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1. Justifications for Copyright v Natural Rights Approach v


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Copyright

1. Justifications for Copyright v

1.1. Natural Rights Approach v

1.2. Consequentialist Approach v

2. Public Domain v

2.1. What is in the Public Domain? v

2.2. What Does the Public Domain mean? v

3. Copyrightable Subject Matter vi

3.1. Idea/Expression Dichotomy vi

Baker v. Selden (Supreme Court, 1879) p. 91 vi

American Dental Association v. Delta (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 103 vi

3.2. Historical Theses and Historical Facts vi

Hoehling v. Universal (Second Circuit, 1980) p. 98 vi

3.3. Idea/Expression in Fiction vi

MGM v. Honda (CD Cal, 1995) p. 284 vi

Titan Sports v. Turner Broadcasting (D Conn, 1997) p. 287 vi

3.4. Fixation vi

Williams v. Artic (Third Circuit, 1982) p. 66 vi

MAI v. Peak Computer (Ninth Circuit, 1993) p. 69 vi

3.5. Originality vi

Burrow-Giles v. Sarony (Supreme Court, 1884) p. 76 vi

Alfred Bell v. Catadalda Fine Arts (Second Circuit, 1951) p. 85 vi

Bleistein v. Donaldson (Supreme Court, 1903) p. 79 vii

Feist v. Rural (Supreme Court, 1991) p. 118 vii

4. Formalities vii

4.1. Virtues of Formalities vii

4.2. Ramifications of Abolishing Formalities vii

5. Derivative Works & Compilations vii

5.1. Derivative Works vii

Batlin v. Snyder (Second Circuit, 1976) p. 109 vii

Alva Studios v. Winninger (SDNY, 1959) p. 111 vii

Pickett v. Prince (Seventh Circuit, 2000) p. 115 vii

ERG v. Genesis (Ninth Circuit, 1997) p. 111 vii

5.2. Compilations viii

Mason v. Montgomery (Fifth Circuit, 1992) p. 125 viii

Feist v. Rural (Supreme Court, 1991) p. 118 viii

Trebonik v. Grossman Music (ND Ohio, 1969) p. 123 viii

Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card (Ninth Circuit, 1970) p. 124 viii

6. Protected Works viii

6.1. Facts and Databases viii

BAPCO v. Donnelly (Eleventh Circuit, 1993) p. 295 viii

CCC v. Maclean (Second Circuit, 1994) p. 299 viii

CDN v. Kapes (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 303 viii

Matthew Bender v. West (Second Circuit, 1998) p. 305 viii

6.2. Useful Articles viii

Masquerade v. Unique (Third Circuit, 1990) p. 230 ix

Mazer v. Stein (Supreme Court, 1954) p. 218 ix

Kieselstein v. Accessories by Pearl (Second Circuit, 1980) p. 220 ix

Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover (Second Circuit, 1985) p. 223 ix

Brandir v. Cascade (Second Circuit, 1987) p. 223 ix

6.3. Computer Programs ix

Apple v. Franklin (Third Circuit, 1983) p. 243 ix

Softel v. Dragon (Second Circuit, 1997) p. 256 ix

Whelan v. Jaslow ix

Computer Associates v. Altai (Second Circuit, 1992) ix

7. Elements of Infringment ix

ABKCO Music v. Harrissongs (Second Circuit, 1983) p. 321 x

Three Boys Music v. Bolton (Ninth Circuit, 2000) p. 319 x

Selle v. Gibb (Seventh Circuit, 1984) p. 322 x

Ty v. GMA (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 324 x

8. Exclusive Rights x

8.1. Reproduction Rights x

Intellectual Reserve x

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539 x

Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films (Sixth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard x

8.2. Distribution Rights x

Hotaling v. Church of LDS (Fourth Circuit, 1997) p. 335 x

Quality King v. L’anza (Supreme Court, 1998) p. 346 x

8.3. Derivative Works xi

Mirage Editions v. ART (Ninth Circuit, 1988) p. 383 xi

Lee v. ART (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 384 xi

Lewis Galoob v. Nintendo (Ninth Circuit, 1992) p. 388 xi

Micro Star v. FormGen (Ninth Circuit, 1998) p. 391 xi

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539 xi

Castle Rock v. Carol (Second Circuit, 1998) p. 377 xi

Steinberg v. Columbia (SDNY, 1987) p. 363 xi

8.4. Moral Rights xi

Gilliam v. ABC (Second Circuit, 1976) p. 396 xi

Dastar v. Fox (Supreme Court, 2003) S p. 374 xii

8.5. Public Performance xii

Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken (Supreme Court, 1975) p. 411 xii

Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne (Third Circuit, 1984) p. 412 xii

Armco? xii

On Command? xii

8.6. Public Display xii

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539 xii

9. Fair Use xii

9.1. What is Fair Use? xii

9.2. Purpose of Fair Use xii

9.3. Four Factor Analysis - § 107 xii

Harper & Row v. Nation (Supreme Court, 1985) xiii

Sony v. Universal (Supreme Court, 1984) p. 541 xiii

New Era v. Carol Publishing (Second Circuit, 1990) p. 514 xiii

Campell v. Acuff-Rose (Supreme Court, 1994) xiii

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco (Second Circuit, 1995) p. 551 xiii

Sega v. Accolade (Ninth Circuit, 1993) p. 527 xiii

Sony v. Connectix (Ninth Circuit, 2000) p. 532 xiii

10. Contributory and Vicarious Liability xiii

10.1. Vicarious Liability xiii

10.2. Contributory Liability xiii

Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom (ND Cal, 1995) p. 453 xiii

Sony v. Universal (Supreme Court, 1984) p. 541 xiv

Playboy v. Frena (MD Fla, 1993) p. 455 xiv

Sega v. MAPHIA (ND Cal, 1994) p. 456 xiv

Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom (ND Cal, 1995) p. 462 xiv

A & M v. Napster (ND Cal, 2000) p. 469 xiv

RIAA v. Aimster xiv

MGM v. Grokster (Ninth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard xiv

11. Technological Protection xiv

Lexmark v. Static Control (Sixth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard xiv

Universal v. Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) p. 581 xiv

11.1. Ramifications xiv

12. Authorship and Ownership xv

CCNV v. Reid (Supreme Court, 1989) p. 136 xv

Avtec Systems v. Peiffer (Fourth Circuit, 1994) p. 144 xv

13. Contracts and Copyright xv

Softman v. Adobe (CD Cal, 2001) p. 665 xv

Adobe v. Stargate xv

ProCD v. Zeidenberg (Seventh Circuit, 1996) p. 658 xv

14. Preemption xv

14.1. Preemption Doctrine in Intellectual Property xv

Goldstein v. California (Supreme Court, 1972) p. 609 xv

Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (Supreme Court, 1974) p. 613 xv

14.2. Express Preemption under § 301 xv

Harper & Row v. The Nation (Second Circuit, 1983) p. 625 xvi

Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista (DNJ, 2002) S p. 407 xvi

14.3. The Right of Publicity xvi

Midler v. Ford (Ninth Circuit, 1988) p. 629 xvi

Baltimore Orioles v. Major League (Seventh Circuit, 1986) p. 630 xvi

Brown v. Ames (Fifth Circuit, 2000) p. 633 xvi

14.4. Misappropriation xvi

INS v. Associated Press (Supreme Court, 1918) p. 640 xvi

NBA v. Motorola (Second Circuit, 1997) p. 643 xvi


1.Justifications for Copyright

1.1.Natural Rights Approach


  1. Investment of labor (Locke)

  2. Extension of personality (Hegel)

1.2.Consequentialist Approach


  1. Property model

  2. Economic incentive

2.Public Domain

2.1.What is in the Public Domain?


  1. Works with expired copyrights

  2. Ineligible works or aspects of works

  3. Works created prior to copyright

  4. Works used outside scope of copyright

2.2.What Does the Public Domain mean?


  1. Not a place

  2. Not a specific time

  3. Not free of charge

  4. Not free of legal restraints

  5. Not available immediately

Commons in the legal sense: use or access cannot be prevented.

3.Copyrightable Subject Matter

3.1.Idea/Expression Dichotomy


An idea may never be copyrighted but its expression may be. § 102 (b)

Exception: merger – when there is only one or very few ways to express an idea.


Baker v. Selden (Supreme Court, 1879) p. 91


Copyright on the expression of a system does not extend to forms that are essential to using the system.

American Dental Association v. Delta (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 103


A taxonomy is protected as an expression of a particular idea.

3.2.Historical Theses and Historical Facts

Hoehling v. Universal (Second Circuit, 1980) p. 98


Historical facts cannot be copyrighted.

3.3.Idea/Expression in Fiction

MGM v. Honda (CD Cal, 1995) p. 284


Movie characters may be copyrightable where they have specific characteristics.

Titan Sports v. Turner Broadcasting (D Conn, 1997) p. 287


A character can be copyrighted if specifically delineated and sufficiently unique.

3.4.Fixation


Work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression to be protected. § 102 (a)

Williams v. Artic (Third Circuit, 1982) p. 66


Fixation requirement is met where work is of sufficiently permanent nature to be reproduced or communicated for more than a transitory period.

MAI v. Peak Computer (Ninth Circuit, 1993) p. 69


A copy in computer RAM is ‘fixed’ for the purposes of the Act.

3.5.Originality

Burrow-Giles v. Sarony (Supreme Court, 1884) p. 76


A photograph can be an original writing, as “original intellectual conception”.

Alfred Bell v. Catadalda Fine Arts (Second Circuit, 1951) p. 85


Distinguishable variation, even if advertent, is enough to constitute originality.

Bleistein v. Donaldson (Supreme Court, 1903) p. 79


Images created for commercial, rather than artistic, purposes are protected.

Feist v. Rural (Supreme Court, 1991) p. 118


For protection, a work must be original to the author and possess at least some minimal degree of creativity.

4.Formalities


No longer required, but registration and deposit are.

4.1.Virtues of Formalities


  1. Information

  2. Certainty

  3. Filtering out

4.2.Ramifications of Abolishing Formalities


  1. Copyright is default

  2. Transaction costs

5.Derivative Works & Compilations


Protected § 103. Restricted to lawful use § 103 (a) and new material § 103 (b).

5.1.Derivative Works

Batlin v. Snyder (Second Circuit, 1976) p. 109


Something more than trivial variation is necessary for copyrightability.

Alva Studios v. Winninger (SDNY, 1959) p. 111


Great skill can substitute for trivial variation, particularly in copying rare work.

Pickett v. Prince (Seventh Circuit, 2000) p. 115


The copyright holder has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.

All derivative rights rest with the first copyright holder. § 106 (2)


ERG v. Genesis (Ninth Circuit, 1997) p. 111


Differences based on functionality or mechanics should not be considered. Original aspects of a derivative work should be more than trivial and must not affect the scope of any copyright protection in the existing material.

5.2.Compilations

Mason v. Montgomery (Fifth Circuit, 1992) p. 125


Selection, coordination and arrangement of factual information can be sufficiently creative to qualify as original.

Feist v. Rural (Supreme Court, 1991) p. 118


Facts are not copyrightable and the mere expenditure of labor to compile them will not make them so.

Trebonik v. Grossman Music (ND Ohio, 1969) p. 123


An arrangement of material in the public domain may be copyrighted if the arrangement is not in the public domain.

Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card (Ninth Circuit, 1970) p. 124


Works should be considered as a whole when considering copyrightability.

6.Protected Works

6.1.Facts and Databases


Facts are uncopyrightable. § 102 (b)

Databases are protected as compilations if they pass the compilations tests:



  1. originality in selection and arrangement

  2. thin protection

BAPCO v. Donnelly (Eleventh Circuit, 1993) p. 295


Listings of names and addresses in a directory are not protected.

CCC v. Maclean (Second Circuit, 1994) p. 299


Selection and arrangement of data can be protected, even where it is a logical response to the market, where originality is expressed therein. All compilations can be seen as an expression of an idea but, on balance, merger does not apply.

CDN v. Kapes (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 303


A process of creating a price by applying judgment creates original expression.

Matthew Bender v. West (Second Circuit, 1998) p. 305


Automatic pagination by computer does not create an original work.

6.2.Useful Articles


Protected under § 102 (5) & § 101, not including mechanical or utilitarian aspects.

Masquerade v. Unique (Third Circuit, 1990) p. 230


Masks are not a useful article.

Mazer v. Stein (Supreme Court, 1954) p. 218


The mass reproduction of an work, even as part of a useful article, does not make it solely utilitarian.

Kieselstein v. Accessories by Pearl (Second Circuit, 1980) p. 220


Articles may contain conceptually separable elements, which may be protectable.

Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover (Second Circuit, 1985) p. 223


Aesthetic features that are dictated by functionality are not protectable.

Brandir v. Cascade (Second Circuit, 1987) p. 223


If design elements are primarily functional, the work may become unprotectable.

6.3.Computer Programs

Apple v. Franklin (Third Circuit, 1983) p. 243


Operating system software is protectable on the same basis as applications.

Softel v. Dragon (Second Circuit, 1997) p. 256


Non-literal similarity of computer programs can constitute infringement.

Whelan v. Jaslow


Software which is identical in structure to existing work is infringing.

Computer Associates v. Altai (Second Circuit, 1992)


To determine non-literal infringement of software, the court should examine the plaintiff’s software in three stages:

  1. abstraction: defining the idea of the program and its modules

  2. filtration: removing functional, required, and public domain elements

  3. comparison: the protectable core against the defendant’s software

7.Elements of Infringment


Exclusive rights are set down in § 106. Proving copying requires

  1. direct evidence of duplication

  2. circumstantial evidence

    1. access (reasonable opportunity)

    2. substantial similarity

ABKCO Music v. Harrissongs (Second Circuit, 1983) p. 321


If the similarity is so striking, this will provide evidence of access.

Three Boys Music v. Bolton (Ninth Circuit, 2000) p. 319


Proof of access requires a reasonable opportunity or a reasonable possibility. Circumstantial evidence requires either a particular chain of events or wide dissemination.

Selle v. Gibb (Seventh Circuit, 1984) p. 322


Even with similarity, there must be proof of some access.

Ty v. GMA (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 324


If works are so similar that access is highly probable, that is evidence of access.

8.Exclusive Rights

8.1.Reproduction Rights


§ 117 provides that temporary copies for computer maintenance do not infringe.

Intellectual Reserve


A website which links to infringing works may materially assist infringement.

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539


Displaying thumbnail images from another website is not infringing but displaying full size images may be.

Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films (Sixth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard


Any sampling from a recording is infringement.

8.2.Distribution Rights


The owner has the exclusive right to distribute. § 106 (3)

Hotaling v. Church of LDS (Fourth Circuit, 1997) p. 335


A library ‘distributes’ a work when it places an unauthorized copy in its collection, includes it in its catalogue, and makes it available to the public.

The owner of a copy of a work has the right to sell or transfer it. § 109 (a)

There are limitations to this right for phonorecords and software. § 109 (b)

Importation of copies from outside the US is an infringement. § 602 (a)


Quality King v. L’anza (Supreme Court, 1998) p. 346


Copies made in the US and sold abroad can be imported without infringement.

8.3.Derivative Works


The right to create derivatives is the property of the copyright holder. § 106 (2)

Mirage Editions v. ART (Ninth Circuit, 1988) p. 383


Placing a print on a ceramic tile creates a derivative. First sale does not apply.

Lee v. ART (Seventh Circuit, 1997) p. 384


Placing a print on a ceramic tile does not create a derivative. Otherwise, any alteration creates a derivative and gives moral rights. It consumes the original.

Lewis Galoob v. Nintendo (Ninth Circuit, 1992) p. 388


An infringing derivative work does not have to be fixed but must exist in some concrete or permanent form.

Micro Star v. FormGen (Ninth Circuit, 1998) p. 391


For a work to be derivative, it must exist in concrete and permanent form and substantially incorporate protected material from the original work.

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539


Displaying thumbnail images from another website is not infringing but displaying full size images may be.

Derivative works can infringe without literal copying.

Tests for substantial similarity:


  1. subtractive approach (Altai, Nichols)

  2. total concept and feel (Ruth Greeting Cards, Krofft)

  3. question of fact or law, for judge and then jury (Castle Rock, Steinberg)

Castle Rock v. Carol (Second Circuit, 1998) p. 377


Substantial similarity requires copying to be quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the conclusion that infringement has occurred.

Steinberg v. Columbia (SDNY, 1987) p. 363


The definition of substantial similarity is “whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”

8.4.Moral Rights

Gilliam v. ABC (Second Circuit, 1976) p. 396


Unauthorized editing for broadcast constitutes copyright infringement.

Dastar v. Fox (Supreme Court, 2003) S p. 374


Trademark law cannot be used to create copyright-like protection.

VARA inserts § 106A, which gives limited moral rights to artists.


8.5.Public Performance


§ 106 (4). § 101 gives a broad definition of public.

Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken (Supreme Court, 1975) p. 411


Listening to a radio in a public place is not a performance. Overturned 1976.

Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne (Third Circuit, 1984) p. 412


A video display booth is a public place.

Armco?


Watching videos in a hotel room is not public performance

On Command?


Pay-per-view TV is a form of transmission and so infringes.

8.6.Public Display


§ 106 (5). Exemption for owner of copy in § 109 (c), teaching in § 110 (1), 112.

Kelly v. Arriba (Ninth Circuit, 1999) p. 539


Displaying thumbnail images from another website is not infringing but displaying full size images may be.

9.Fair Use

9.1.What is Fair Use?


  1. Privilege?

  2. Implied license?

9.2.Purpose of Fair Use


  1. Economic rationale

    1. High transactions costs

    2. Externalities

  2. Free speech

9.3.Four Factor Analysis - § 107


  1. Purpose and character of use

  2. Nature of copyright work

  3. Amount used

  4. Market harm

Harper & Row v. Nation (Supreme Court, 1985)


Publication of portions of a work soon to be published is not fair use.

Sony v. Universal (Supreme Court, 1984) p. 541


Time-shifting home recording is fair use. If a technology has commercially significant non-infringing uses, it may be legally sold.

New Era v. Carol Publishing (Second Circuit, 1990) p. 514


Critical biographies fall within fair use.

Campell v. Acuff-Rose (Supreme Court, 1994)


The commercial purpose of a work is only one element in the fair use enquiry.

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco (Second Circuit, 1995) p. 551


There may be no fair use even where there is no direct market for the works.

Sega v. Accolade (Ninth Circuit, 1993) p. 527


When it is the only way to gain access to ideas and functional elements in software, disassembly is fair use.

Sony v. Connectix (Ninth Circuit, 2000) p. 532


Fair use will prevent copyright being used to confer a monopoly on technology.

10.Contributory and Vicarious Liability

10.1.Vicarious Liability


  1. direct infringement

  2. ability to control

  3. direct financial benefit

10.2.Contributory Liability


  1. direct infringement

  2. knowledge of infringing activity

  3. induce, cause or materially contribute to infringing activity

Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom (ND Cal, 1995) p. 453


Infringement by users of an OSP does not lead to direct liability for the OSP.

Sony v. Universal (Supreme Court, 1984) p. 541


If your product has commercially significant non-infringing uses, you cannot be constructively aware of the infringing uses.

Playboy v. Frena (MD Fla, 1993) p. 455


Making images available online on a server makes the OSP liable for distribution.

Sega v. MAPHIA (ND Cal, 1994) p. 456


Charging access fee for online materials is direct and contributory infringement.

Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom (ND Cal, 1995) p. 462


OSPs facilitate distribution and so may be contributorily liable.

A & M v. Napster (ND Cal, 2000) p. 469


Peer-to-peer system with centralized control and advertising is vicariously liable.

RIAA v. Aimster


Where there is no central control, there is no vicarious liability.

MGM v. Grokster (Ninth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard


Where there is no central control or indexing, there is no liability.

Safe harbor for OSPs § 512


11.Technological Protection


DMCA – circumvention and distribution of devices prohibited § 1201

Lexmark v. Static Control (Sixth Circuit, 2004) Blackboard


DMCA cannot be used to control after-sales market. The access control measure must prevent access to content, not the device itself.

Universal v. Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) p. 581


The access control measure must be effective, not perfect. Linking to websites is distribution of device. Fair use defenses do not apply to § 1201.

11.1.Ramifications


  1. Innovation policy (blocking public access)

  2. Free speech (Felten, Corley)

  3. Privacy § 1201 (i)

  4. Competition and anti-trust (Lexmark, Skylink, Sony v. Gamemaster)

12.Authorship and Ownership


Initial ownership is the property of the author. § 201 (a)

For joint authorship:



  1. Each contribution must be separately copyrightable. Erickson p. 130

  2. There must be an intention to be joint authors. Aalmuhammed p. 131

Works made for hire § 101 are property of the employer. § 201 (b)

CCNV v. Reid (Supreme Court, 1989) p. 136


Who is an employee is determined by applying the law of agency.

Avtec Systems v. Peiffer (Fourth Circuit, 1994) p. 144


Work must be done in “scope of employment”, according to the law of agency.

Collective works are separately owned. § 201 (c)



Ownership can be transferred. § 101

13.Contracts and Copyright


Contracts give copyright holders an opportunity to exclude e.g. fair use.

Softman v. Adobe (CD Cal, 2001) p. 665


A software reseller is not bound by a EULA as it does not assent to it.

Adobe v. Stargate


What are being sold are licenses and the reseller is also bound by it.

ProCD v. Zeidenberg (Seventh Circuit, 1996) p. 658


Provided there is assent under the UCC, the contract binds the user.

14.Preemption

14.1.Preemption Doctrine in Intellectual Property

Goldstein v. California (Supreme Court, 1972) p. 609


States can create copyrights where Congress has “drawn no balance”.

Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (Supreme Court, 1974) p. 613


States can create trade secret protections as there is no conflict with patent law.

14.2.Express Preemption under § 301


To determine if there is a conflict:

  1. Is the subject matter of the state law claim the same as § 102/103?

  2. Does the state law claim give the same scope of protection as § 106?

Harper & Row v. The Nation (Second Circuit, 1983) p. 625


There must be a qualitative difference between the state law claim and the Act.

Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista (DNJ, 2002) S p. 407


The court will look beyond the claim itself, to see what the plaintiff seeks.

14.3.The Right of Publicity

Midler v. Ford (Ninth Circuit, 1988) p. 629


Publicity is a property right.

Baltimore Orioles v. Major League (Seventh Circuit, 1986) p. 630


The performance of baseball players is fixed in broadcast and thus preempted.

Brown v. Ames (Fifth Circuit, 2000) p. 633


A claim for misappropriation is not preempted.

14.4.Misappropriation

INS v. Associated Press (Supreme Court, 1918) p. 640


Taking another’s reporting is misappropriation and unfair competition.

NBA v. Motorola (Second Circuit, 1997) p. 643


Copyright law preempts the misappropriation claim. Only a narrow “hot news” claim survives.




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