In light of the above it is pertinent to note that al-Ghazzali did not accept the concept of infallibility ('Lsma).13s In the biographies of the Prophet (sira) and in Koranic exegesis (tafs7r) there exists a tendency, much akin to rabbinic Midrash, to create a more perfect personality for
the faith's model. This led to a widespread acceptance among Sunni dogmatists of the concept of prophetic immunity from sin and error. Among the shi'a, of course, infallibility was attributed to the imam to a greater degree than to the prophets.139 In al-Ghazzali's view no man is free of sin, it is a part of man's fundamental make-up. Al-Ghazzali, in many of his writings, makes clear his attitude of opposition to this basic aspect of Shi'ism.140 Furthermore, as regards the Sunni tradition, in discussing the requisite qualities and attributes of the community's leadership he explicitly denies infallibility as a requisite.141 In fact, al-Ghazzali advocated, for pedagogical purposes, the public discussion of the prophets' sins and their consequent punishment.142 All men are fallible
but they are also given the potential to overcome the weakness of their nature and achieve salvation.
The ground of sin is the pursuit and love of the mundane world. Such pursuit diverts man from the search for the hereafter and leads to the loss of salvation. The nature of sin is disobedience and its effect is the alienation of man from God. The specifics of any particular act of sinning are important in the process of correction but are irrelevant in defining the act-as sinful. It is the disobedience to God, in whatever form it is manifested, that removes one from proximity to God.143
It has already been noted that man's nature, combining appetites and intellect, make his sinning inevitable but also provides the wherewithal for overcoming the consequences of sin and achieving salvation. This comes through the intellect's gaining control over the appetites. The intellect masters the appetites by gaining knowledge and leading to gnosis. When it fails, totally or partially, it leaves the man with active appetites and ignorance (jahl), and such a state leads inexorably to sin. Knowledge, then, is the key to avoidance of sin.144
Belief, according to al-Ghazzali, is of two types. Firstly, there is the belief in God, His attributes and deeds. This belief belongs to the category al-Ghazzali refers to as the science of revelation ('ilm al-mukashafa). To be lacking in such faith is to be left with sheer unbelief and, therefore, perdition. It is the root of all belief and knowledge without which there can be no other. Secondly, there is the bel ef, termed faith (iman), in the practical duties and states of man's heart. i his al-Ghazzali refers to under the heading of the science of behavior ('ilm al-mu dmala). This belief is equated, in al-Ghazzali's writings, with knowledge. If one's belief in the practical sciences is defective, therefore, he is ignorant. Ignorance, again, is the condition that brings man to sin. It follows, then, that a person may indeed sin while still being a believer. A defect in the latter belief does not necessitate a defect in the former.145
Al-Ghazzali understood, however, as did others in the Christian and Jewish traditions, that sin is an inner process of disease and decay.146 Continuing sinfulness, which of itself is a defect only in the context of the practical sciences, must, little by little, erode the belief in the science of revelation. Eventually, if sin is left unchecked, the erosion of basic belief will lead to spiritual death, the loss of the heart.147 If one loses the heart, of course, salvation is precluded. In this context al-Ghazzali is fond of using the parable of the mirror. Man's heart is like a mirror which was originally brought to a high polish (i.e., man is born with a sound heart). If he sins he allows vapour and filth to encrust itself upon
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the surface of the mirror. If this process is not controlled and reversed the metal becomes so dull as to preclude the possibility of reburnishing. Once the mirror begins to dull it must immediately be cleansed and polished. Thus, a man, after sinning, must proceed forthwith to attain the knowledge that counteracts the dulling effect of ignorance and defective faith; if not, the course of the decay will proceed apace.148 This process of correction is, of course, repentance. It emerges from the confrontation between knowledge and ignorance. This confrontation, rooted as it is in human nature, is constant and enduring. Thus repentance is a life-long obligation flowing from the imperfection of man.149
In pre-Islamic Arabia the gods were worshipped with certain rites centering on public sacrifice. It has already been noted that the morality of the age seems to have had limited religious sanction or relevance. The pagan, insofar as he went beyond the mundane, lived in a world filled with magical forces to be propitiated and neutralized. Muhammad, in preaching the message of Islam, cancelled public sacrifice and relegated such ritual to a private and secondary status. He instituted public worship through prayer and taught obedience to God through the fulfillment of the religious commandments.150 This parallels, to a significant degree, a process of change in rabbinic Judaism just before and following the destruction of the second Temple of Jerusalem. In Judaism, the sacrificial cult was slowly losing ground to the institution of the synagogue so that, with the destruction of the Temple, a smooth transition to obligatory public prayer was possible. The developments of the later biblical tradition in which the sacrificial practices were increasingly limited by the prophetic call to worship through good works and piety, were decisive in the development of both talmudic Judaism and Christianity 151
The centrality of the pious life in obedience to the divine commandments was challenged by the proponents of sufism. The mystics believed that perfection and salvation could be achieved only by the search for knowledge and experience of God. Worship, on its various levels, was to be defined by its utility in the quest for the unitive state. Many of those travelling on the mystic Way developed an indifference to the observance of the commandments. They viewed the commandments, all normative piety, as a lower form of spirituality designed for the uninitiated masses. Al-Ghazzali sought to inculcate the mystics with an appreciation of the basic importance of obedience to God through the commandments as an ongoing requisite of salvation.152
Maimonides, representative of many medieval thinkers, in this regard
viewed the religious commandments as a means by which man, through control of his bestial impulses and the discipline of virtue, could perfect himself, morally and intellectually. Having thus perfected himself, man would be prepared for the ultimate knowledge of God. This knowledge, for Maimonides, was philosophical.'53 After attaining to this perfection the commandments are no longer functional.154 Al-Ghazzali's position is, to a great extent, parallel. The purpose of the commandments is to help man master his appetites, educate himself in virtuous living, and deepen his religious experience. Al-Ghazzali does not, however, view the intellectual knowledge of God to be the highest objective. Man's goal is knowledge, intuitive and experiential. In this world such experience is only attainable through deeds of obedience. Observance of the commandments, then, lead to knowledge ('ilm). This knowledge further refines his deeds which allow him to experience gnosis. Man's nature, furthermore, is such that there are always forces working to dull the surface of his heart. The result, for the pilgrim (sdlik), is a continuous need for further commitment to the pursuit of obedience through the observance of the commandments. Moreover, the higher a man is able to reach in his knowledge, the more he is able to infuse his observance with depth of intent. In the `way of the hereafter' the proper observance of the commandments require the combination of knowledge and action ('ilm wa- aural). The process creates a spiral of expanding knowledge leading to deeper observance which, in turn, brings man to greater knowledge. Clearly al-Ghazzali was addressing himself to both the shallow religiosity of the mechanically pious and the rootless spirituality of the libertine mystics.'55
In sum, then, salvation is to be found in the experience of God the Beloved. It is a constant state attainable only in the hereafter. It must, however, be cultivated in this life which is a proving ground of man's worthiness. Man's nature is such as makes sin and ignorance, the seeds of the disease of the heart, inevitable, but it is also such as allows him, through observance of the religious commandments, in an increasingly refined and deepened manner, to expand his knowledge of God. The continuing combination of knowledge and obedience, counteracting ignorance and heedlessness (ghafla), permits his attaining a measure of gnosis, the foretaste of salvation. This foretaste is itself a credit redeemable in the hereafter.
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V
During the early formative years of classical Islam there emerged a number of debates whose development and resolution were decisive in forming the body of doctrine that became accepted as orthodox.156 Among these was the debate over the individual and communal consequences of sin. The Koran indicates that sin leads man to hellfire.157 The questions that arose, in this context, concerned which sins or types of sin are those that result in damnation and, following such a determination, what status does one sinning in such a way have within the community of believers.
The Koran differentiates, as to punishment or forgiveness, between two groupings of sin: grave (kabira) and minor (saghira). This can be seen in the verse: IF YOU AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS AND ADMIT YOU BY THE GATE OF HONOUR.15s Thus it follows that minor sin does not, of itself, carry the punishment of hellfire. The people of Hell are those who commit grave sins. The ensuing debate concerned itself, then, with the immediate and ultimate disposition of such as commit sins considered grave.
The khdriji sectarians believed, to use Watt's terminology, in the `charismatic community'.159 Salvation was tied into membership in the community of believers which alone was the source of the people of Paradise. Moreover, salvation was dependent on the integrity of the community. A person who committed a grave sin was, therefore, to be excised from the community. Such a man is an unbeliever and of the people of Hell. These people, moreover, posing a threat to the salvation of the entire community, must be fought. killed if necessary. There were, however, variations within the khariji movement. The azariga, for example, were extreme in the application of this principle. They never succeeded in forming large or stable communities and were constantly in armed conflict with the established political and social order. The najdiyya, however, did succeed in establishing their own political unit. The practical demands of government were, no doubt, responsible for a more moderate approach. They asserted that isolated instances of sin did not make one an unbeliever or threaten the salvation of the community. Such a threat only followed persistent grave violations. In any case, all the khariji factions held the position that grave sin was unbelief and its consequence was eternal punishment16°
The mu'tazila, like most other Islamic groups, did not concur in this
attitude toward a salvational community. They held that one who commits a grave sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever. Rather, he occupies an intermediate position (manila bayna 'I-manzilatayn). Their outlook, as with most other early Islamic theologies, was more individualistic. They did concur with the kharijis, however, that the consequence
of grave sin is eternal punishment.L61
A third group, important for the emergence of the orthodox view, was the nuurji'a. They believed that the status of the grave sinner, both as to his being a believer and his ultimate fate, were matters that could not be judged by men. They were questions best left for God at Judgement. Man should, to be considered a believer in this temporal setting, make the profession of faith. This latter consideration evokes the question of the relative importance, as regards man's ultimate disposition, of faith
versus works.162
The orthodox position, as articulated by al-Ash'ari and his school, posits that all unbelievers will be assigned to eternal damnation. Those attaining the status of believer, however, have done so as a result of their profession of faith and not as a result of their works. If a man has faith, if he accepts the Islamic creed, he will gain entrance to Paradise. The ash art school did not ignore the effects of sin. Indeed, many may be purged in the fires of Hell for a time. Ultimately, however, all who profess the faith will be saved.163
Al-Ghazzali's position is, of course, very close to that of the ash art school. He does, however, refine this position in light of his understanding of both belief and sin. Polytheism (shirk), which is unbelief in the sphere of the revealed sciences, precludes pardon and condemns the unbeliever to perdition, eternally. If, on the other hand, a person is a believer he is assured of salvation.164 If the man dies a sinner, a defect in the practical sciences, he is punished with hellfire for a time. Only the sound heart is accepted by God. If the surface of the heart is dirtied, it must be cleansed by fire. After death the only fire is that of Hell. In such a case the function of hellfire is purgative. After the heart is restored to its purity, entrance to some level of Paradise is effected.165 In this there is no real difference from the ash'ari position. However, al-Ghazzali's understanding of sin, as previously expounded, is much more sophisticated. It is difficult for a man to continue in sin without an erosion of his belief in the revealed sciences. There is an intimate relationship, that of root and branch, between the areas known as faith and works. It is difficult for al-Ghazzali to envision a man persisting unrepentant in sin and remaining uncorrupted in faith. These two are
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not easily divisible.
Furthermore, while profession of faith is sufficient to preclude exclu
sion from the community and temporal punishment as an unbeliever,
al-Ghazzali is emphatic that ultimately it is of no avail if it is only ver
bal. Al-Ghazzali believes that it is beyond human competence to judge
the veracity of anther's profession of faith. Also, he does not believe
that a man's faith can, in this life, be confirmed or denied by his sins.
All of these judgments are beyond human ken. 166 God, however, will
indeed make these judgments.
Al-Ghazzali does not consider the community as the basic reference for or source of salvation. In line with the Koran, al-Ghazzali is committed to an individualistic approach. 167 Each man stands for judgement as an individual. Also, each person's struggle for salvation must be based on his own strengths and weaknesses as an individual.168 Al-Ghazzali, as Islam in general, does not present an institutionalized atonement procedure as might be found in Judaism and Christianity. 169 Public confession is neither required nor encouraged except in the case of social offense. 110 Indeed, since sin is derived from the pursuit of the appetites, the specific development of which varies from individual to individual, the quest for integrity of faith and works must differ from one person to another. The convenantal relationship in Islam is between the individual Muslim and God .171
In rejecting the community as the source of salvation al-Ghazzali does not lose sight of the societal environment in which man lives out his temporal life. Ignorance, for example, can only be removed by the spread of knowledge. As God entrusted the people's education to the prophets so it falls to the lot of.the learned doctors, the prophets' heirs, to continue this work.172 Yet, in terms of ultimate responsibility each learned doctor will be judged as an individual, as will his charges. His communal work is a personal obligation imposed by his level of knowledge or appointed position173 That all men have social responsibilities for which they are answerable to God is attested to by the fact that injustices against one's fellows are also transgressions against God and are breaches of the belief in the practical sciences.174 The community is not the source of salvation but rather it is, by divine will and command, an area of responsibility in which man can pursue either obedience or disobedience.
There is another interesting element in al-Ghazzali's treatment of sin. Sins, according to al-Ghazzali, may be measured in two ways: objectively or subjectively. Objective assessment may be made by recourse
to the Law. Yet, this alone would be an insufficient measure. Al-Ghazzali insists that the measurement of a sin must take into account the spiritual level (i.e. knowledge and perception) of the sinner. The transgression of an ignoramus is not the same violation as the identical infraction perpetrated by a learned doctor.175 Incidentally, the social or communal stature of the sinner, as well as the attendant publicity of the sin, are also important variables. The learned doctor, for example, is a model whose public actions will be emulated. A sin he commits publicly could lead others to sin. He would then be doubly culpable.'76
In discussing the division of sins into those grave and those minor, al-Ghazzali has recourse to a number of different standards based on the legal tradition. He is able, finally, to indicate that some sins are definitely known as being grave, others as minor, while some are in doubt.177 Yet, in continuing his analysis he introduces a subjective element asserting that a minor sin may become grave notwithstanding its status according to the objective sources of tradition through a person's persistence or faulty attitude.178
A determination of sin is based on a code of morality whose violation is an offense against God. The mu'tazila conceived of an autonomous morality which followed from rational premises. Al-Ghazzali rejects this conception out of hand. It is evident from the aforementioned that, for al-Ghazzali, the ethical is secondary to the religious. Revelation is the
sole source of morality.179 The basis of that morality is God's command. Sin is no more and no less than rebellion against God.1S0 This does not mean that Reason has no function in al-Ghazzali's system. To the contrary, even the sciences of the hereafter are categorized by him as rational sciences.181 Nonetheless, al-Ghazzali is insistent that morality is revelatory. -
If there is a little of the paradoxical in al-Ghazzali's attitude as regards Reason, such is not unique. There are a number of areas in al-Ghazzali's treatment of repentance that seem paradoxical. It may well be impossible to explain these beyond indicating that al-Ghazzali did not consider the Revival as directed to those to whom the whole truth might be exposed. Some things are mysteries, knowledge of which is reserved for the initiated. Yet, in introducing this work, it would seem useful to at least treat an example or two of the mysterious in the Kitab at-Tawba.
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VI
One of the most fundamental and contested issues in the formative years after the establishment of Islam was defining the implications of the prophet's assertion of God's omnipotence. An early and basic question that emerged from this issue pertained to a determination of man's basic nature. Does man act as a free agent or are his actions predetermined by God.
The khdriji movement, influenced to no small degree by their political philosophy and goals, were among the earliest advocates of the free will position.182 They were followed in this by the mu'tazila.183 On the other extreme were many in the traditionalist camp who, feeling that the assertion of human freedom impinged upon the absoluteness of God's omnipotence, upheld a position of pure and total determinism.184
Al-Ash'ari, reflecting the orthodox position, affirmed the determinists' position while adding that man was nonetheless responsible for his actions. He explained that God creates all of the component elements that lead to an action and then man chooses the act into which he is compelled. While the act is totally of God's creation, man acquires it (kasb, iktisdb). This formulation is quite obscure, proverbially So.' 85 Yet it is clearly an attempt to reaffirm God's absolute freedom while preventing fatalistic indifference to proper moral behaviour. Man's subjective feeling of choice is given formal status while, at the same time, there. is a recognition of God's acting out His will through men. This conception is foreign to Jewish thought as it is, in general, to Christianity. There does, however, exist a similar idea in the New Testament. 186
This conception is echoed by al-Ghazzali. Man, he says, is compelled into that choice that is his. He goes to great length to show how God creates the various sequential elements that lead man into acting in a predetermined manner.187 Yet, al-Ghazzali also promotes ideas that do not seem. to harmonize with this position. The very idea of repentance implies man's ability to choose and act upon that choice. In fact, al-Ghazzali asserts that the ability to turn from evil and correct one's mistakes is a fundamental characteristic of human nature. Al-Ghazzali, moreover, states that God does not require of man more than that of which he is capable. If so, God's commanding man presupposes his ability and volition. Finally, al-Ghazzali often emphasizes the ability of all men, at least potentially, to raise themselves to the ranks of the saints, prophets, and angels. 188
The basic paradox inherent in the various writings of al-Ghazzali on this subject is explicitly rendered in his presentation of the parable of the blind man and the elephant. In this parable of Buddhist origin, al-Ghazzali tells of a group of blind men who examine, by touch, different parts of an elephant in order to ascertain its nature. Each man, having felt a different part of the animal, describes the nature of the animal differently. All of the men spoke truthfully, yet none of them was able to encompass, in his description, the totality of the animal. Thus, says al-Ghazzali, those who take the positions of determinism, acquisition (kasb), and free well, have each stated a part of the truth but, if taken singly as embracing the totality of the truth, each position is only a dis
tortion of reality.189
Al-Ghazzali, the teacher and spiritual physician, had, it seems, a basic functional commitment to the position that man has the ability to make choices and act freely. He also understood that creation's order, as well as man's own previous actions, limit his freedom. The elements requisite for any choice must also exist. Moreover, al-Ghazzali no doubt felt the need, as did those before him (e.g., al-Ash'ari), to protect the theological integrity of God's omnipotence. Man is required to understand that nothing can be accomplished, even for the gnostic ('arif ), without divine grace.190 Yet as dependent as man is on God, he is not simply a vessel or automaton. He does, in a real sense, have the ability to exer
cise choice (ikhtiyar).191
Man, especially such as for whom al-Ghazzali wrote the Revival, should be, left with the mystery and paradox unresolved. It was, for al-Ghazzali, a mystery in pursuit of which the unenlightened would stumble-and which the illumined are forbidden to reveal .192
The debate about man's free volition was intimately tied to two other issues: Order and Justice. Do defined causes beget constant and predictable results. Most of the early Muslim theologians, in the context of their attitudes on the question of God's omnipotence, were atomistic in their view of the world. There does not exist a necessary cause-effect relationship. Rather, each moment is a fresh creation and expression of divine will. If man stands witness to the fact that a particular cause has always resulted in the same effect, he cannot, with certainty, project this as having a bearing on the next instance of that cause.193
Al-Ghazzali rejects this position. Happiness or misery in the hereafter are directly attributable to man's actions, good or bad. In fact, this causal relationship can be reduced to the lowest measurable degree. The scales of judgement are tipped to salvation or perdition even by the weight of
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an atom. His parable of the conquering king, which was cited previously, is eloquent testimony to this belief in causality. Each man's station in the hereafter, as in the newly conquered territory, is defined directly by the measure of his service or disservice. Again, in a different context, al-Ghazzali indicates that a person's fate is decided, in the minutest detail, by the quantity, duration, and intensity of his faith and works.194 This is not an insignificant statement of fact. The acceptance of the reality of this causal order was, in his view, the very foundation of the belief in the divine origin of the commandments and the revela
tion (shar).195
This causal order does not relate to the hereafter alone. Remaining in the moral sphere, al-Ghazzali viewed all calamity in this life as being a consequence of sin.196 Al-Ghazzali also viewed the struggle for moral correction to be a natural outcome of the maturation of the intellect. If the intellect is allowed to develop, it will naturally confront the appetites and induce man to repentance.197 According to Obermann, moreover, al-Ghazzali feels that acceptance of repentance is necessary in the sense that the very act of repentance results, causally, in the effects of acceptance (i.e. purification of the heart).198
The mysterious element is raised by al-Ghazzali in treating the ideas of God's mercy and wrath. At times a man will be granted salvation or condemned to hellfire when all the apparent causes point to a different result. The condemnation of an apparently righteous man or the saving of an evil one would argue for the lack of order and causality. Al-Ghazzali, however, emphatically asserts that there is always a cause even, as in such a case, if it be hidden and secret. These hidden causes (asbab haf 99 While there exists a causal order, it is God's order (sunna) and as such it is comprehensible only through revelation.
The other issue was that of Justice. There is order in creation, can this order be termed equitable. The Mu'tazila held, as one of their two most basic propositions, that it was part of the very nature of God that He be just and, according to some of their theorists, act in man's best interests. Thus they could speak of justice being an obligation of God200 Al-Ash'ari was convinced, no doubt, of God's being equitable. This concern is probably one of the motives for his struggling with man's responsibility in the face of the doctrine of determinism. Yet, he could not reconcile the idea of obligation with God's omnipotence, a concept that assures absolute freedom of will.
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Al-Ghazzali follows and elaborates al-Ash'ari's position. Is God just? His response is a resounding affirmative. God does not reward evil or punish obedience. Man's actions are requited with absolute equity 201 There exists almost infinite variety, among men, in the quantity and quality of their obedience or disobedience. God, then, prepares innumerable levels both in Paradise and Hel1202 A man's fate is measured according to his faith and works. These are, therefore, examined even to the measure of an atom203 If a man realizes genuine repentance it will surely be accepted 204 Even in the working of the mysterious elements of mercy and wrath al-Ghazzali explicitly insists on their being just 205 Can this justice, which is clearly an absolute, be termed an obligation or a necessity? Here al-Ghazzali responds with an emphatic negative.206 Justice, for al-Ghazzali, is a part of God's order and practice (sunna). This order is an act of God's will, He could have willed otherwise. Being a part of His order, however, it is not wholly comprehensible to man except insofar as God wills it to be so. The dimension of justice must also be one in which, for man, mystery remains a part.
Al-Ghazzali's low valuation of formal theology might, through these examples, be more readily understood. He felt that theology might be useful to treat the doubts of the spiritually sick, but it could not be a tool of the healthy seeker of God207 God, ultimately, cannot be known, as the philosophers would have it, through the exercise of reason and intellect. God, as His order, is beyond hul. in comprehension. The knowledge that al-Ghazzali would have the believer seek is the intuitive knowledge that comes solely through the experience of and proximity to the living and omnipotent God. Only in this manner, through illumination, can the mysteries be uncovered. The totality of the single truth in which al-Ghazzali believed could not even be taught, objectively, by
men.208
VII
Repentance was a concept accepted and valued in both Judaism and Christianity. It was an integral part of Muhammad's message. In al-Ghazzali, however, repentance is given added dimensions and significance. Repentance is not only the means of overcoming the consequences and influence of a `sick' past, it is the first step towards a `healthy' future. Given man's nature, and the ordeal of this mundane
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existence, it is also a -continuing part of man's quest for salvation.
Many of al-Ghazzali's insights and teachings can be seen in the earlier traditions of Judaism and Christianity. To a large degree, also, al-Ghazzali drew directly from earlier Muslim sources, traditional and mystic 209 The unique contribution that was al-Ghazzali's remains his mastery in two areas. Firstly, he possessed in his own person, the vast and variegated knowledge that was classical Islam. He was Koranic devotee, theologian, jurist, student of mystical theory, and defender of orthodoxy locked in debate with sectarianism and philosophy. He possessed this knowledge and integrated it into his own spiritual life and quest. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he was a master pedagogue. He was devoted to his fellow believers and was, because of his belief in the idea of renewal dedicated to sharing his quest.
It is in this light that we proceed to al-Ghazzali's Book of Repentance.
TRANSLATION OF BOOK XXXI OF THE
IIJYA' 'ULUM AD-DIN
[2]210 THE BOOK OF REPENTANCE
Which is the first book in the Quarter of Salvation of the Book of the
Revival of the Religious Sciences
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
Praise to God, with whose praise every book is prefaced; with whose invocation every discourse commences; by whose praise the people of felicity shall abide with ease in the abode of recompense; and by whose name the wretched are consoled, even if the bar is set down before them, and they are separated from the blissful by a portaled wall; inside thereof Divine Mercy obtains, while outside Divine Chastisement proceeds.
We turn unto Him in penitence, convinced that He is master of all masters and originator of all causes. We look to Him in anticipation, knowing Him to be the King, compassionate, forgiving and disposed to accept penitence. We blend dread with hope, not doubting that while being forgiving of transgression and receptive to repentance He is also stern in inflicting punishment.
We pray for His prophet Muhammad, God bless him, and for his family and companions, 211 a prayer that will rescue us from the terror of the place whence one will look down on the day of resurrection 212 and will secure for us nearness to and safe refuge with God.
But to proceed; Repentance from sin, by recourse to the Veiler of vices, Knower of secrets, is the starting point for the followers of the spiritual path, the capital of the successful, the first step of the aspirants, key to the straightening of the bent, the prelude of the selection and election for those who are brought close to God; and for our father Adam, God bless him,213 and all the other prophets. How appropriate it is for children to emulate their fathers and ancestors. It is small wonder if a son of Adam sins and does wrong, ,a- disposition which one who trans-
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