75 on absence of military vulnerability because of its geographical characteristics and its very strong capabilities with respect to regional power Australia: in comparison with Australian capabilities Indonesia would score a 1.00. Following the end of the Cold War Indonesian capabilities exceed 10% of US’ capabilities. In all other cases – i.e. UK, France and Israel; China; and Israel post 1967 – the transgressors had very large relative sinc. scores and/or a nuclear arsenal, these cases are all fully in the set. The triple alliance of the UK, France, and Israel had combined capabilities of 32% of the Hegemon; Israel joined the nuclear club as early as the end of the sixties; and China, besides its nuclear arsenal, shows a steep increase from roughly 30-40% in the 1950s to roughly between 80 and 90% from 1970 onwards.1

To conclude, Morocco is more out than in (0.25) in both periods; Iraq scores 0.5, Indonesia is more in than out at 0.75 because of its relative sinc. score and geographic characteristics; and the triple alliance, China, and Israel are fully in the set of absence of military vulnerability. Based on the current study it is not possible to discount absence military vulnerability as part of a sufficient a causal combination with absence of economic vulnerability.
Interdependence

Interdependence refers to the importance for the transgressing state as a trading partner for the (regional) hegemon, and is measured by the share of the transgressor in the Hegemon’s imports and exports (see Table III). An important trading partner is less likely to undergo intervention, because the capable power would not like to risk the profitable trade relations.

Most of the transgressors – i.e. Iraq, Morocco, Israel, China 1950-90 and Indonesia - constituted a relatively small part of US2 trade. Following the war with Iran the share of Iraqi trade had greatly diminished and was with less than 0.2 percent of negligible importance to the US. Trade with China before 1970 and Morocco was never greater than 0.1 percent of total US trade. Israel, Indonesia, and China from 1970-90 were of slightly bigger importance, with Israel showing a slight rise from 1967 till 2000 from approximately 0.5 to 1 percent. The share of trade with Indonesia declined from approx. 1.5 % around 1975 to 0.6 % in the late 90s following the Asia crisis. Whereas China’s share increased rapidly in the 1970-90 period, but remained below 2% of total US trade.

The most important trading partners of the US were China following the Cold War and the United Kingdom and France during the Suez crisis. US-China trade grew steeply from 1.75 % in 1990 to an average of 5% in 2000 and was therefore coded a 0.75, whereas trade with the UK and France comprised more than 8% of total US trade, before and during the Suez crisis and was consequently coded as being fully into the interdependence set..

In sum, Iraq, Morocco, and China 1950-70 were coded as fully out of the set. Israel, Indonesia, and China 1970-90 more out than in, China 1990-2000 more in than out, and the triple alliance of UK, France and Israel fully in the set of interdependence. No Causal relationship between interdependence and absence of intervention was observed.


Absence of media attention of the transgression

The factor, absence of media attention, refers to the visibility of the transgression on the domestic agenda of the capable power. Incidents and the media attention paid to these incidents induce the international community to act. Populations pressure their governments to resolve the issue. It is assumed that when an issue or a conflict receives little attention, governments are more likely to remain indifferent.

A large part of the conflicts received little to no attention in the media of the capable power. Most notably, Tibet and East-Timor before the end of the Cold War and the Western Sahara received little media attention. Tibet, however, did become an issue of increasing salience during the post-Cold War period because of growing popularity of Buddhism and the subsequent appearance of the Tibetan issue in Hollywood blockbusters. Still, the attention for the Tibetan issue remained relatively small compared to other more visible conflicts.

Very high immediate media attention was paid to incidents in the case of Iraq, the Suez crisis, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza territories, and in East-Timor in 1999. Regarding the Iraq case, for example, analogies with Hitler flourished, Kuwaiti refugees made emotional testimonies, and the military build up could be closely followed from the living room. The Israeli occupation became visible during the 1967 conflict and later because of terrorist actions and the intifada of the Palestinian resistance. Israel was displayed in U.S. media as hardworking pioneers drawing parallels to the American forefathers. Especially following the Cold War, events like the dili massacre ensured that East Timor received a lot of attention especially within the Australian media. In addition to this, following the referendum in East-Timor, the Indonesian military began to wreak havoc in the province; drawing media attention to the large numbers of people that were murdered, displaced or forcibly deported to West-Timor.

In sum, we see absence of media attention in most cases that did not show intervention: Tibet and the Western Sahara in all periods and East Timor during the cold war. We also see high media attention in cases that led to subsequent intervention: the case of Iraq, the Suez-crisis, and post-Cold-War East-Timor. On the other hand in the case of Israel, a high level of media attention coincides with absence of intervention. No causal relationship between absence of media attention and absence of intervention was observed.
Transgressor links and absence of occupied territory links

The factors occupied territory links and absence of transgressor links are based on the domestic relations between the (regional) hegemon and either the occupied territory or the transgressor. It was assumed that inks between the populations of the transgressor and the (regional) hegemon and the absence of links between the populations of the occupied territory and the (regional) hegemon affect non-intervention.

We see very few domestic ties between the US and the transgressor, however in three cases there exist very strong ties with the transgressor. The US has strong domestic and cultural bonds with the UK, France and Israel in all periods.3 Moreover, only in a few cases there existed some domestic bonds with the occupied territory – i.e. Kuwait, Tibet, and East Timor.

Mainly because of the frequent World War II analogies in media reports and the depiction of the Kuwaiti’s as victims of a Hitler-like Saddam Hussain,4 the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was determined to be more out than in the set of absence of occupied territory links and was coded a 0.25.

With regard to the Tibetan issue there was initially little interest from the US public. Therefore, the first two periods were coded fully in and more in than out respectively. However, the predicament of Tibet has really come to life to the US public since the beginning of the 90s with the appearance of the issue in several popular movies. The renewed interest for Tibet has been stimulated by the growing popularity of Buddhism in the US as one of the fasted growing religions. This has in turn spawned various lobby activities, generating lots of media attention and has in turn led to pro-exile positions in US congress, even to the point that US congress refers to Tibet as an occupied country.5 Therefore, in the 1990-2000 period the conflict was coded more out than in the set of absence of occupied territory links with a 0.25.

The final important occupied territory link was between East Timor and regional power Australia. In the collective memory of the Australian populace, the Australians had been greatly indebted to the East Timorese people that had valiantly supported a small contingent of Australian troops against Japan during World War II, thereby thwarting a Japanese invasion of the Australian continent. This collective identity may have contributed to the high level of attention from the Australian public with regard to the brutalities committed by the Indonesian military.6 Consequently, Indonesia was scored a 0.25 on occupied territory links in both periods. No causal relationship between transgressor links or absence of occupied territory links and absence of intervention was observed.



Relative Institutional Capabilities

The factor relative institutional capabilities was constructed by taking the institutional capabilities of the transgressor and the occupied territory – i.e. access to General Assembly, General Assembly member, access to veto power, permanent member of the Security Council (see also Table III).



Only two cases are fully out of the set of relative institutional capabilities, scoring a 0.00: China in the 1950-70, because continental China was not yet a member of the UN; and Iraq because the occupied territory Kuwait was a member of the UN. In the case of Indonesia, the occupied territory did have access to the UN through Portugal, which was the former colonial administrator of the would-be-independent territory. Moreover, because Indonesia was a general assembly member, it scored a 0.25 in both periods. Morocco was also a general assembly member, but the Western Sahara had no real access to the UN and therefore scored a 0.5 in both periods. Israel is a full general Assembly member of the United Nations, but does not have a permanent seat in the Security Council and therefore no veto power. However, Isreal is a special case, because since the end of the 60s, the US increasingly made use of its Veto power on behalf of Israel, shielding it from condemnation or sanctions. Therefore Israel was determined to be more in than out of the set with 0.75. In all other cases – i.e. the UK, France & Israel; and China 1970-2000 – the transgressors were permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power, and where therefore fully in the set scoring a 1.00. No causal relationship between relative institutional capabilities and absence of intervention was observed.



1 More than 80% of hegemonic power is a very large figure indeed. Still, this score is a very rough measure and these figures can therefore be misleading as China has to bridge a real technological gap compared with the United States. Nevertheless, it is clear that China is fully out of the set of military vulnerability.

2 EU trade may be relevant in the post-Cold War phase, as it could potentially have intervened with economic sanctions. The EU trade picture is, however, quite similar to that of the US in all cases with the sole difference that the EU had a higher share of trade with China. Still, because the US is the most important intervener, post-Cold War China was coded a 0.75 instead of a 1.00. Further note that coding China with a 1.00 has absolutely no effect on the outcome of the analysis.

3 The ties between the US and its European allies are represented in the words of secretary of state Dulles. Explaining why the US should be moderate in its condemnation of Britain and France he states: “We are of the same civilization, the same beliefs and so on (Neff, 1981: 386). It was no secret that the United States kept close domestic and cultural ties with its Western European allies. The US Isreali cultural and domestic relations are widely documented; see for example Gilboa (1987), Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (1998), Melani McAlister (2001), David Schoenbaum (1998), Peter L. Hahn (2001), Yaakov Ariel (1991), Paul Boyer (1992), and William. B. Quandt (2005).

4 See for example Bennet & Paletz (1994), Hurst (2004, or McAlister (2001).

5 Sautman 1999

6 see Taylor (1991), Gunn (1997), Cotton (2004) Tanter e.a. (2001), Chalk (2001) and also Tiffen (2001)


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